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Recent and expected future developments in the domains of artificial intel-
ligence, intelligent software agents, and robotics will create a new kind of
environment where artificial entities and human beings seamlessly operate
together to offer services. The users of these services may not necessary
know whether the service is actually offered by a human being or an artifi-
cial entity. This kind of environment raises a requirement for using a joint
terminology between human beings and artificial entities, especially in the
domain of the epistemic quality of information. The epistemic quality of
information will play an important role in this kind of intelligent distrib-
uted systems. One of the main reasons is that it affects the dependability
of those systems.
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief including their
nature, sources, limits, and forms. Human beings have been interested in
epistemology since the times of ancient Greece, as knowledge is seen to be
an important factor of human beings’ actions and success in the actions.
We are of the opinion that the scene of epistemology is changing more than
ever before: artificial intelligence has entered into the domain. In this thesis
we argue that first, an intelligent software entity is capable of having beliefs
and second, both knowledge and justified belief will be important factors
in the dependability of AI–based agents’ actions and success in the actions.
iii
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We carry out a theoretical analysis of the epistemological concepts—belief,
justified belief, and knowledge—for the context of intelligent software agents
and dependable intelligent distributed systems. We introduce enhanced
definitions of justified belief and knowledge, which we call Pragmatic Pro-
cess Reliabilism. These definitions can be adopted into dependable intelli-
gent distributed systems.
We enhance the dependability taxonomy in order to cope better with the
situations created by learning and the variation of the epistemic quality
of information. The enhancements comprise the following concepts: at-
tributes (skillfulness, truthfulness, and serveability), fault classes (training
fault and learning fault), failure (action failure and observed failure), and
means (relearning and retraining).
We develop a theoretical framework (Belief Description Framework – BDF)
to perceive, process, and distribute information in order to verify that our
ideas can be implemented. We model the framework using Unified Mod-
elling Language in order to demonstrate its applicability for implementa-
tion. First, we define relationships between epistemological concepts and
software entities (classes). Second, we show that information, belief, jus-
tified belief, and knowledge can be specified as classes and instantiated as
objects. The Information class defines the environment—a kind of informa-
tion ecosystem—of information. It is the central point. It has relationships
with other classes: Proposition, Presentation, EpistemicQuality, Warrant, Se-
curity, Context, and ActorOnInformation. Third, we specify some important
requirements for BDF. Fourth, we show by modelling BDF using the UML
modelling method that BDF can be specified and implemented.
v
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In this thesis we use several terms that have a different meaning in the dis-
ciplines of computer science and philosophy. Therefore, we use the follow-
ing conventions to make the distinction between the meanings of computer
science and philosophy:
1. Superscript ”p” is used when a term has the philosophical meaning.
For example, reliabilityp refers to the philosophical meaning of the
term reliability.1
2. Superscript ”c” is used when a term has the meaning specified in
computer science. For example, reliabilityc refers to the meaning of
the term reliability in computer science.
3. Subscript ”bdi” is used when we refer to the belief–desire–intention
type of intelligent software agent. For example, ISAbdi is one type of
intelligent software agent.
Use of fonts:
1. Italics is used to emphasize an important term, a key part of a text,
or other points worth of special attention.
2. Bold is used to emphasize a term or an abbreviation.
3. Small capitals is used in definitions defined by us.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the future more and more information services are provided by co-
operative groups of human beings and intelligent software agents (here-
inafter ISA) based on artificial intelligence (hereinafter AI) [2]. The users
of these services may not necessary know, or do not even want to know,
whether a service is actually offered by a human being or an artificial en-
tity. When a user of information—either a human being, a robot, or an
ISA—obtains a piece of information in order to utilize it, then the follow-
ing questions can be raised: What is the epistemic quality of the piece of
information? Is it knowledgep, justified beliefp, beliefp, nonsense, or what?
Should the user rely on it when planning and carrying out further actions?
We argue that epistemology provides proper methods to answer these ques-
tions also in the domains of AI and computer science. And the joint context
of human beings and ISAs also raises a requirement for using the same ter-
minology between human beings and artificial entities, especially in the
domain of the epistemic quality of information.
Epistemology is the study of knowledgep and justified beliefp including
their nature, sources, limits, and forms. Human beings have been interested
in epistemology since the times of ancient Greece, as knowledgep is seen to
be an important factor of human beings’ actions and success in the actions.
Now, the scene of epistemology is changing more than ever before: AI
has entered into the domain. In this thesis we argue that knowledgep and
justified beliefp will also be important factors of AI–based agents’ actions
and success in their actions.
The epistemic quality of information is related to the dependability the-
ory of computer science because it affects the dependability of intelligent
distributed systems (hereinafter IDS). Incorrect, false input information
most probably causes a failure of a service provided by IDS. There are two
major aspects that we need to analyse and synthesize in order to establish
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a firm foundation of the epistemic quality of information for the depend-
ability theory. The aspects deal with the existing dependability theory of
computer science and the concepts of information, beliefp, justified beliefp,
knowledgep, truth, and trustworthiness in epistemology.
The main research questions in the domain of computer science are as
follows:
1. Is it possible to design and implement an ISA which complies with
human beings’ epistemic concepts of information?
2. In which cases does an artificial epistemic agent deal with knowledgep,
justified beliefp, and beliefp when it perceives or distribute informa-
tion in the context of IDS?
3. What is the relationship between trust and the epistemic quality of
information in the contexts of ISA and IDS?
4. What are the grounds for an artificial epistemic agent to trust in-
formation provided by IDS?
5. What kind of enhancements are required to the dependability tax-
onomy of computer science so that it better address the issues related
to learning and the varying epistemic quality of information?
The main research questions in the domain of epistemology are as follows:
1. Is it possible for an artificial entity, such as ISA, to have beliefsp,
justified beliefsp, and knowledgep?1
2. What kind of concepts are knowledgep, justified beliefp, beliefp, truth,
and trustworthinessp in the contexts of ISA and IDS?
3. Is it possible and beneficial to define joint definitions of beliefp, jus-
tified beliefp, and knowledgep for both artificial entities and human
beings?
In this thesis we have mainly a theoretical approach to the above ques-
tions, because practical implementations and the proofs of developed con-
cepts would require a multidisciplinary (artificial intelligence, human com-
puter interaction, epistemology, psychology, and sociology) project.2
1This is related to the issue of anthropomorphism.
2This kind of project requires a lot of manpower which is outside the possibilities of
this research project. The implementation and the proofs of concepts will be the topic
of the future research.
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Recent developments in AI, ISAs, and robotics have shown that ar-
tificial entities do exhibit human–like behaviour and therefore indicating
a possibility to have beliefsp, justified beliefsp, and knowledgep. In addi-
tion, foundational questions and challenges in the development of AI are
philosophical in nature dealing with concepts of knowledgep, representa-
tion, and action. In the year 1980 John R. Searle raised a long standing
and severe dispute about the capabilities of computer systems to be a mind;
thus, to understand, to have intentionsp, to have beliefsp, etc. In his article
Minds, Brain, and Program he used the now famous Chinese Room argu-
ment to state the following main theses: (1) Intentionality in human beings
is created by causal features of the brain and (2) instantiating a computer
program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality [128]. One
of the main objectives was the view that formal computations on symbols
could not produce thought. The reason is that there is no way to attach
any meaning to the formal symbols because syntax and internal connec-
tions are insufficient for semantics [27]. We argue that artificial entities
such as ISAs are capable to have, for example, beliefsp, justified beliefsp,
and knowledgep. We will discuss our arguments about these issues in more
detail in Chapter 3.
Our intention in this thesis is to establish a solid, theoretical foundation
for beliefp, justified beliefp, and knowledgep for the context of IDS, where
an ISA provides—possibly in co–operation with human beings—human be-
ings and other ISAs with dependable information when acting on behalf of
human beings in dependable intelligent distributed systems (hereinafter
DIDS). This will comprise a requirement analysis, natural language (as a
meta–language) descriptions of justification theories, truth theories, and
knowledge theories.
We discuss the epistemological concepts of beliefp, justified beliefp, and
knowledgep, so that they can be better understood in the contexts of ISA
and IDS. We also enhance the concepts of justified beliefp and knowledgep
and adapts these concepts for the contexts of ISA and DIDS. The adapt-
ation of the above–mentioned epistemic theories means to select, modify,
or define the theories to be proper in the context of ISA; hence, to be
applicable for the theories of dependable computing. The adaptation in-
troduces a new viewpoint to epistemology: traditional epistemology is the
study of concepts used by human beings, but our approach is also to study
how to implement those existing epistemological concepts in the context
of artificial entities. In addition, the concepts of information, truth, and
trustworthiness are explored in order to form a firm ground to discuss the
epistemological concepts.
4 1 Introduction
We utilize in this thesis the concept of ISA as the abstract model of
an intelligent software entity and especially the version of ISA where the
concept is based on a Belief–Desire–Intention (hereinafter BDI) architec-
ture (hereinafter ISAbdi) [114]. The BDI architecture is based on Michael
Bratman’s theory of human practical reasoning [24]. There are other pos-
sibilities for the abstract model of the intelligent software agent, such as
neural networks, but from the conceptual point of view they are not as well
structured as BDI for the purpose of this thesis.
We introduce a formal Belief Description Framework (hereinafter BDF)
model using an UML3 representation. The main role of the model is to
act as a bridge between the epistemological theories and an implementa-
tion. The implementation model will describe a basic architecture, which
provides methods to operate on beliefsp, justified beliefsp, and knowledgep.
We use UML because it is widely used offering a graphical model that
enables different views of a system. And it has become a de–facto stand-
ard modelling language for software engineering. UML has good extension
mechanisms and semantic variation possibilities, which enable creation of
profiles that can be adjusted to the purposes of various applications. A re-
quired vocabulary can be added directly into a model through the definition
of classes, methods, attributes, and states.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
When people share propositional information with the intention also to ex-
press the level of their confidence in information, they quite often begin
their statement with phrases I/we know that ..., I/we (strongly) believe
that ... because ..., or I/we believe that .... And based on the used phrase a
receiver establishes his/her confidence in information.4 When today’s com-
puter systems distribute propositional information, outputs are usually only
propositions expressing information without any indication of the level of
confidence in information. And users tend to consider distributed inform-
ation to be true (knowledgep) because we usually tend to trust computers.
But, as mentioned above, in the future we may not know (or even do not
care, at all) whether the source of information is a human being or an ISA;
therefore, there is a need for using same concepts in the context of inform-
ation exchange regardless of the source of information. Hence, there is a
requirement for ISAs to categorize the epistemic quality of information in
the similar way as human beings do it. We argue that epistemology provides
3Unified Modeling Language
4Of course, there are also other factors affecting the confidence level.
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proper concepts for the categorization: knowledgep, justified beliefp, and
beliefp.
In the Internet there are numerous web services, social networking ser-
vices, and other information distribution services, from which users—either
human beings or ISAs—can obtain information. The main trustworthiness
feature of these services5 usually is that users rely on (or do not rely on)
the distributors of information meaning that the distributors are who they
claim to be.6 And the users trust on whatever basis that the distributors
provide them with the correct information via dependable information dis-
tribution channels. However, several incidents have indicated that this is
not a satisfactory solution [47]; for example, see the scenarios in Section
2.1.1. Retrieving information from the Internet requires an epistemically
virtuous use of the Internet; however, this does not guarantee that a user
will acquire justified beliefsp or knowledgep [68]. One of the problems is
that users usually trust information distributors without any real warrants
supporting trustworthiness. In order for IDS to be dependable demands
additional solutions.
The epistemic quality of the piece of information, whether it is knowl-
edgep, justified beliefp, beliefp, or information, has or at least should have,
an effect on actions taken by the users of the piece of information. There-
fore, the users, especially artificial epistemic agents should have an appro-
priate access to the epistemic quality of the piece of information, meaning
that the epistemic quality should be embedded somehow in the piece of
information.
Human beings have several sources of their motivation to carry out an
action, some of which are subconscious; thus, information is only one of the
sources of motivation, though in some cases an important one. But in the
case of ISAbdi information is the main source of motivation to execute an
action. Therefore, the epistemic quality of information has a significant role
in the motivation of ISAbdi to select and carry out correct actions and thus
being one of the most important factors in the success of ISAbdi’s actions.
In order to analyse and synthesize the role of the above–mentioned
epistemic concepts we need to explicate several issues, such as:
1. Can ISAbdi have beliefs
p or are beliefsp something only for human
beings? What is the role of anthropomorphism?
2. What is the role of truth in the environment of ISAbdi? If truth has
a meaningful role, then which truth theory is the proper one?
5This is the case at the time of writing this thesis (25th May 2020)
6This is usually implemented with available certification services.
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3. Can ISAbdi have justified beliefs
p? If so, what justifies them? In
other words, what is the most appropriate justification theory in the
environment where ISAbdi operates?
4. Can ISAbdi have knowledge
p or is knowledgep something only for hu-
man beings? If ISAbdi can have knowledge
p, then which theory of
knowledge is appropriate in the environment where ISAbdi operates?
7
5. What are the sources of knowledgep and the sources of justification
for ISAbdi?
6. What is the relationship between trust and knowledgep, justified
beliefp, and beliefp in the context of ISAbdi?
7. What would be the role of beliefp, justified beliefp and knowledgep
in the dependability of ISAbdi and DIDS? This is one of the key
questions, which needs to be answered in this thesis. The roles of
knowledgep and justified beliefp are somehow heavily intermixed with
the role of trustworthiness in the services provided in the Internet.
What is the relationship between them? Could knowledgep and justi-
fied beliefp provide a better approach than today’s methods to achieve
trustworthiness to offer more dependable information services in the
Internet?
8. An important question from the viewpoint of computer science is
that can beliefp, justified beliefp and knowledgep be modelled and
implemented?
1.2 Contributions
The main and original contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. A new, epistemological approach to the dependability of ISAbdi
and IDS. It is based on the epistemological theories and epistemic
quality of information. This is the major contribution of this thesis.
2. Better understanding about dependability issues related to the
epistemic quality of information in DIDS including ideas to design and
use them. We discuss this issue in Section 2.1.1 Scenarios, in Chapters
4 Belief as Dependability Factor and 6 Belief Description Framework.
7As we currently have a firm confidence in ISAbdi having knowledge, we need to explore
how to explicate current human–related knowledge theories (e.g. reliabilism, testimony)
to the environments of ISAbdi (if any new explication is needed).
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3. Careful analyses of epistemic value, truth, trust, and trustworthi-
ness in the joint context of ISAs and human beings. We discuss these
topics in Sections 3.2 Epistemic Value, 3.3 Truth, and 3.7 Trust.
4. Enhanced definitions of justified beliefp and knowledgep to be
adapted in the joint context of ISAs and human beings. We introduce
and discuss these definitions in Sections 3.4 Belief, 3.5 Justified Belief,
and 3.6 Knowledge.
5. New concepts of dependability taxonomy for intelligent distributed
systems. We introduce these in Chapter 5 Enhancement to Depend-
ability Taxonomy.
6. Belief Description Framework that introduces one proposal to
model the ISAbdi’s states of belief
p, justified beliefp, and knowledgep
including how to manage different epistemic quality of information.
We introduce this in Chapter 6 Belief Description Framework.
7. A simple UML model to show implementability of Belief Descrip-
tion Framework. We introduce this in Appendix Belief Description
Framework.
1.3 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is structured into seven topics as follows: The first chapter In-
troduction presents the motivation, the problem statement, and the main
results. The second chapter Background and Overview provides the reader
with background information and an overview of the topics, such as scen-
arios, dependability taxonomy, and logical issues of knowledgep and beliefp
related to ISAbdi.
The third chapter Six Concepts examines the epistemological concepts
in the context of ISAbdi and introduces an approach to the definitions of
truth, beliefp, justified beliefp, and knowledgep. It also discusses trust and
trustworthiness to explicate them in the context of ISAbdi.
The fourth chapter Beliefs as Dependability Factors introduces beliefsp,
justification and justified beliefsp, and knowledgep as dependability factors.
It also discusses some major problems with implementing beliefp–related
dependability.
The fifth chapter Enhancements to Dependability Taxonomy introduces
required enhancements of the dependability taxonomy.
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The sixth chapter Belief Description Framework presents the model of
a framework to represent, manage, and distribute knowledgep, justified
beliefp, and beliefp.




2.1 Introduction to Dependability Issues
In this section we introduce scenarios which are used to illustrate our mo-
tivations and problems related to the epistemic quality of information. We
also use the scenarios to evaluate of our solutions. The scenarios deal
with issues such as untrue tweet, the correctness of diagnoses, and the de-
pendability of a traffic information service. We also present the part of
Jean–Claude Laprie’s et. al. dependability theory that is relevant to this
thesis.
2.1.1 Scenarios
In this section we introduce and discuss three illustrative scenarios that
will attract attention to the importance of beliefp, justified beliefp, and
knowledgep in the context of dependable IDS. The first scenario discusses
knowledgep, justified beliefp, and beliefp and their significance in a social
media. The second scenario presents an emergency medical case, where
beliefp, justified beliefp, and knowledgep play significant roles in the proper
treatment of a patient. The third scenario examines a traffic information
service which illustrates some of the implementation issues of our Belief
Description Framework.
When discussing these scenarios we assume proper justification and
knowledge theories to be forms of reliabilism1, and testimony2 to be as
1Alvin I. Goldman: ”If S’s belief in p at t results from a reliable cognitive process, and
there is no reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S, which had it been used
by S in addition to the process actually used, would have resulted in S’s not believing p
at t, then S’s belief in p at t is justified.”
2Jennifer Lackey: ”For every speaker S and hearer H, H comes to know that p via S’s
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a transfer method of justified beliefp and knowledgep. In Chapter 3 we
motivate this assumption.
Faked White House Bomb Tweet Causes Stock Market Panic
On the 23rd of April, 2013, at 13:07, the following tweet was delivered from
the Associated Press [36]: ”Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House
and Barack Obama Injured.”
The stock market reacted immediately. The Dow Jones fell by in a
matter of seconds about 140 points, which is more than a full per cent of
its value. When it had become clear that the tweet was not true, the Dow
Jones regained almost everything it had lost within 10 minutes of the untrue
tweet.
It turned out that the Twitter3 account of the Associate Press had been
cracked.
Reports suggest more than 20 billion dollars worth of equity positions
changed hands on the New York Stock Exchange during the brief trading
hiccup.
Thus, some traders made big profits, and some traders made significant
losses within those 10 minutes. Therefore, we are entitled to raise several
questions: Why did this happen? Why did traders on Wall Street not
collide with social media, when a false tweet from a trusted source was
distributed? Why did traders rely on this piece of information? Is Twit-
ter trustworthy? Is The Associated Press4 trustworthy? Do not traders
care? Can this kind of incident be avoided in the future by having more
trustworthy social media services? In this thesis we address some of these
questions.
This scenario points out an attitude of trusting without any specific
formal warrant for information on a well–known information distributor to
distribute only news that are true.5 In the future there will be more and
more automatically generated—written by AI–based applications—news,6
and therefore, this kind of attitude is no longer acceptable. There will be
statement that p only if (i) S’s statement that p is appropriately connected with the fact
that p; (ii) H has no defeaters indicating the contrary.”
3www.twitter.com
4https://www.ap.org
5The Associated Press is one of the oldest news agents and considered to be trust-
worthy.
6An interview with Professor Kristian Hammond by Steven Levy in Wired
Magazine; see url www.wired.com/2012/04/can-an-algorithm-write-a-better-news-story-
than-a-human-reporter/all/
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a requirement to provide some kind of a warrant of the epistemic quality
associated with news.
We can consider the tweet ”Breaking: Two Explosions in the White
House and Barack Obama Injured.” to be a combination of three proposi-
tions expressed in ”tweet language”7. The propositions are as follows:
1st proposition: Breaking : This is a breaking news item.
2nd proposition: Two Explosions in the White House: There have been
two explosions in the White House.
3rd proposition: Barack Obama Injured : President Barack Obama is in-
jured.
The logical expression of the tweet is the following one: ”this is a break-
ing news item and there have been two explosion in the White House and
President Barack Obama is injured”.
None of the beliefsp (propositional attitudes) based on these proposi-
tions is the result of reliablep cognitive processes. In this case there are two
main cognitive processes involved in the beliefp–forming. The first one is
the cracker’s process of the proposition creation. Our intuition claims that
the process that deliberately results in lies is not reliablep (reliabilism).
The second one is the beliefp–forming process of the receiver. Even though
the process itself could be reliablep, the receiver of the tweet cannot come
to know the beliefsp as they are not appropriately connected with the facts
(testimony). Therefore, we can claim that there is no justificationp for the
beliefsp and the beliefsp are not knowledge.
When we evaluate the beliefsp from the receiver’s subjective viewpoint,
the outcome seems to be different. The receiver considers that both his
beliefp–forming process and the process, which the Associated Press uses
to publish tweets, are reliablep enough. The Associated Press mostly pro-
duces reliablep news, and it cannot be cracked. And for the first ten minutes
after the tweet there is no reliablep or conditionally reliablep process avail-
able to the receiver that would result in the receiver not to believe the
propositions. Therefore, the receiver’s beliefsp for the first ten minutes
are justified (reliabilism). But his/her beliefsp are not knowledgep, as the
beliefsp are not true; though the receiver is not aware of it.
There is an obvious demand for some kind of a certification service that
classifies news to different categories according to their epistemic quality
(trustworthiness); for example, to be either information, beliefp, justified
7We see the tweet language to be a kind of short–hand expressions, which is due to
the limitation of the Twitter service.
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beliefp, or knowledgep. And the category should be embedded with news
in order to allow a receiver to evaluate the usefulness of news.
Traders on Wall Street seem to be too tightly intertwined with Twit-
ter, an information service, which acts as both a gossip distribution media
and news service, where individuals, professional journalists, and publish-
ers send out breaking news. Traders seem to rely on information, which
is not certified as either knowledgep or justified beliefp. The warrant ser-
vice would provide traders with a better possibility to evaluate news, and
therefore to achieve overall better results.
A Tourist having an Accident in a Foreign Country
The following scenario8 illustrates the progress of diagnoses from beliefp to
knowledgep. The entity, which we are discussing in this scenario, is the
diagnoses of trauma, which are expressed as propositions ”The correct dia-
gnosis is ...”. These change along getting more reliablep information.
Phase 1 — An accident and the first diagnosis
Mr. Matti Meikäläinen, a 30–year–old action actor, spent his vacation
in a small town in Thailand. Having spent five relaxing days in the town he
decided to see also the surrounding countryside. He rented a motor scooter
and started to drive towards a nearby small fishing village. Unfortunately,
Matti was not used to the left–hand traffic, and therefore, he had a traffic
accident in a road crossing. Matti’s right ankle was stuck under the mo-
tor scooter when it fell over. It seemed to cause a low–energy trauma, as
luckily Matti was driving slowly. Matti drove slowly back to the hotel and
went directly to visit a nearby nurse, whom a person at the hotel’s recep-
tion desk recommended. The nurse checked Matti’s ankle and said that it
was not serious, just some muscles were sprained. However, next morn-
ing Matti’s ankle was really painful and swollen, and he could not step on
his foot. Matti was transferred to the district hospital. While waiting for
X–ray image to be taken, Matti activated his Travellers’ Health and In-
surance Service (hereinafter THIS) application, which was installed on his
smart phone, and he typed in, following the instructions given by THIS,
all the details of his accident. THIS application contacted Matti’s travel
insurance company and sent all the details to the company. An on–duty
physician at the district hospital analysed the X–ray image and came to the
conclusion that there is a lateral malleolus fracture in Matti’s ankle. The
8We developed this hypothetical but quite possible scenario together with Doctor Ari
Kinnunen, who was the co–founder and the medical director of EMA (Emergency Medical
Assistant) Group.
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physician said to Matti: ”The correct diagnosis is lateral malleolus
fracture”. Based on the diagnosis an orthopaedic cast was laid to stabilize
the ankle.
Phase 2 — Further examinations and the second diagnosis
Matti’s travel insurance company granted EMA (Emergency Medical As-
sistant) in Finland to carry out the care monitoring and other required
actions to ensure the best possible medical care for Matti. The Travel-
lers’ Medical Assistance (hereinafter TMA) application of EMA retrieves
Matti’s relevant medical history from the National Health Archive of Fin-
land (www.kanta.fi) in order to verify that Matti does not have any such
illnesses that must be taken into account in Matti’s treatment. There were
no such illnesses. The proper functioning of the ankle is essential in Matti’s
profession; therefore, a physician at EMA requested via TMA for a copy of
the X–ray image from the hospital. TMA received the copy and carried out
a first–level analysis, the result of which indicated that the X–ray image was
low quality, one axis image. TMA displayed the X–ray image and the data
of its quality to the physician on duty, who realized that the X–ray image
may not have revealed all the possible fractures because of its low quality.
She requested via TMA that Matti must be transferred to a hospital having
facilities for a higher quality X–ray imaging. TMA organized the transfer
together with local people in Thailand. Matti was transferred to a private
hospital in Bangkok, where other—this time a high quality, multi–axes—
X–ray images were taken. TMA retrieved the new X–ray images from the
Bangkok hospital, and sent them to a consulting Finnish radiology center
specialized in detecting even minor fractures, which are usually difficult to
observe in X–ray images. The center uses a new computer–aided diagnosis
(hereinafter CADx) system to interpret X–ray images automatically. The
CADx system found out from the X–ray images that the previous diagnose
was not correct, but there was a bimalleolus fracture, which could cause
a permanent ankle disability without proper operation. The CADx system
stated: ”The correct diagnosis is bimalleolus fracture”, and the re-
liability of the diagnoses is based on the high quality image scanning, the
reliability of which is 0.999. The CADx system sent the interpretation to
the TMA application of EMA, which informed the physician on duty of the
diagnosis. TMA also informed Matti via his THIS application about the
new diagnosis. The wrong diagnosis could have ended Matti’s career as an
action actor.
Phase 3 — Operation and the third, final diagnosis
The physician at EMA decided to transfer Matti back to Finland in or-
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der for the ankle to be operated and for the proper post–operative care. A
nurse was sent to Bangkok to escort Matti back to Finland because Matti
had a high risk of deep venous thromboses, the prevention of which required
low molecular heparine medication. The nurse escorted Matti to Helsinki
University Hospital, where Matti’s ankle was operated. The operation re-
vealed that there in fact were trimalleolus fractures, and screws and a plate
were required to be placed to support the normal alignment. The orthopaed-
ist verified that ”The correct diagnosis is trimalleolus fracture”.
The operation and proper post–operative care shortened Matti’s recovery
significantly and prevented the permanent disability of Matti’s ankle.
This scenario indicates the importance of comprehending the differences
between beliefp, justified beliefp, and knowledgep to the success of the med-
ical care. If the medical care would have been carried out only on the basis
of the beliefp without proper justification (required level of reliabilityp), it
could have resulted in permanent disability and an unnecessary spending of
health care cost. We analyse this scenario in more detail in Sections 2.2.2
and 3.2.
Traffic Information Service
The following scenario of traffic information service9 (hereinafter TIS) is
used to demonstrate issues in the defining of the required reliabilityp of
beliefp, justified beliefp, and knowledgep. It is also used to demonstrate the
scheme of possible worlds using an example of the ontology of TIS.10
The scenario is as follows: In the environment of Road 101 there is a
traffic information service that informs the drivers of approaching vehicles
about the driving conditions on Road 101. There are three declarations of
the driving conditions: (1) When the road might be slippery a notice is dis-
played. (2) When there are clear indications of the road being slippery a
warning is displayed. (3) When it is certain that the road is dangerously
slippery an alert is displayed. TIS is provided in co–operation by several
ISAbdis and human beings. The role of ISAbdi–A is to announce traffic no-
tices, warnings, or alerts both to human drivers and autonomous vehicles
driven by ISAbdis, when vehicles are approaching Road 101, and the belief
p
of ISAbdi–A ”Road 101 is slippery.” fulfils specified epistemic require-
ments. TIS is illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
Let us have an example of the processes of TIS (Figure 2.3). We as-
sume that ISAbdi–A perceives from a source X the proposition ”Road 101
9This is purely a hypothetical example in order to clarify our thinking about the roles
and sources of information in DIDS.
10See Appendix Discussions on Evaluating Epistemic Quality of Beliefs.
2.1 Introduction to Dependability Issues 15
Figure 2.1: A scenario of traffic information service.
Figure 2.2: UML use case of traffic information service.
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Figure 2.3: An example of TIS utilizing a certification service.
is slippery.” including the metadata ”Time 02.04.2016 14:00” ”Source X”.
Because there is no reliabilityp data of the creation process of the propos-
ition available, ISAbdi–A sends the proposition to a certification service in
order to get the certificate of the epistemic quality of information. Let us
further assume that after the evaluation ISAbdi–A perceives from the certi-
fication service: ”Road 101 is slippery.” ”Reliabilityp is 0.95.” ”Reliabilityp
of certification is 0.86.” Certified by Public Certification Service. The third
one expresses the reliabilityp of the certificate creation process of the cer-
tification service. Based on this ISAbdi–A forms the belief
p ”Road 101 is
slippery.” with the associated metadata. There are two separate factors to
be taken into account when inferring whether or not to announce a traffic
notice, warning, or alert. In this case the reliabilityp does not fulfil the
requirement for the beliefp to be knowledgep, as the reliabilityp of the cer-
tification process is not high enough. But it is high enough for the beliefp
”Road 101 is slippery.” to be justified beliefp. Therefore, ISAbdi–A declares
the traffic warning both to ADC and to HDC.
The scenario of TIS is used and further discussed in more detail in
Section 4.2.2 and in Chapter 6.
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2.1.2 Dependability Theory
We commonly characterize computing systems with the following prop-
erties: functionality, usability, performance, dependability, adaptability,
manageability, and cost. Since the first generation of digital computers
the dependability11 of computer systems has been an important topic of
computer science. Early computers were built using unreliablec compon-
ents, therefore, research on dependability started with developing practical
techniques to improve their reliabilityc. As an example we can mention the
redundancy theories that C.E. Shannon, J. von Neumann, and E. F. Moore
developed [97]. In the decades of 1980 and 1990 Jean–Claude Laprie et.
al. developed a consistent set of the concepts and terminology of depend-
ability and published them in the book Dependability: Basic Concepts and
Terminology [82].
We argue that the latest developments in the domains of AI, ISAs and
autonomous robots change the scene in such a way that the dependability
concepts and terminology need to be enhanced to take into account the
effects of learning, autonomous operation, and varying epistemic quality of
information. For example, the current dependability taxonomy does not
properly address environments, where ISAbdi—or a robot—operates with
uncertain information (not knowledgep) or learns by the trial–and–error
method. We address these problems below and in Chapter 5 (Enhancement
to Dependability Taxonomy).
Basic Concepts and Taxonomy
We can look at dependability from two different viewpoints: we emphasise
either qualitative factors or quantitative factors. We can consider the de-
pendability of a system to be either the ability to deliver service that can
justifiably be trusted or the ability to avoid service failures that are more
frequent and more severe than is acceptable to the users [11]. The former
viewpoint begs the question of what does ”justifiably be trusted” actually
mean. We will discuss justification in Section 3.5 and trust in Section 3.7
from the philosophical viewpoint. The latter one is more straightforward
from the viewpoint of computer science because the concept ”more frequent
and more severe than is acceptable to the users” is easier to actualise, for
example, by measurements in usability tests or system acceptance tests [12].
There is a causal relationship between these two definitions: we commonly
obtain justification for trust when there are less service failures and service
failures are less severe than we are willing to accept.
11Mostly called reliabilityc at that time.
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There are other definitions of dependability—usually established for
special application domains—such as follows: ”The collective term used to
describe the availability performance and its influencing factors: reliability
performance, maintainability performance, and maintenance support per-
formance” [102] and ”The extent to which the system can be relied upon
to perform exclusively and correctly the system task(s) under defined op-
erational and environmental conditions over a defined period of time, or at
a given instant of time” [73].
The dependence of an entity A on another entity B represents the extent
to which A’s dependability is affected by that of B. Trust is accepted de-
pendence. The relation depend upon is defined as follows: A depends upon
B if the correctness of B’s service delivery is necessary for the correctness
of A’s service delivery. Accepted dependence is about the judgement that
this level of dependence is acceptable.
The basic concepts of the dependability taxonomy comprise the follow-
ing terms [11]:
1. A system is an entity that interacts with other entities, i.e., other
systems, which form the environment of the given system.
2. A system boundary is the frontier between the system and its envir-
onment.
3. The function of a system is what the system is intended (described
by functional specifications) to do.
4. The functional specification of a system describes what the system is
intended to do in terms of functionality and performance.
5. The behaviour of a system is what the system does to implement its
function. The behaviour is described by a sequence of states of the
system.
6. The total state of a system comprises the following states: computa-
tion, stored information, interconnection, and physical condition.
7. The structure of a system enables the system to generate its beha-
viour.
8. The service of a system is the behaviour of the system as it is per-
ceived by its users.
9. A system delivers correct service when the service fulfils the system
function.
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Figure 2.4: Dependability taxonomy.
10. A service failure is an event that takes place when the delivered ser-
vice deviates from the correct service.
11. A service outage is the period of the delivery of an incorrect service.
Service failure modes are ranked based on failure severities.
12. A degraded mode of system exists, when the system is capable to offer
only a subset of the needed services.
13. The external state of system is the part of the total state of the system
that is perceivable at the service interface.
14. The internal state of system is the part of the total state of the system
that is not perceivable at the service interface.
Jean–Claude Laprie et.al. model dependability as illustrated in Figure 2.4
[11, 12, 83]. The dependability taxonomy comprises three sets of factors
that are attributes, impairments, and means. The attributes are the fol-
lowing ones:
1. Availability is the readiness for usage.
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2. Reliabilityc is the continuity of service.
3. Maintainability is the ability to undergo repairs and evolution.
4. Confidentiality is the non–occurrence of unauthorized disclosure of
information.
5. Integrity is the non–occurrence of improper alterations of information.
6. Consistency is the logical coherence of data or the logical coherence
of co–operating processes.
7. Safetyc is the non–occurrence of catastrophic consequences on the
environment.
There exist also secondary attributes such as the following ones:
1. Accountability: availability and integrity of the identity of the person
that performed an operation.
2. Authenticity: integrity of the content and origin of a message, pos-
sibly of some other information, such as the time of emission.
3. Nonrepudiability: availability and integrity of the identity of the
sender of a message.
The impairments are as follows:
1. Faults are the causes of errors.
2. Errors are the deviations from the correct service states.
3. Failures mean that at least one (or more) external state of the system
deviates from the correct service state.
The development of a dependable computing system requires a combined
set of methods and techniques:
1. Fault prevention: means to prevent fault occurrence or introduction.
2. Fault tolerance: means to ensure that a service fulfils the function of
the system in the presence of faults.
3. Fault removal: means to reduce the presence of faults.
4. Fault forecasting: means to estimate the present number, the future
incidence, and the consequences of faults.
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The core features of Laprie’s dependability model are based on the
assumption that dependability is a technical attribute and the dependable
features are within the computing systems themselves. The model has the
following assumptions as its guidelines [32]:
• Errors arise inevitably from faults.
• A system is constructed so that an error could be detected by an
external observer.
• Users are able to recognize the occurrences of system failures.
We claim that the above assumptions will not hold in the future. This
taxonomy of system dependability needs to be enhanced in order to be
applicable in the environment of future dependable intelligent distributed
computing systems based on AI, ISA, and robots. The role of comput-
ing systems in the society is rapidly changing towards autonomous agents,
which are operating increasingly in a social environment of uncertain in-
formation. Therefore, the importance of recognizing whether information
is beliefp, justified beliefp or knowledgep and acting based on the epistemic
quality of information increases in the determination of the dependability
of ISA and IDS. There are also other domains, such as Advanced Persistent
Threats [29] and dependability of cyber–physical systems [124], which have
also addresses the need for enhancements to the dependability taxonomy.
2.2 Intelligent Distributed Systems
In this section we discuss some features of intelligent distributed systems.
We define a system to be an intelligent distributed system as follows:
Definition. An intelligent distributed system is a collection
of independent agents that appears to its users as a single
coherent system, where an independent agent can be either
an intelligent software agent, a robot, a process running in
a computer, or a human being, and some of the independent
agents are software–based entities, of which some are imple-
mented utilizing artificial intelligence.
An example of an intelligent distributed system is illustrated in Figure
2.5, where a single coherent system providing a service to users is built up
by several independent agents, such as an inference system, a distributed
information base, intelligent software agents, social media, a professional
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Figure 2.5: An example of an intelligent distributed system.
human being, and an information certification service. A user can be either
a human being or an intelligent software agent acting as an epistemic agent.
We define the epistemic agent as follows:
Definition. An epistemic agent is an entity (either a human be-
ing or an intelligent software agent) that has an important
effect on a situation and perceives, holds, processes, and dis-
tributes semantical information.
At first we discuss briefly the main features of AI that are relevant to
this thesis, such as GOFAI (Good Old Fashioned AI), connectionist models
(a.k.a. neural networks and deep learning), ISAbdi, and representations of
semantic information.12 Then we proceed to discuss the role of knowledgep,
justified beliefp, and beliefp in DIDS. Finally, we discuss logical issues re-
lated to beliefp, justified beliefp, and knowledgep.
12The actual topic of this thesis is not AI, but features that are required in AI–based
solutions
2.2 Intelligent Distributed Systems 23
2.2.1 Artificial Intelligence
In this section we discuss the following areas of AI: GOFAI, connectionist
models, intelligent software agents, and representations of semantic inform-
ation.
AI is an approach consisting of many disciplines to understand, model,
and implement intelligence and cognitive processes. Tools such as mathem-
atics, logic, computation, and mechanics are used to realize AI. Philosophy
has had a significant role in AI because the concept of truth has been im-
portant in both AI research and epistemology; foundational questions of AI
are philosophical in nature; and philosophical concepts, such as knowledge,
information representation, and action need to be understood properly in
AI in order to model and implement them. On the other hand, AI raises
new questions in metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, such as how in-
telligent behaviour ought to be explained or how to understand human
intelligence.
AI comprises several themes such as smart software versus cognitive
modelling, symbolic AI versus connectionism (a.k.a. neural networks or
deep learning), reasoning versus perception, reasoning versus knowledge,
to present or not to present, and narrow AI versus human–level intelli-
gence [42, 92]. In this thesis we work on a cognitive modelling to establish
a model for ISA to have information, beliefp, justifiedp, and knowledgep.
We concentrate on symbolic AI because it better provides an environment
where information can be classified based on the epistemic quality, and
propositions are presented symbolically by nature. In the case of reasoning
versus perception our approach is more close to perception than reason-
ing. And also in the case of reasoning versus knowledgep we concentrate on
knowledgep because in the real world systems with a significant amount of
information we must know and model the epistemic quality of information.
In the case of to present or not to present we argue that a system shall
model its world, at least to the amount, where possible consequences of
an action can be evaluated to a required dependability. We do not have
any strong opinion about narrow AI (weak AI) versus human–level intel-
ligence (strong AI) despite the fact that we argue that ISA is capable to
have beliefp, justified beliefp, and knowledgep.
GOFAI
GOFAI is a label that denotes classical, symbolic AI [15]. The basic idea
of GOFAI is to operate on programmed instructions and formal symbolic
representations. GOFAI symbols and programs composed of them are re-
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garded as purely formal—having semantics—structures, and GOFAI com-
putation involves the construction and transformation of symbolic data
structures [15]. For example, a proposition and a program evaluating the
epistemic quality of propositional information can be implemented using
GOFAI. Most of the intelligence in GOFAI lies in the choices of actions and
heuristics specified by the programmer. GOFAI programs often simulate
the conscious deliberation of high–level human thought because in GOFAI
propositions are presented with specific semantic content. One strength of
GOFAI is the ability of representing propositional contents. We claim that
the epistemic quality of input information plays an important role, when
a GOFAI program in a running state decides that a particular action is
needed to achieve its goal.
The frame problem plays a role in GOFAI. There are two aspects: first,
knowing which factors in a situation would be changed by an action and
which would not, and second—the more important issue in this thesis—
reasoning with incomplete information due to the variety of the epistemic
quality of information in the real world and the vagueness of ordinary lan-
guage concepts. The frame problem is probably insoluble for the general
case, but it has been and will be solved for specific purposes in many dif-
ferent environments [15].
The key strengths of GOFAI are modelling multi–level hierarchy, se-
quential order, and inferential relations between specific propositional con-
tents [15].
Connectionism
Connectionism is the current, dominant domain of AI. Connectionism is
the way of capturing and understanding the mechanisms and processes of
cognition through building models using networks of simple, neuron–like
processing elements, each of which perform simple numerical computation.
The main idea of connectionism is that cognition is a result of an interac-
tion of a large number of simple processing units (i.e., the large number
of connected neurons in the brain). A representation is a pattern of ac-
tivation over a set of processing units in a model. Processing is carried
out through the propagation of activations among the processing units and
via the interconnections among them. The propagation of activations is
mediated by the numerical connection weights between pairs of processing
units. Learning takes place through the change of the connection weights.
According to connectionism cognition should be approached more in terms
of mechanisms of constraint satisfaction, pattern recognition, and weight
adaptation, rather than explicit symbol manipulation [144].
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Connectionist representations can be categorized into two main cat-
egories: localist representations and distributed representations. In localist
representations each node represents a single concept, and in distributed
representations each concept is represented by an activation pattern over
a set of nodes [144]. Memory is often a constructive process involving the
interactions of simple processing units. Because the representation of in-
formation is not in a linguistic form, connectionism causes problems in the
evaluation and representation of the epistemic quality of information. In
localist representations the problems are not so severe as in distributed
representations, because each unit is interpretable and has a clear concep-
tual meaning. Each unit also captures the property of explicit information;
thus, information being better accessible and more manipulable [144].
Connectionist models face difficulties when higher–level cognition, such
as reasoning and problem solving, is required as well as in the case of the
binding problem (the combination of multiple arbitrary in processing and
representation) [144].
Hybrid Approach
Because of the problems of pure symbolic and pure connectionist models,
hybrid models have been proposed to resolve the problems [144]. Symbolic
models work better in the domains of search and knowledge representation.
Search comprises domains such as a systematic exploration of a space of
problem states and a means of conceptualizing and conducting problem
solving. Knowledge representations comprise domains such as logic–based
representations, structured representations (i.e. semantic networks), and
production rules. Connectionist models work better in the domains of im-
plicit information, learning, parallelism, and reasoning by constraint satis-
faction and pattern recognition. Hybrid models tend to combine the best
features of both approaches. The result would be more expressive, more
powerful, often more efficient, and more useful in both cognitive modelling
and practical applications, as cognitive processes are not homogeneous.
Cognitive processes consist of a wide variety of information representations
and processes that play different roles and serve different purposes.
An architecture incorporating both symbolicist and connectionist mod-
els can be implemented computationally by a combination of a symbolic
system (explicit information) and a connectionist system (implicit inform-
ation). We can classify at a high level hybrid models as follows:
1. Closed, meaning that a system comprises explicit information or in-
formation can be inferred from explicit information within an accept-
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able time–frame. Closed models with formal symbolic representations
are suitable to be implemented using symbolic models.
2. Semi–open, meaning that a system comprises, in addition to explicit
information, information that cannot be inferred within the required
time–frame. Semi–open models are suitable to be implemented using
hybrid models.
3. Open, meaning that a system comprises mainly implicit information.
Open models are suitable to be implemented using connectionist mod-
els.
We address in this thesis closed and semi–open models.
Hybrid models can lead to complicated architectures and systems be-
cause they may comprise a variety of different types of processes and repres-
entations, and multiple heterogeneous mechanisms interacting in a complex
way. Therefore, the following issues are raised [144]: First, how to decide
which representation (symbolic, localist, or distributed) is most proper for
each part of the system. Second, how do learning and symbolic representa-
tion interact? Third, how do we structure different parts of a hybrid system
to achieve optimal results? Fourth, how can complex symbolic structures
(rules, frames, and semantic networks) be learned?
We are of the opinion that hybrid models, where the epistemic quality
of information is managed by the symbolic models, are the most proper
ones for many contexts and environments of ISA and DIDS.
Intelligent Software Agents
The development of software technology and AI, in particular, in the last
two decades has established a new foundation for software–based systems.
These systems, which are generally called agent–based systems, quite often
act independently on behalf of human being, and they demonstrate more
and more human–like behaviour. In the domain of IDS artificial epistemic
agents can be implemented using a paradigm called intelligent software
agent technology. There is no unambiguous definition of the term intelligent
software agent. However, a descriptive one is as follows: An intelligent
software agent is a computational entity that can be viewed as perceiving and
acting upon its environment and that is autonomous in that its behaviour
at least partially depends on its own experience [162]. There are different
types of ISAs, such as collaborative agents, personal agents, information
agents, and various combinations of these agents. A number of various
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studies of ISAs have resulted in different kinds of models, such as reactive,
goal–directed, and deliberative models.
There has been several approaches to capture the idea of ISA. The ap-
proach of knowledge and action (Robert C. Moore) concentrated on the
question of what an agent needs to know in order to be capable of perform-
ing an action [166]. The approach of intention (Philip R. Cohen and Hector
J. Levesque) studied the concept of intending to act that defines conditions
for an agent to perform an action. This approach used two basic attitudes
that were beliefc and goal [166]. This introduced beliefc as one of the basic
notions of the intelligent software agent theory. In related work Anand
Rao and Michael Georgeff developed a model based on beliefsc, desiresc,
and intentionsc that resulted in a belief–desire–intention (hereinafter BDI)
architecture for the internal structure of ISA [26, 113, 114]. BDI is based
on the ideas of Michael Bratman’s philosophical theory of practical reason-
ing [24]. Beliefsc represent characteristics of an environment, which ISAbdi
perceives whenever needed. Desiresc represent goals to be achieved as well
as properties associated with goals. Intentionsc represent selected actions
to achieve a desired goal.
The BDI model is the most suitable one for the objectives of this thesis.
First, it is based on the idea of modelling the activity (practical reasoning)
of human being. Second, the concept of beliefc is adequately similar to the
one of epistemology, so that it can be used to discuss and define beliefp,
justified beliefp, and knowledgep for the joint environment of human be-
ings and ISAs. Third, beliefsc and desiresc can be represented as states
comprising propositions. And finally, BDI is the widely accepted model.
Therefore, in this thesis we utilize ISAbdi as a high level, abstract model
of artificial epistemic agents of IDS that processes, evaluates, and manages
information and its epistemic quality.
Typically, ISAbdi has a representation of the state of the world and a
representation of the desired state of the world. As beliefsc contain in-
formation (propositions) that ISAbdi has about its surrounding world, it
is the entity that we discuss in this section. ISAbdi’s sources of beliefs
c
(knowledgep, justified beliefsp and beliefp) can be, for example, perception,
introspection, memory, reason, and testimony. ISAbdi’s perceptual cap-
abilities can be implemented with various kinds of input devices, such as
video/infrared camera and radar (sight), microphone (hearing), pressure
sensor (touch), air flow sensor (smelling) (in general, different kinds of en-
vironmental sensors), keyboard, touch screen, etc. Introspection can be
thought to be ISAbdi’s capacity to inspect its internal state: which beliefs
c
are stored in ISAbdi’s memory, what is the amount of beliefs
c, what is the
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maximum capacity to hold beliefsc, what is the status of beliefsc, what is
the status of inferring processes, etc. ISAbdi’s memory comprises semantic,
structured data—actual data and associated semantic metadata13—that
can be stored, for example, in a main memory, in an external disk, or in
a cloud. Reasoning establishes—in addition to perceiving—the important
source of beliefsc. It is also most studied subject in the domain of ISAbdi;
but nevertheless, it is still a very difficult issue. Actual knowledge does
not seem to obey any logic [34]. And, in addition, it is not yet possible
to build an ISAbdi that possesses the reasoning power described by normal
modal systems [154]. However, various modal epistemic logic has been pro-
posed, for example, one by Ho Ngoc Duc [34] and another one by Michael
Wooldridge [165]. Testimony is considered to be the source of beliefsc when
ISAbdi acquires propositions from other ISAbdis or human beings.
As already discussed above, ISAbdi exhibits human–like behaviour, but
what kind? There is no unambiguous definition about what kinds of beha-
vioural properties ISAbdi should have. ISAbdi usually exhibits the following
prominent properties:
1. Autonomy: ISAbdi acts independently on behalf of its master without
human intervention.
2. Proactive: ISAbdi is capable to create or control a situation by caus-
ing something to happen rather than responding to it after it has
happened.
3. Goal–oriented: ISAbdi has its own desires which it tries to achieve.
4. Collaborative: ISAbdi is capable of working jointly with other ISAs
and/or human beings on activities.
5. Communicative: ISAbdi is capable of exchanging beliefs
c (knowledgep,
justified beliefsp, and beliefsp) with other ISAbdis and/or human be-
ings.
Figure 2.6 illustrates one possible BDI architecture of ISAbdi. In this
BDI architecture most interesting components are perception as the inter-
face to the external world, beliefsc (world model, mental model, and social
model) as propositions about the external world, and situations (routine
emergency, local planning, and co–operating) as propositions about the in-
ternal state. The belief generation process is the activity that would deal
with the epistemic evaluations of beliefsc.
13This data represents propositions about the external world.
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Figure 2.6: BDI architecture.
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An overview of the BDI–based reasoning process is as follows:
1st Perceive the environment to generate beliefsc.
2nd Choose a desirec to achieve, then select a plan to reach that
desirec.
3rd Decide based on the plan the next action to perform.
4th Perform the selected action.
5th Every now and then check if the plan is still valid.
ISAbdi is in general continuously interacting with its environment. The
environment is not only a source of problems for ISAbdi to solve, but rather a
co–operation component with which ISAbdi is involved. From the viewpoint
of justification and knowledgep, perception and beliefc generation are the
key entities in the BDI architecture.
Representation of Semantic Information
The essence of the issue of representation is that representations are crit-
ical for the process of deciding what action to take, and not so much for
the process of executing the action [42]. In the context of ISAbdi there are
two representation lines, which are logic–based and probability–based [4].
In this thesis we discuss logic–basic representations as they are more suit-
able to represent propositions; despite of the fact that some information
types, such as spatial, temporal, and uncertain information are difficult
to represent using a sentential language. There are two domains: first,
representing the world (ontologyc) where information is used, and second,
representing information (propositions about the world). The represent-
ation of semantical information affects many factors of the information
management (searching, extracting, maintaining, uncovering, and viewing
information) in addition to the possibilities and efficiency of inference based
on semantical information. Requirements for an ontologyc language are as
follows: 1) a well–defined syntax, 2) a formal semantics, and 3) sufficient
and efficient expressive power.
Semantic Web technologies [5, 155, 157] are currently most prominent
technologies in the domain of information exchange and reasoning. The
goal of Semantic Web is to enable computers to do more useful work and
to develop systems that can support trusted interactions over a network.
Based on Semantic Web technologies several domain–specific solutions have
been developed, such as solutions for healthcare, life sciences, energy, and
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sensors. The representation of the syntax of Semantic Web technologies is
based on Extensible Markup Language (XML) [160, 161]; though, there are
other syntaxes, too. The representation of semantics is based on Resource
Description Framework (RDF) [151, 153], RDF Schema [152], and Web
Ontology Language (OWL) [154, 158, 159]. There are other options, such
as Topic Maps and DARPA Agent Markup Language (DAML) [30, 74].
OWL is a language to represent ontologiesc.14 OWL is designed to
formulate and to reason with knowledgep about a domain of interest. The
conceptual structure of OWL 2 is defined using UML.
There are two variations of OWL–based representation of semantics
[159]: OWL 2 direct semantics (OWL 2 DL) and OWL 2 RDF–based se-
mantics. The direct semantics can be utilized in ontologiesc that are OWL
2 DL subset of OWL 2. OWL–based ontologiesc that do not follow OWL 2
DL are set to belong to OWL 2 Full. Direct semantics assigns the meaning
for OWL 2 using the style of description logic, and RDF–based semantics
is an extension of the semantics for RDF schema (RDF graphs).
OWL 2 Full [159] is undecidable, and it is very complicated to imple-
ment a reasoner. Therefore, there are subsets of OWL 2, such as OWL
2 DL, which are designed so that the implementations of reasoners are
not overwhelming tasks. OWL 2 specifications comprise three profiles ac-
cording to application requirements: OWL 2 EL, OWL 2 RL, and OWL
2 QL. The OWL 2 EL profile is designed to be used in the domains that
require large ontologies with complex structural descriptions. The OWL 2
QL profile is designed for a standard relational database technology. The
OWL 2 RL profile is designed to be used in the application domains that
require scalable reasoning and still maintaining as much expressive power
as possible.
OWL 2 is based on predicate logic, and it does not yet support modal
logics. But there is a W3C Candidate Recommendation of Time Ontology
in OWL [156]. In general, OWL 2 specifications assume that information is
true, and they do not make any difference between beliefp, justified beliefp,
and knowledgep. As such we see that OWL 2 is the first step towards the
presentation of information with different epistemic quality and supporting
modal logics; however, there will be several requirements to enhance OWL.
An example of an OWL ontology describing the scenario of Traffic Alert
Service (see page 14) is in Appendix Discussions on Evaluating Epistemic
Quality of Beliefs.
14Ontologyc is an explicit and formal specification of a conceptualization. An ontologyc
describes formally a domain of discourse. Ontologyp is the study of the nature of exist-
ence, which is concerned with identifying the kinds of things that actually exist, and how
to describe them.
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Figure 2.7: Different contexts of propositions.
2.2.2 Knowledge and Justified Belief in Dependable Intelli-
gent Distributed Systems
In this section we discuss the role of knowledgep, justified beliefp, and beliefp
in the context of DIDS. We utilize the scenario A Tourist having an Acci-
dent in a Foreign Country introduced in Section 2.1.1 to illustrate our ap-
proach by analysing the roles of beliefp, justified beliefp, and knowledgep in
each phase to achieve dependability. The scenario illustrates co–operation
between ISAbdis
15 and human beings.
In this scenario—actually in real life, too—the propositions stating the
15We assume that CADx, THIS, and TMA are implemented using ISAbdis (hybrid
model).
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diagnosis have the most important role in the process of Matti’s medical
care. Therefore, we need to evaluate the epistemic quality of information
stated by the following propositions:
• ”The correct diagnosis is lateral malleolus fracture.”
• ”The correct diagnosis is bimalleolus fracture.”
• ”The correct diagnosis is trimalleolus fracture.”
And what could be the effect of each epistemic quality of information on
the process of Matti’s medical care?
When we evaluate the epistemic quality of information stated by the
propositions, we have to consider several different viewpoints and contexts,
such as (see Figure 2.7):
1. Medical personnel in a small town and a hospital in the small town.
The level of professional skills in medicine is not in accord with mod-
ern, high–level expertise, and the quality of medical equipment is
low–level.
2. Medical personnel at EMA and travellers’ emergency medical assist-
ance. The professional skills in medicine and the equipment represent
high–level expertise in analysis of potential medical risks in the treat-
ment of patients abroad and the repatriation of patients.
3. CADx and AI. CADx represents a high–level, the state–of–art expert
system to analyse X–rays, especially to reveal bone fractures.
4. An orthopedist at Helsinki University Hospital. The level of profes-
sional skills in orthopaedic is in accord with modern, highest level
expertise.
5. Travel insurance company and compensation for disabilities. The
combination of good service and overall cost reduction are the key
issues in this viewpoint.
6. Matti’s recovery and his future occupation. To avoid Matti’s disabil-
ity and to ensure his possibility to continue his acting career in action
movies are the key issues in this viewpoint.
7. An attributor’s16 viewpoint. This represents the viewpoint of an epi-
stemologist who has no role in the scenario itself. This is a kind of
an ’objective’ viewpoint.
16An attributor is a person who evaluates the epistemic quality of information from
the external viewpoint on the scenario.
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Let us look at the epistemic quality of information stated by the pro-
positions from the viewpoint of Matti’s recovery and his future occupation.
The most important factor is the correctness of the diagnoses, because oth-
erwise proper medical treatment and full recovery are severely jeopardized.
As we assume proper justification and knowledge theories to be forms of re-
liabilism we concentrate on the reliabilityp of the beliefp–forming processes
and possible defeaters created by a reliablep beliefp–forming process.
The proposition ”The correct diagnosis is lateral malleolus fracture.” is
the object of the beliefp that Matti, the physician at the district hospital,
and the physician at EMA have in phase 1. But is the beliefp justified
beliefp?
We can consider that the physician at the district hospital has a justi-
fication for his beliefp, as he has been trained to rely that the process which
has produced the X–ray image is reliablep, the quality of the X–ray image
is adequate, and his capability to interpret the X–ray image is reliablep
enough. Thus, in his context the reliabilityp of the diagnose process is high
enough, and there are no known defeaters in this phase (reliabilism). The
physician ensures Matti that the diagnosis is the correct one; thus, in phase
1 there is also justification for Matti’s beliefp because there are not yet any
defeaters (testimonially transferred). As Alvin Goldman states: ”Surely
a belief can sometimes be justified even if additional evidence–gathering
would yield a different doxastic attitude.” [60]. However, the physician at
EMA has no justification for the beliefp, because based on the former ex-
periences about similar cases she has learned that this kind of diagnoses
must be verified by further examinations. This is because the reliabilityp
of the beliefp–forming processes (e.g. the quality of X–ray image and the
physician’s medical skills) are not at the required level (defeater). The
piece of information stated by the proposition ”The correct diagnosis is
lateral malleolus fracture.” is not knowledgep because the proposition is
not true.17
In phase 2, the defeater (the second diagnosis) is informed to Matti;
therefore, the first diagnosis is no longer justified, and Matti formed the new
beliefp. The proposition ”The correct diagnosis is bimalleolus fracture.” is
the object of the beliefp that the CADx system, Matti, TMA application,
and the physician at EMA have in phase 2. The beliefp is also the justified
beliefp in phase 2 because
CADx system: The beliefp has been formed using a reliablep process, and
there are no known defeaters (reliabilism).
17But in this phase the epistemic agents do not have any factors to determine that the
diagnosis in not true.
2.2 Intelligent Distributed Systems 35
Matti: He has obtained the beliefp from a reliablep source, and there are
no known defeaters (testimonially transferred).
TMA application: It has obtained the beliefp from a reliablep source,
and there are no known defeaters (testimonially transferred).
The physician at EMA: She has obtained the beliefp from a reliablep
source, and there are no known defeaters (testimonially transferred).
However, the piece of information stated by the proposition ”The correct
diagnosis is bimalleolus fracture.” is not knowledgep because the proposi-
tion is not true.
In phase 3 there is the defeater—the third diagnosis—that cancels the
justification of Matti’s, the physician’s and TMA’s beliefp. The third pro-
position ”The correct diagnosis is trimalleolus fracture.” is the object of
the beliefp that Matti, the TMA application, the physician at EMA, and
the orthopedist at the Helsinki University Hospital have in phase 3. The
beliefp is also the justified beliefp in phase 3 because
Orthopedist: He has obtained the beliefp from the reliablep process (the
operation of the ankle) and there are no defeaters (reliabilism).
Matti: He has obtained the beliefp from the reliablep source, and there are
no defeaters.18 (testimonially transferred).
TMA application: It has obtained the beliefp from the reliablep source,
and there are no defeaters (testimonially transferred).
The physician at EMA: She has obtained the beliefp from the reliablep
source, and there are no defeaters (testimonially transferred).
The beliefp, the object of which is the proposition ”The correct diagnosis is
trimalleolus fracture.”, is knowledgep. It is true based on perceptions, the
reliabilityp of which is regarded to be the highest possible (the correspondes
theory of truth).19
However, when having the attributor’s viewpoint to the epistemic qual-
ity of information stated by the propositions, we have a different result of
the analysis, as follows:
18Most likely there will not be any defeaters in the future.
19However, we can not claim, that this knowledgep is factual because there is always a
possibility that the orthopedist may have made an error; though the possible error may
never be revealed because the results based on the knowledgep are good.
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First diagnosis: We can argue that the proposition is the object of merely
a beliefp because it is not formed using a reliablep enough process and
there exist defeaters. The epistemic agents in question just are not
aware of those issues.
Second diagnosis: We can argue that there is no justification for the
beliefp, even though the beliefp has been formed using a reliablep
process, but the reliabilityp of which is not high enough when consid-
ering the requirement of reliabilityp set by the possible consequences
of failure. There exists the defeater of which the epistemic agents in
question just are not aware.
Third diagnosis: We can argue that there is justification for the beliefp
because the beliefp has been formed using the highly reliablep pro-
cess.20 There exist no defeaters. The beliefp is also true, if we accept,
for instance, the correspondence theory of truth (see Section 3.5.3)
and consider that the correspondence can be verified using a reliablep
perception. Therefore, the third and final proposition ”The correct
diagnosis is trimalleolus fracture.” is knowledgep.
As a final remark of this scenario, we have argued that the role of
beliefp, justified beliefp and knowledgep in DIDS based systems is essential,
and therefore, knowledgep has value over justified beliefp and beliefp, but in
some cases those are very difficult to grasp. There are several issues, such
as context–awareness and the requirement of factualism.
In DIDS (multi–ISAbdi systems) there is also involved the aspect of
social rationality, which can be expressed using the following assumptions
[3]:
1. Sincerity: No ISAbdi will attempt to have others believe a proposition
that it either knows or believes to be false or a proposition that it
wants to be false.
2. Honesty: ISAbdi must act according to their beliefs.
3. Fair Play: ISAbdi must abide by the agreed deals.
4. Sociability: In the case of indifference, ISAbdi must accept others’
offers, and deals must always be individually rational.
In principle, these social rationality assumptions would make the devel-
opment and execution of multi–ISAbdi systems much easier, cheaper, and
20Even though the process is very highly reliable, there is always a minor possibility
that there is an error in the diagnosis.
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cost–effective, but the reality of today’s Internet world—which will be the
dominant environment for ISAbdis—does not support these assumptions, at
all. Thus, it is increasingly important to develop ISAbdis that are not just
powerful, but also transparent to inspection regarding their knowledgep,
justified beliefsp, and beliefsp21 [22].
2.2.3 Logical Issues of Knowledge, Justified Belief, and Be-
lief
In this section we discuss some features of epistemic logic in order to provide
background information on reasoning methods related to beliefp, justifica-
tion, and knowledgep.22
AI, especially GOFAI, has been heavily influenced by ideas of philosoph-
ical logic when trying to solve or solving problems dealing with knowledgep
representations, reasoning, and communications between ISAs [145]. The
fundamental theoretical topics, such as epistemic logic, temporal logic, and
beliefp revision in addition to the formalization of non–mathematical reas-
oning are similar to both AI and philosophical logic [145]. Predicate logic
and various modal logics23 play important roles in this co–operation, and
AI has affected in many ways recent developments of modal logics.
One of the main differences between AI and philosophical logic is that
the latter one does not, in general, deal with implementability or efficiency
of reasoning, whereas to the former one these issues are important, as ap-
plications of above–mentioned logics are most often the driving force in AI
[145]. Examples of the application domains comprise understanding nar-
ratives, diagnosis of various failed entities, spatial reasoning, and reasoning
about the attitudes of other agents. The ultimate goal has been to form-
alize common–sense reasoning [145]. But there are still ongoing debates
about the suitability of logic to solve problems in AI. For example, it is
very difficult to express using logic analogy, space, shape, and uncertainty.
And the performance requirements of AI systems are often higher than
contemporary logic–based inference systems can fulfil [4].
Modal logic deals with reasoning that involves expressions such as ne-
cessary, possibly, obligatory, permitted, etc. In the context of ISAbdi the
21Of course the same applies to inferring methods.
22The logical framework of BDF (see Chapter 6) is outside the scope of this thesis,
therefore, we do not discuss in more detail, utilize, or further develop epistemic logic or
other modal logics. However, we see that knowing the relevant logical issues is beneficial
in understanding the context of this thesis.
23The term ’modal logic’ seems to have two different scopes: 1) only alethic logic and
2) in addition epistemic, temporal, action, etc. logics.
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important logics are in addition to predicate logic the following ones:
1. Epistemic logic, which studies reasoning in the domain of beliefp,
justification, and knowledgep.
2. Temporal logic, which studies reasoning in the domain of time.
3. Logic of actions, which studies reasoning in the domain of actions.
In this thesis we concentrate on epistemic logic.
G.H. von Wright’s article An Essay in Modal Logic, 1951 [150] can be
considered as a starting point of the formal study of epistemic logic as it
exists today [115]. Jaakko Hintikka demonstrated in his book Knowledge
and Belief [70] that the modal approach to single–agent epistemic attitudes
is beneficial. He explicated epistemic attitudes using a model of theoretic
relation over possible worlds [145].
Epistemic logic focuses mainly on propositional knowledgep and beliefsp.
Justification has not yet raised any significant interest. The language of epi-
stemic logic is based on the language of propositional logic that is enhanced
with knowledgep and beliefp operators. K1A means that agent 1 knows A
and B2A means that agent 2 believes A for an arbitrary proposition A. One
of the differences between the logic of knowledgep and the logic of beliefp
is that the logic of knowledgep includes the schema (T) KiA → A stating
that knowledgep must be true, but the logic of beliefp does not require a
proposition to be true—a doxastic agent may have false beliefsp.
Time plays a fundamental role in the actions of ISAbdi; therefore, tem-
poral logics are also important in the context of ISAbdi. There are two
approaches to temporal logics, of which one is based on modal logic and
the other one is based on predicate logic. The approach based on modal
logic was introduced by Arthur Prior in the 1960s [61]. The languages
comprise the following four operators:
• G : ”It will always be the case that ... ”
• F : ”It will at some time be the case that ... ”
• H : ”It has always been the case that ... ”
• P : ”It has at some time been the case that ... ”.
Michael Bratman’s philosophical analysis of the notion of intention is
one of the starting points of the logic of action, especially in AI and com-
puter science. Practical reasoning is reasoning directed toward actions, thus
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the process of figuring out what to do [165]. Agents’ intentions play the im-
portant role when selecting actions that are desired and when committing
to the selected actions. Rao and Georgeff [131] formalized the belief–desire–
intention model using the branching–time temporal logic CTL, on top of
which they introduced modal operators for belief, goal (nowadays desire),
and intention as well as operators for the results of actions succeeded(a)
and failure(a). The formal semantics is based on the Kripke models with
accessibility relations between worlds for each modal operator.
The semantics of modal logics is defined by using possible worlds se-
mantics, where a set W of possible worlds w is defined. There is a truth
value assigned to each propositional variable in the specified language for
each of the possible worlds w in W. For example, the truth value of an
atomic proposition p at world w, w ∈ W, given by the valuation Γ can
be expressed as Γ(p,w). Then the truth value of a complex proposition of
modal logic for a given valuation Γ and a world w ∈ W can be specified as
for example: Γ( A, w) = T iff for every world w’∈W,Γ(A,w’) = T.24
Thus A is true at a world w exactly when A is true in all possible worlds
[50].
Next we discuss some requirements for modal logics in the context of
ISAbdi. These requirements are only a highlight of the issues, which need
to be addressed. In addition to normal philosophical requirements of logic
(soundness and completeness) there are requirements such as efficiency,
practical reasoning, common–sense reasoning, and a philosophical aspect
how to actually characterize the properties of ISAbdi in terms of formulae
of modal logics.
Efficiency requirements are usually set by the performance requirements
of services that ISAbdi is designed to provide. Especially, if ISAbdi oper-
ates in a real–time environment, the implementation of beliefc, desirec, and
intentionc databases—for example, representations of beliefsc—must be ef-
ficient in addition to efficient reasoning processes. ISAbdi cannot deliberate
indefinitely. However, we do not discuss in this thesis how these require-
ments could be achieved.
Practical reasoning distinguishes from theoretical reasoning in that the-
oretical reasoning is directed towards beliefsp, but practical reasoning dir-
ected towards actions [165]. Practical reasoning seems to be a two–phase
activity: at first, ISAbdi deduces what states of affairs it wants to achieve,
and then ISAbdi performs means–ends reasoning about how to achieve the
selected state of affairs. This implies that there is a need for a kind of
hybrid logics.
24 == ’it is necessary that’
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Currently common understanding is that usable AI and thus ISAbdi
exhibiting human–like behaviour requires common–sense knowledge [87].
Common–sense knowledge is difficult to define, but usually it is seen as
a collection of simple facts about everyday life such as ”dogs bark” and
”cats meow”. In fact, common–sense reasoning also requires a combination
of different modal logics. In general, common–sense reasoning does not
require that all the possibilities to accept a proof must be satisfied, and very
improbable possibilities can be neglected. This refers to the so–called frame
problem. Mostly, this is due to the required efficiency of the reasoning as
all the logically possible options cannot be processed in a required response
time or using available computing resources.
When we try to characterize properties of ISAbdi in terms of formulae
of modal logics, we deal, for example, with the problem of what is the right
formula to characterize the relationship between intentionsc and beliefsc
[165]. For example, how to build up a formula that characterizes ”If i
intends ϕ, then i believes ϕ is possible.”? Is this the correct one: (Int i ϕ)
⇒ (Bel i Eϕ)25?
Epistemic Logic
A modal approach to epistemic logic is in principle simple: systems of
modal logic are provided with epistemic interpretation, and main technical
results about epistemic logic can be obtained almost automatically. To in-
terpret modal logic epistemically, an epistemic agent reads modal formulas
as epistemic statements that express the epistemic agent’s attitude towards
certain sentences. In addition, the epistemic agent has a new interpretation
of the semantics for modal logic [34]. Some features of the logical beha-
viour of epistemic concepts are quite obvious. For example, claiming to
know p and q implies to know q26, and it cannot be coherent to assert ”p
but the epistemic agent does not believe (know) p” [115]. Furthermore, if
the epistemic agent knows p then p must be the case.
However, describing actual knowledgep is a very difficult task, as actual
knowledgep does not always seem to obey any logic [34]. Therefore, idealiz-
ations are required regarding the reasoning capabilities of epistemic agents.
This raises a question of the correct level of idealization [34]: An idealized
model should correspond the intended environment of an epistemic agent
exactly enough in order the epistemic agent to operate according to its
service requirements. But, on the other hand, the idealized model should
enable the resulting epistemic logic to be weak enough for the (AI–based)
25E is an existential path quantifier, that is Eϕ is true on some path
26(p ∧ q → q)
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epistemic agent, for example, by not requiring it to be a very powerful
reasoner, which knows all the logical consequences of it’s knowledge, in-
cluding all logical truths (so–called logical omniscience problem). To solve
a part of this problem we need to somehow categorize knowledgep (and
beliefps) into classes that epistemic agents, like ISAbdi, can really know and
classes that epistemic agents should know, if they had enough resources to
do so.
There are several different versions of the epistemic logics:
• Logic of knowledge for single agent reasoning
• Logic of knowledge for multi–agent reasoning
• Logic of common knowledge for multi–agent reasoning
• Logic of justification
• Logics for multi–modal contexts
• Logic of beliefs for agent reasoning
• Logic for knowledge and belief representations.
In this thesis we discuss mainly the first two items and very briefly the
third and fourth ones.
Epistemic Logic of Single Agent
The language of epistemic logic comprises the language of propositional
logic added with the following unary epistemic and doxastic operators:
• KiA meaning that agent i knows A and
• BiA meaning that agent i believes A.
For example, the meaning of the formula ¬Ki¬A is that agent i considers
A possible [123].
The language of epistemic logic is defined as follows:
Definition. Let L be a non–empty, countable set of atomic formulae of
the propositional logic and i be an agent. The sentences of LK are defined
inductively as follows:
1. L ⊆ LK
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2. If A ∈ LK then ¬A ∈ LK
3. If A ∈ LK and B ∈ LK then (A ∧ B) ∈ LK
4. If A ∈ LK and B ∈ LK then (A ∨ B) ∈ LK
5. If A ∈ LK and B ∈ LK then (A → B) ∈ LK
6. If A ∈ LK and then KiA ∈ LK .
The axioms of epistemic logic are specified as follows [34, 115, 123]:
Definition. K is the epistemic logic specified by the following axioms and
rules on inference:
(PC): All tautologies of the propositional logic
(K): KiA ∧Ki(A→ B)→ KiB (Distribution axiom)
(MP): From A and A→ B to infer B (Modus Ponens)
(RN): From A to infer KiA (Rule of Necessitation)
We can obtain stronger logics by adding to the logic K principles that
express other desirable properties of knowledgep. For example, the following
common schemes can be added [115]:
(T): KiA → A (Knowledge axiom)
(D): KiA → ¬Ki¬A (Consistency axiom)
( 4): KiA→ KiKiA (Positive introspection axiom)
( 5): ¬KiA → Ki ¬KiA (Negative introspection axiom)
(.2): ¬Ki ¬KiA → Ki ¬Ki ¬A
(.3): Ki(KiA → KiB) ∨ Ki(KiB → KiA)
(.4): A → (¬Ki ¬KiA → KiA)
Knowledgep axiom (T) states that knowledgep must be true. Systems
containing the schema (T) are called the logic of knowledgep, and if the
schema (T) is dropped then systems are called the logic of beliefp. In the
context of ISAbdi, especially when ISAbdi perceives its external world, it is
not straightforward to detect when a proposition is true or false (see Section
3.3). However, care should be taken not to collapse knowledgep and beliefp
in the combined systems [115].
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Consistency axiom (D) demands that an agent must be consistent in
its knowledgep; hence, it cannot know both a formula and its negation.
In the context of ISAbdi, especially in the cases where ISAbdi has a huge
knowledge database, the consistency requirement may create problems to
efficiency requirements.
The positive introspection axiom (4) states that the agent actually
knows what it knows, and the negative introspection axiom (5) states that
the agent actually knows what it does not know. In context of ISAbdi these
axioms may lead to the regression problem and make the implementation of
beliefc databases of ISAbdi complicated by requiring metadata of metadata
of ... of knowing that knows.
By selecting separate sets of the above axioms different systems of ax-
ioms can be established, and each system of axioms has a different level of
modal strength. The axiom (K) establishes the system K, but this system
is too weak for epistemic reasoning. Hence, the system T, which comprises
the axioms (K) and (T) as valid axioms, is the weakest one used in epistemic
reasoning.
In the context of ISAbdi it is not quite clear what these requirements
mean on implementations of ISAbdi as for example, they can easily create
a regression problem: ISAbdi knows that it knows that it knows that ... or
demand a powerful reasoner that cannot properly be implemented using
today’s software solutions.
Epistemic Logic of Multiple Agents
Nowadays an increasing number of systems based on ISA are multi–
agent systems comprising several—most often different kinds of—epistemic
agents. Therefore, there is a need for multi–agent epistemic logic systems.
One way to achieve this is to augment a single agent epistemic logic to
a group of agents. Hence, there are two primary differences compared to
single agent epistemic logics: the number of agents and the number of
accessibility relations.
Let us suppose that there is a group G consisting of n agents. The
language of single–agent epistemic logic [34, 115, 123] is augmented by
n knowledge operators K1, K2,..., Kn. Now, it is possible to state that
”agent 1 knows that agent 2 does not know that agent 1 knows that p”:
K 1¬K 2K 1p. The model M for a single agent epistemic system is augmen-
ted by n accessibility relations R1, R2,..., Rn. The structure of the model
M is the following one: M = (W, R1, R2,...,Rn, V ). And the satisfaction
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relation is as follows:
M,w |= KiA iff for every v ∈ W: if wRiv then M,v |= A.
There is a special case regarding a group of agents to know facts, and
that is the case when all the agents in the group know simultaneously the
very same fact that A. This is called common knowledge, and it can be
defined as follows [115]: K 1A ∧ K 2A ∧...∧ K nA. Common knowledge can
be semantically interpreted using the model for multi–agent systems and
augmenting it by a special accessibility relation Rc, where Rc = (R1 ∪ R2
∪...∪ Rn). And the model is as follows: M = (W, R1, R2,...,Rn, Rc, V ).
The satisfaction relation is M,w |= CA iff wRcv implies M,v |= A.
Epistemic Logic of Justification
The epistemic logic of justification has not yet achieved any significant
popularity among AI researchers and logicians. It has not been common to
study epistemic justification using logical principles. One exception is the
closure principle, which has been discussed in the evaluation of different
justification theories. According to conjunction closure the set of proposi-
tions that one has justification for believing is closed under the operation of
taking conjunction, that is from JP ∧ JQ to infer J(P ∧ Q) [138].27 This
principle and its (in)validity has been discussed to some extent in the con-
texts of the lottery and preface paradoxes. However, the logic of epistemic
justification is still in its infancy. In his article The logic of epistemic justi-
fication Martin Smith tries to import into debates the nature of epistemic
justification according to which logical principles can provide valuable re-
sources for evaluating different theories of justification [138]. Also, Sven
Rosenkranz discusses the logical principles of justification in his paper The
Structure of Justification [119].
Risk minimisation theories claim that ”one has justification for believing
a proposition P just in case it would be unlikely, given one’s evidence, for P
to be false” [138]. Risk minimisation theories (we can count reliabilism to be
one of them) require that there is some probability threshold beyond which
a proposition would not be false, and therefore, believing the proposition
is justified. Thus, there is a probability function Pr such that E ⇒ P iff
Pr(P|E) > t, for some t close to but less than 1. Martin Smith states in his
article The logic of epistemic justification [138] ”A probability function is
nothing more than a function mapping propositions to numbers in a way
27J is a modal operator which states that one has justification for believing.
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that meets certain constraints. The domain of a probability function is
a set of propositions F that is closed under negation and disjunction and
includes a maximal proposition entailed by all others in the set.”
Possible worlds are often used to model propositions for computing
probability functions:
1. Pr(W) = 1 (W = a set of possible worlds)
2. Pr(P) ≥ 0
3. If P and Q are inconsistent then Pr(P ∨ Q) = Pr(P) + Pr(Q).
Conditional probability is defined by the formula [138]:
Pr(P|E) = Pr(P ∧ E)/Pr(E) if Pr(E) > 0 and is undefined otherwise.
Martin Smith argues that risk minimisation theories have problems
with conjunction closure [138]. The basic reason is the following one: Let
us suppose that the justification threshold is 0.9, and
1. The probability of proposition P1 is 0.95, therefore it is justified;
2. The probability of proposition P2 is 0.95, therefore it is justified;
3. The probability of proposition P3 is 0.95, therefore it is justified;
4. The probability of conjunction of propositions P1 ∧ P2 is 0.9025,
therefore it is justified;
5. The probability of conjunction of propositions P1 ∧ P3 is 0.9025,
therefore it is justified;
6. The probability of conjunction of propositions P2 ∧ P3 is 0.9025,
therefore it is justified; but
7. The probability of conjunction of propositions P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3 is 0.8573,
therefore it is not justified.
This is not according to conjunction closure [138]. But if the threshold
is 1 (infallibilist theory of justification), then conjunction closure is assured.
But infallibilism is the way to scepticism. Martin Smith argues that the
risk minimisation theories invalidates also the following ones [138]:
1. Cumulative transitivity: ((E ⇒ P), (E ∧ P) ⇒ Q): (E ⇒ Q)
2. Monotonicity: (E ⇒ P): ((E ∧ Q) ⇒ P)
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3. Amalgamation: (E ⇒ P), (F ⇒ P): ((E ∨ F) ⇒ P)
The question is that is it mandatory for the validity of justification theory
that conjunction closure and other ones must be assured.
Martin Smith proposes the following alternative theory to the risk min-
imisation: ”One has justification for believing a proposition P just in case
it would be abnormal, given one’s evidence, for P to be false.” [138]. He
argues the above logical principle are invalidated by this theory. However,
it is not quite clear what the term abnormal means.
Sven Rosenkranz argues that the structural account of justification can
be expressed using the following five principles [119]:
E: JP → ¬K¬KP
TK : KP → P
RNK : If ` P, then ` KP
RMK : If ` P → Q, then ` KP → KQ
Lum: ¬K¬KP → K¬K¬KP
Sven Rosenkranz says that the logic of justification based on the above
principles involves idealisations. He also argues that the logic of justification
cannot be a normal modal logic. The dominant factor is that whether the
logic for justification agglomerates over conjunction or not [119].28
Sven Rosenkranz also discusses the following principles for justification
[119]:
• From JP to infer JJP.
• From ¬JP to infer J¬JP.
• From JJP to infer JP.
• From J¬JP to infer ¬JP
Because of the scarce interest in the logic of justification it is not yet at
the demanded level, and further studies are required.
28For the proof, see the article The Structure of Justification [119].
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Summary of Logical Issues
Epistemic logic can be categorized into following types: the logic of beliefp,
the logic of justification, and the logic of knowledgep. The first one and the
last one have so far gained the most interest among logicians and AI people.
The logic of justification is still in its infancy requiring further studies.
In addition to normal philosophical requirements of logic there are re-
quirements such as efficiency, practical reasoning, common–sense reasoning,
and a philosophical aspect on how to actually characterize the properties
of ISAbdi in the terms of formulas of modal logics. There have been sev-
eral approaches to solve the problems created by the above requirements,
but there is still a lot of research to do. Incomplete information, different
degrees of justifications (reliabilityp of beliefp–forming process), concur-
rency, and continuous change are still major problems in epistemic logics
in the context of ISAbdi. In the context of AI logic quite often requires
to undertake the task of formalizing large examples involving non–trivial
common–sense reasoning.
The frame problem has caused a lot of work on reasoning in AI. The
problem arises because it should be necessary for a rational agent to know
thoroughly the whole state change: not only the properties of the world
that change as the result of an action but also the properties that do not
change when the action is executed. Another aspect is, how could ISAbdi
limit the scope of the proposition it needs to reconsider in the context of
its actions, especially in the cases where ISAbdi has enormous knowledge
p
bases to examine?
When we try to implement an ISAbdi, which should exhibit human–
like behaviour, it is not enough to utilize only epistemic logics because a
rational behaviour is most often the result of reasoning concurrently using
many different modal logics. Therefore, we need a kind of hybrid logic
that combines alethic logic, epistemic logic, temporal logic, and logic of
action. As an example of the hybrid approach is Michael Wooldridge’s
LORA – Logic Of Rational Agents [165]. LORA extends full first–order
branching time temporal logic with the addition of modalities for referring
to the beliefs, desires, and intentions of agents, and with a dynamic logic
for reasoning about actions. The semantics of LORA is very complicated,
and it requires a lot of study in order to properly implement it. For more
information about LORA, see [165].
Some of the problems of modal logics could be overcome using solutions
based on connectionism. Therefore, an approach comprising different ar-
chitectures of ISAs may provide a most proper solution for many contexts
and environment of IDS.
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Chapter 3
Six Concepts
3.1 Introduction to the Six Concepts
In this chapter we discuss six concepts that we consider to be important
in the context of the dependability of IDS. We analyse various epistem-
ological theories and their applicability to the environment of ISAbdi and
DIDS. When analysing epistemological theories and their applicability we
need to have a new viewpoint in addition to the viewpoint of traditional
epistemology. In traditional epistemology we study, define and analyse epi-
stemological theories in the context of an existing system (human brain and
natural languages, mainly English) in order to define theories that best ad-
dress the epistemological problems. In the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS we
need to take into account a viewpoint how to implement theories for new
AI systems. This viewpoint comprises several requirements such as how
to specify and code programs (programming languages, data presentation
languages, ontology languages, data structures, modal logics, ontologies,
etc.) and runtime requirements (memory, performance, dependability, in-
frastructure requirements, etc.). The actual importance of each of these
requirements is mostly dependent on applications. In this thesis we do not
discuss any specific real applications; therefore, we have a generic approach
to these requirements and we do not discuss them in detail. Based on the
analysis we propose new definitions of justified beliefp and knowledgep so
that they can be better applied to the environment of ISAbdi and DIDS.
Epistemology is an open–ended study of human knowledge and justified
beliefs. Man has discussed knowledge and justified beliefs over two thou-
sand years considering that those terms are attributable only to human
beings. However, the progress in computer science and related disciplines
during the last 60 years has brought a new dimension to the discussion.
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Alan Turing brought the topic on the scene in his 1950 paper Computer
Machinery and Intelligence [146], where he issued a question: Can ma-
chines think? The next fundamental article was John McCarthy’s Ascrib-
ing Mental Qualities to Machines [89] (published 1979), where McCarthy
introduced ideas to ascribe certain beliefs, knowledge, free will, intentions,
consciousness, abilities or wants to a computer program, when such an
ascription expresses the same information in the contexts of a machine and
a person. Thus, anthropomorphism had entered into computer science, and
we discuss this issue in more detail below.
Significant progress has taken place since those articles, and for ex-
ample, at the 2014 Turing Test the winning bot—chatting robot—fooled
over 30 percent of the judges to think that they were communicating with
a human being1, IBM’s Watson won Jeopardy! Challenge, Google’s Al-
phaGo won the world’s best GO player (Lee Sedol), and AlphaGo Zero
has learned by itself the best moves of the game GO by playing millions
of games against itself. Hence, we can claim that intelligent software en-
tities have shown human–like behaviour; therefore, indicating a possibility
to have beliefsp, justified beliefsp, and knowledgep. Epistemology and in-
telligent software entities have been discussed in more detail from different
viewpoints, for example, in [4, 6, 21, 106, 135, 134, 163].
John R. Searle raised severe dispute about the capabilities of a com-
puter system to be a mind; thus, to understand, to have intentions, etc. In
his Chinese Room argument the main theses were as follows: (1) Intention-
ality2 in human beings is created by causal features of the brain and (2)
instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition
of intentionality [128]. One of the main targets was the view that formal
computations on symbols could produce thought; in other words, there is
no way to attach any meaning to the formal symbols because syntax and
internal connections are insufficient for semantics [27]. There are several
replies to John R. Searle’s claims comprising, for example, so–called virtual
mind reply, systems reply, robot reply, brain simulator reply, and intuition
reply [27].
We see that the main weaknesses of John R. Searle’s arguments are
as follows: 1) Terms, such as understand, intention, and beliefp are not
unambiguously explicated, well enough. Therefore, there are several grey
1Though there are opinions that the Turing Test is not a good test to determine
whether a machine can think or not.
2”Intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to present, or to
stand for things, properties, and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states
that they have intentionality is to say that there are mental representations or that they
have contents” [75].
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areas within which it seems to be very difficult to achieve any consensus.
2) John R. Searle seems to assume that human beings have some kind of
higher level biological (metaphysical) entity that explains the ’superior’ fea-
tures over artificial entities.3 Therefore, intentionality (including beliefsp)
is something that seems to be possible only for human beings. 3) The
Chinese Room argument is outdated in the context of AI, because AI re-
searchers are more interested in and discussing the term superintelligence.
Superintelligence refers to artificial entities that greatly outperform the best
current human minds in most general cognitive domains. As Nick Bostrom
in his book Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies states that AI
needs not resemble a human mind much, and AI will have very different
cognitive architectures than biological intelligences [21]. We have discussed
the Chinese Room argument in more detail in the Appendix Is it Time to
Get Out of the Chinese Room.
Our approach to the issues raised by anthropomorphism can be sum-
marized in the following claims:
• Externalist attitude: The states of a physical entity get their con-
tent through causal connections to the external reality they represent.
This is not limited only to human beings.4
• A computer might have propositional attitudes if it has the right
causal connections to the world.5
• The syntactically specifiable objects over which computations are
defined can possess semantics; it is just that the semantics is not
involved in the specifications [117]. In the context of ISAbdi we can
have semantics involved using metadata about information explain-
ing causal connections to the world and the causal connections them-
selves.6
• Programming is precisely what could give something a mind.7
However, anthropomorphism still seems to be a difficult issue, especially
from a humanistic point of view, as Sir Anthony Kenny discussed in his
first Georg Henrik von Wright lecture at the University of Helsinki [77],
and Peter Hacker tried to prove in his talk at the Wheatly Forum [64].
3We are not aware of any evidence that would prove human beings to have such an
entity.
4Corroborated by Fred Dretske, Hilary Putnam, and Jerry Fodor
5Corroborated by Jerry Fodor
6Corroborated by Georges Rey
7Corroborated by Daniel Dennett
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Figure 3.1: Human belief and ISA belief.
We have a black box approach to terms that can be considered to be
anthropomorphic. The following example illustrates our thoughts (Figure
3.1):
Let us suppose that two cars are approaching side by side a crossroad, where
a pedestrian is just crossing the road so that the cars must stop to give way to
the pedestrian. One car is driven by a man and another car is driven by an ISA.
Let us also suppose that the status of information and information processing
of both the man and the ISA regarding traffic laws is equal. The ISA has also
similar kinds of concepts of the pedestrian, crossing and road as human beings
have. Now, the man sees via his reliable visual system that the pedestrian is
crossing the road and infers based on this perception a proposition ”A pedes-
trian is crossing the road.” and forms a beliefp based on it. Therefore, he must
stop his car in order to avoid an accident. Similarly, the ISA perceives via its
equally reliable video, radar and shape recognition system that the pedestrian
is crossing the road and deduces based on this perception a proposition ”A
pedestrian is crossing the road.” and forms a beliefp based on it. Therefore, it
must stop the car in order to avoid an accident.
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Now, we can argue that in the case of the man the proposition ”A
pedestrian is crossing the road.” is the object of the man’s beliefp (see
definitions below in Section 3.4). Now, what can we say in the case of the
ISA? Clearly, the proposition ”A pedestrian is crossing the road.” is what
the ISA considers to be the case, and there is very little unreliabilityp of the
matter. In addition, the ISA is in a state of having a representation of the
proposition stored, and the representation is created by actual and causal
relations to sensory stimulations. If we want to explain this situation of
the ISA to another person then the concept of beliefp is the best one to
explicate it.
What are the differences between these cases? The processes leading
to the representations are different, but their outcomes are similar. The
observable behaviour in both of these cases is similar. The internal rep-
resentations of the propositions are quite different. In the case of the man
we do not actually know what is the exact (neurobiological) representation
of the beliefp, the proposition and its supporting information, because the
related sciences (cognitive neurobiology, psychology, etc.) are not yet ad-
vanced enough. But in the case of the ISA we do know it. Hence, it seems
to be that in this case humanism concerns something that we do not fully
understand yet. Therefore, in the case of human beings there might be
something—but we don’t know exactly what—that deserves the human-
istic attitudes towards terms like beliefp, intentionp, knowledgep, etc. But
the meaning of the term belief p is the same in both cases; both the man
and the ISA are in the state of beliefp, the object of which is the proposition
”A pedestrian is crossing the road.”.
Jerry Fodor argued that human beings are semantic engines with a lan-
guage of thought [41]. Aaron Sloman and his group at the University of
Birmingham have developed a concept of information–processing virtual
machine (hereinafter VM) and virtual machine functionalism (hereinafter
VMF) [136, 137]. We can use virtual machines to represent the black boxes
in Figure 3.1. According to this concept the human mind is one kind of
virtual machine, which is operated by a human body. And ISA is another
kind of virtual machine, which is operated by a computer. The basic idea
of functionalism is that the essence of a mental state is not to be found in
the biology of the brain but rather in the role that it plays in one’s mind
and in the causal relations that it bears to stimuli [6]. Thus, functionalism
claims that mental states are not only physical states, but also functions or
operations of those physical states. Hence, mind could be implemented in
any physical system (natural or artificial), which is capable of supporting
the required computation and the functioning of the system including its
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actions. Another similar approach is the computational theory of mind
(hereinafter CTM), which was proposed by Hilary Putman and further en-
hanced by Jerry Fodor [112, 116]. But instead of speaking about occurrent
propositional attitude states VMF concentrates on the architecture of the
mind and the states and functionalities enabled by the components of the
virtual machines.
Every VM has an architecture that provides tools to operate on in-
formation. The architecture comprises forms of representation, algorithms,
concurrently active sub–systems, connections between sub–systems, and
causal interaction between sub–systems, etc. The human mind has one
kind of architecture and ISA has another kind of architecture. VMF allows
multiple, concurrently active, interacting mental states, and an individual
can have many mental sub–states at any time. Each sub–state is defined
by its causal relationship to other sub–states and its environment [136].
VM schema and VMF provide us with a good, acceptable foundation
to discuss epistemic terms in the context of ISAbdi.
Another popular approach to capturing and understanding the mechan-
ism and processes of cognition is to build models using networks of simple,
neuron–like processing elements, each of which performs simple numerical
computations as already discussed in Section 2.2.1. In this approach a rep-
resentation is often a pattern of activations over a set of processing units in
the model [144]. But this form of the representation of information is much
more difficult to analyse and evaluate than the representations based on
explicit symbols; hence, it is not suitable for the objectives of this thesis.
Intuitionp plays a significant role in epistemology [111]; for example,
when evaluating the appropriateness of different definitions of knowledgep,
justified beliefp, and beliefp. However, the exact nature of intuitionsp has
not been precisely explicated, and principled taxonomy of the various kinds
of intuitionsp has not been established [111]. Therefore, we can claim that
there is no significant role of intuitionp in the context of ISAbdi. At first
glance this seems to be in contradiction with our claim above: ISAbdi
can have knowledgep, justified beliefsp, and beliefsp. But this is not the
case. Intuitionp has a role in the evaluation of theories and definitions,
but not, when evaluating whether the information stated by a proposition
is knowledgep and/or justified beliefp based on an appropriate definition.
Therefore, ISAbdi is not required to have intuition
p.
We can summarize our basic thoughts on the philosophy of the mind
and anthropomorphism in the context of ISAbdi as follows: we support
virtual machine functionalism, which implies that same mental states can
be realized using quite different methods and various physical systems, such
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Figure 3.2: Classification of information.
as a human brain, a dolphin brain, and an artificial entity. Therefore, we
argue that we can use anthropomorphic terms, such as beliefp, justified
beliefp, knowledgep, and intentionp in the context of artificial entities, such
as ISAbdi. In addition, we support speech–act theory, which emphasizes
that the key unit of linguistic meaning is not an abstract sentence but an
utterance as a concrete act carried out by people and ISAbdis [6].
We have the following classification of information as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.2. There are many different meanings for the term information de-
pending on the context of its usage, for example, information is that which
informs [33, 40]. A general definition of information as a semantic content
that comprises both data and meaning is the following one [40]:
I is an instance of information, understood as objective semantic content,
if and only if:
1. I consists of n data (d), for n ≥ 1;
2. The data are well–formed; and
3. The well–format data is meaningful.
In this thesis we define information to be any data that is syntactically well–
formed and has a meaning—that is, it involves semantic—to an epistemic
agent, who holds information.
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In philosophy proposition seems to be a difficult concept, and even the
existence of proposition is questionable as discussed in the article written by
Matthew McGrath and Devin Frank [90]. The term proposition has many
different explications. A proposition can be used as the primary bearers
of truth–value, the object of beliefs, the referents of that–clauses, and the
meanings of sentences [90]. In this thesis we use the term proposition to be
shareable objects of attitudes and the primary bearers of truth–value. We
also see propositions to be a type of objective semantic contents. Semantic
information has an important role in communications, where an important
type of semantic information is factual information. It tells the informee
something about something else. Factual information has a declarative
nature [40].
Beliefp is the attitude of an epistemic agent to a proposition that the
epistemic agent considers to be true. Justified beliefp is beliefp for which
the epistemic agent has a justification for it to be true. Knowledgep is
justified beliefp that is true.8 9
Next we discuss in more detail epistemic value, the theories of truth,
beliefp, justified beliefp, knowledgep, and trust. We start with a discussion
of epistemic value in order to point out issues why knowledgep is more
valuable than plain (true) beliefp. We continue the discussion with the
topic of truth, because truth is a kind of fundamental concept in the way
that epistemic agents aim at it or at least should aim at it. On the other
hand, it is difficult to comprehend the actual meaning of truth in the context
of ISAbdi.
3.2 Epistemic Value
One of the aims of epistemology is to understand the value of knowledgep.
Is knowledgep valuable, and if it is valuable then why? The same question
can be raised in the context of ISAbdi, as well. We argue that knowledge
p
is more valuable than justified beliefp also in the context of ISAbdi, but
not exactly in the same sense as discussed in the Meno problem written by
Plato. At first, we need to clarify what we mean with the term epistemic
value, as its explication varies across contexts. There are at least two
different ways to discuss epistemic value [108, 109]: The first way to express
8There are also other requirements for beliefp to be knowledgep as discussed in Section
3.6.
9As we support fallibilism, we are of the opinion that there is a minor possibility
that a beliefp which we reason to be knowledge is not always true. For example, science
is considered to aim at and create knowledge, but history has shown that many times
scientific knowledge is proved later to be untrue.
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that something is of epistemic value is to say that it is something which is
epistemic (for example knowledgep) and which is valuable. The second way
to express that something is of epistemic value is to attribute a particular
kind of value to it (a kind of value which is epistemic). There is a difference
between epistemic value and the value of epistemic. It should be noted
that something epistemic can also have non–epistemic values, such as an
aesthetic value. In the context of ISAbdi we are primarily interested in the
first interpretation, as it expresses how epistemic entities are utilized by
ISAbdi when it operates to provide services. For example, the proposition
”Snow is white.” is seen as an epistemic entity having epistemic quality of
beliefp, justified beliefp, or knowledgep, and it has a value—various degrees
based on its epistemic quality—in the process of reasoning about the next
action to carry out.
In recent decades a lot of attention has been devoted to the question
”Why does knowledge matter?”; especially, why knowledgep that p is more
valuable than mere true beliefp that p, or actually, why knowledgep that p
cannot be more epistemically valuable than mere true beliefp that p. At
least, we can argue that truth in one’s beliefp is minimally valuable in the
sense, that all other things being equal, true beliefsp are better than false
ones because true beliefsp enable us to fulfil our goals better [110].
In the context of ISAbdi our questions can be expressed as follows: What
do we mean with the term epistemic value? What is the role of epistemic
value in the environment of ISAbdi? Why is knowledge
p more valuable than
justified beliefp and why is justified beliefp more valuable than mere beliefp?
There are several different kinds of values, which can be attached to
knowledgep, justified beliefp and beliefp. It is commonly accepted that
true beliefp is often instrumentally valuable. Something has instrumental
value if and only if it is valuable for the sake of something else meaning
it is valuable as a means to some end [67]. But one of the key questions
is as follows: Is true beliefp—as well as justified beliefp and knowledgep—
intrinsically valuable, that is valuable for its own sake in the context of
ISAbdi? One way to try to answer this question is to consider whether
ISAbdi has an intellectual interest in a truth, which is grounded in ISAbdi’s
’curiosity’. Thus, true beliefp would be valuable for its own sake when it
answers such an interest [23]. Has ISAbdi such a kind of curiosity? We argue
that this is not the case. Even though for some peculiar reasons ISAbdi could
be designed and implemented to act as ’curiously’ for its own sake, ISAbdi
would not have a real kind of motivation to act ’curiously’ as ISAbdi is
not a naturally curious being.10 In addition, we claim that in the context
10This is the case at the time of writing this thesis.
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of ISAbdi all the epistemic entities have value only as a means to provide
ISAbdi’s customers with the best possible services (ISAbdi’s existence is
motivated only through its capabilities to serve others); thus, ISAbdi is not
interested in knowledge for its own sake, but only as the instrumental value.
There could also be eudaemonic value [67]. Eudaemonic value for S is
value vis–a–vis well–being of S, in other words, what is good or bad for S
[67]. As eudaemonic value is seen as a subjective thing—from the viewpoint
of an epistemic agent—we claim that in the context of ISAbdi there is no
such value because there is no such psychological phenomenon of ISAbdi,
which can be assumed to exhibit well–being of ISAbdi.
11 Therefore, we
see the value of knowledge from the perspective of a sui generis domain of
epistemic value, distinct from the domain of eudaemonic value.
We continue the discussion about epistemic value with the help of the
medical scenario introduced in Section 2.1.1, which we analyse in order to
point out our understanding of the epistemic value.
Therefore, we need to evaluate the epistemic value of the information
stated by each proposition:
A: The correct diagnosis is trimalleolus fracture.
B: The correct diagnosis is bimalleolus fracture.
C: The correct diagnosis is lateral malleolus fracture.
and how they affect the process of Matti’s medical care.
This scenario indicates that the instrumental value of knowledgep is
higher compared to the instrumental value of either justified beliefp or mere
beliefp for the proper medical care and best possible recovery. This is
because beliefp and justified beliefp are more likely false than knowledgep,
and a right diagnosis is the most essential factor in the determination of
correct medical procedures. Thus, we can reason that because ISAbdi is
required to achieve its goals, then it would be preferable for ISAbdi to have
relevant knowledgep. The scenario also indicates that reliabilism is a proper
approach to knowledgep and justified beliefp, as the most reliable process
(operation) to do the diagnosis leads to the best practice and result. This
is because knowledgep comprise the existence of a reliablep connection to
truth.
In our scenario above the epistemic value of knowledgep is discussed
comparing the epistemic value of the information stated by proposition A
11There is a question about what we mean with the term well–being of ISAbdi. If its
explication comprises the existence of ISAbdi, then there can be eudaemonic value.
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(knowledgep) to the epistemic value of the information stated by proposi-
tion B (justified beliefp) and the epistemic value of the information stated
by proposition B to the epistemic value of the information stated by pro-
position C (mere beliefp). The much debated epistemic value problem—the
Meno problem by Plato and its derivatives—discusses possible added value
of knowledgep compared to true beliefp in the case when a proposition is
the same one. The first derivative is as follows [110]: why is knowledgep
more valuable than any proper subset of its parts? The second derivative
requires to explain what special kind of value is achieved once beliefp is
transformed from true justified beliefp to knowledgep? Thus the question
is: what is the relevance of these problems in the context of ISAbdi?
Duncan Pritchard expresses the Meno problem (the swamping argu-
ment) as follows [109]:
P1 If the value of a property possessed by an item is only instrumental
value relative to a further good and that good is already present in
that item, then this property can confer no additional value to that
item.
P2 The value of the property of being a reliably formed belief is instru-
mental value relative to the good of true belief.
C1 Reliably formed true belief is no more valuable than mere true belief.
From (P1) and (P2)
P3 Knowledge is reliably formed true belief.
C2 Knowledge is no more valuable than mere true belief.
From (C1) and (P3)
At first, we are of the opinion that in the context of ISAbdi knowledge
p
is not always more valuable than true beliefp, but there are many cases
where instrumentally knowledgep is more valuable than mere true beliefp.
Mere true beliefp is more likely to be lost than knowledgep, which is more
stable. Knowledgep is not entirely stable either, but justified beliefp and
mere beliefp are more unstable than knowledgep. There is a good reason
why knowledgep is more stable than mere true beliefp because knowledgep,
unlike mere true beliefp, could not easily be mistaken [110].
Linda Zagzebski states that the reliabilityp of the source of a beliefp can-
not explain the difference in value between knowledgep and true beliefp, if
truth is all that matters because reliabilityp in itself has no value or disvalue
[169]. However, according to her, knowledgep should not be understood in
itself as a state consisting of a known beliefp, but rather as a state which
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consists of both the true beliefp and the information of the source of the
true beliefp. As Alvin Goldman12 and Erik Olsson state in their article
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge [58]: ”A reliablep process itself has
value, which can be added to that of the resulting true beliefp to yield a
compound state of affairs13 (a knowledgep state) with more value than the
true beliefp alone.” When a true beliefp is produced by a reliable process,
the compound state of affairs has a certain property that would be miss-
ing, if the same true beliefp were not so produced [58]. Alvin Goldman and
Erik Olsson argue that the property of making it likely that one’s future
beliefsp of a similar kind will also be true is such a property (conditional
probability solution) [58]. Stability is the key component. The extent to
which a knowledgep state enhances the conditional probability of future
true beliefsp depends on a number of empirical regularities [58]. This is a
valid argument in the context of ISAbdi, as usually ISAbdi processes same
algorithms over and over again. There is a connection to the dependability
theory of computer science. On the other hand, Duncan Pritchard argues
that this reliabilityp is a value that attaches to a process producing reliablyp
true beliefp and not to true beliefp itself. However, we do not agree that
this statement invalidates the above argument in the context of ISAbdi be-
cause in the presence of fallibilism and vagueness of the concept of truth the
instrumental value of reliablyp produced true belief (knowledgep ) is higher
than unreliablyp produced true beliefp. This is linked to the trustworthi-
ness of a true beliefp when ISAbdi uses it in decision making processes, as
a reliablep process attaches its trustworthiness to the true beliefp.
Thus, the question is the following: Do benefits achieved by knowledgep
overwhelm the efforts that are required to achieve knowledgep?14 In addi-
tion, we argue that in pragmatic circumstances ISAbdi is not interested in
whether knowledgep A is more valuable than true beliefp A, but ISAbdi is
actually interested in whether knowledgep A is more valuable than justified
beliefp B and whether justified beliefp B is more valuable than mere beliefp
C. This is the case because the answer to the latter questions are more
important as factors when deciding on actions to be carried out—just like
our scenario above indicates. ISAbdi is not interested in knowledge
p for its
own sake, but to provide its customers with dependable services.
Finally, we agree with John Hyman who expresses the difficulty of the
knowledge value problem in the following way [71]: ”Instead of asking what
we need to add to belief to get knowledge, or how knowledge differs from
12Alvin Goldman himself does not support this.
13A compound state consists of a reliable process followed by a true beliefp.
14This is an application dependent factor; thus, the problem itself is outside the scope
of this thesis.
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belief, we are forced to ask how knowledge gets exercised or expressed—
since this is invariably how abilities are defined. ..... Knowledge is the
ability to be guided by the facts.”
3.3 Truth
One of the first definitions of truth is Aristotle’s ”For to state of that which
is the case that it is not the case or of that which is not the case that it
is the case is false, and to state of that which is the case that it is the
case and of that which is not the case that it is not the case is true.”
[69]. Since Aristotle’s time several truth theories have been developed,
such as the coherence theory (Francis Bradley) [167], the pragmatic theory
(Charles Peirce, John Dewey, Michael Dummett, William James) [53], the
correspondence theory (Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Aus-
tin) [88, 121], the semantic theories (Alfred Tarski, Donald Davidson) [53],
the redundancy theories (Frank Ramsey, John Mackie, Nuel Belnap, Peter
Strawson) [143].15 Because of the many theories of truth there has been an
opinion that not all declarative sentences in all domains are true in exactly
the same way. This is called pluralism about truth. The basic interpreta-
tion includes statements that there is more than one truth property, some
of which are had by all true sentences [104].
Truth theories can also be classified as 1) deflationary theories, which
include the redundancy theory, the prosententialism theory, the disappear-
ance theory, the disquotational theory, and the minimalist theory and 2) in-
flationary theories, which include the correspondence theory, the coherence
theory, and the pragmatism theory. The key difference between deflation-
ary theories and inflationary theories is the question whether or not truth
is a substantive property. Deflationists reject the idea that truth is the
substantive property while inflationists support the idea of the substantive
property. In other words the disagreement is over the following claim: there
exists some property F (e.g. correspondence) such that any proposition, if
true, is so in virtue of being F and this is a fact that is not transparent in
concept of truth. So the inflationary theory of truth claims that F is neces-
sary and sufficient for explaining the truth of any true proposition p [104].
According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a statement is
true is just to assert the statement itself [143].
As there is not after 2000 years of studies and discussions an unam-
biguous definition of truth, and as Jonathan Ichikawa et. al. [72] expresses
15In the parenthesis philosophers who supported the theory.
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”Something’s truth does not require that anyone can know or prove that it
is true. Not all truths are established truths. ... Truth is a metaphysical,
as opposed to epistemological, notion: truth is a matter of how things are,
not how they can be shown to be. So when we say that only true things can
be known, we’re not (yet) saying anything about how anyone can access
the truth.” clearly point out the difficulty of the issue.
As most epistemologists are of the opinion that what is false cannot be
knowledgep, the concept of truth may play a role when ISAbdi processes
information on behalf of human beings in the environment of DIDS. Below
we discuss some main features of truth theories related to this thesis. We
start with some requirements of truth theories.
Hannes Leitgeb has outlined in his article What Theories of Truth
Should be Like (but Cannot be) [86] several requirements for a good theory
of truth. Below we go through some requirements, which are relevant in
the context of ISAbdi.
1. Truth is to be expressed by a predicate and a theory of syntax
should be available.
”There is almost unanimous agreement that truth is to be expressed by
a predicate of the form ’is true’— briefly,’Tr’—and thus by a linguistic
device that is applied to singular terms which are meant to denote the
very objects that are true or untrue. For example, if ’Tr’ is a predicate of
declarative sentences, then we want to concatenate it with proper names,
definite descriptions or variables that refer to these sentences. [86]”
In the context of ISAbdi, where truth is usually expressed using artificial
languages, there are several different ways to express truth: as a parameter,
as a predicate, and as metadata. Which one is best is most often evaluated
according to other factors than the concept of truth itself. The factors are
more related to expressiveness, purpose, parsing, etc. of the language.
We argue that in the context of artificial languages propositions are
more appropriate truth bearers than sentences. In the world of ISAbdi
propositions are generally understood as making meaningful claims about
what the world is like. Sentences are more connected to the theory of
artificial languages: what is a correct syntax, how to parse a sentences, etc.
The predicate ’is true’ or ’Tr’ can be expressed in metadata describing
the world where the proposition is stated. The next example shows the use
of RDF–language (XML–representation) to express the proposition ”Snow













2. If a theory of truth is added to mathematical or empirical
theories, it should be possible to prove the latter true.
”A theory of truth should be designed in a way such that if truth is to
be explained for the language of a certain theory T, then adding such a
theory of truth to T should allow us to prove (the members of ) T true, or
otherwise this theory of truth would be either useless or flawed. [86]”
In the context of ISAbdi dealing with logical and mathematical theories
this is a rather uncontroversial issue. However, when ISAbdi deals with em-
pirical theories this is a very strong claim. And most often in the context
of ISAbdi truth is applied to an ’ordinary’ belief; thus, we can deploy here
Frapolli’s epistemic objections [43]. The theory of truth has to explain the
connection between truth and the criteria for its application. When truth
is attached to a propositional content, the content is put forward to be used
for further assertive acts, inference, or an action affecting ISAbdi’s world.
ISAbdi has to be in a position that enables it to believe that the content
deserves its support. In order to be in a position to declare that p is true,
ISAbdi has to check or prove that p. Therefore, the meaning of truth does
not include any epistemic trait [122].
3. The truth predicate should not be subject of any type restric-
tions.
”If we agree that the sentence ’2 + 2 = 4’ is true, it is a minor step to admit
that also the sentence ’Tr(’2 + 2 = 4’)’ is true. Accordingly, we want to
claim that ’Tr(’Tr(’2 + 2 = 4’)’)’ is true, and so forth. This leads us to
higher and higher levels of reflection, but there is nothing obviously wrong
about this fact. [86]”
Alfred Tarski tried to solve semantic paradoxes by suggesting a type-
theoretic hierarchy of object languages, metalanguages, metametalanguages,
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etc. Each of these language levels would have its own truth predicate that is
different from the truth predicates of the other levels. However, according
to Hannes Leigeb there are compelling reasons for using a simple untyped
truth predicate [86]. And Saul Kripke has pointed out that our language
contains just one word ”true”, and in addition there are applications of
truth predicates in everyday language for which we would not even know
what types should be assigned to them [78]. We are of the opinion that in
the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS the role of those semantic paradoxes do
not overcome the benefits of using using a simple untyped truth predicate.
As already mentioned above most often in the context of ISAbdi truth is
applied to an ’ordinary’ beliefp. Therefore, even though in the use of ar-
tificial languages, the truth predicate should not be subject to any type
restrictions.
4. Truth should be compositional.
”Suppose a sentence is built up from other sentences: whether or not this
complex sentence is true seems to be determined solely by whether or not
its syntactic constituent sentences are true and by the way the latter are
put together. This phenomenon is usually subsumed under the umbrella
term ’compositionality’; compositionality principles for truth, reference,
meaning, and so forth, are among the fundamental principles of semantics.
[86, 122]”
In the context of ISAbdi this requirement does not raise any concerns.
5. The theory should allow for standard interpretations.
”Speaking of the truth of a sentence without fixing an interpretation of
the linguistic expressions within the sentence does not make much sense;
without such an interpretation a sentence is not more than a sequence
of meaningless signs arranged in accordance with a set of recursive rules.
Usually, when we use a sentence we automatically assign an intended in-
terpretation to it. [86]”
In the context of ISAbdi we see this requirement to be mandatory be-
cause ISAbdi in the environment of DIDS must obey its intended ontological
commitments. Otherwise ISAbdi may not work according to its specific-
ations or the specifications are not defined properly corresponding with
requirements of dependable computing.
There are several interesting questions regarding the concept of truth
in the context of ISAbdi’s:
1. Is truth the same kind of concept in the context of ISAbdi as it is in
the context of human being?
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2. What is the role of truth in the context of ISAbdi?
3. Which truth theory or concept would be most appropriate in the
context of ISAbdi?
4. What is the truth bearer in the context of ISAbdi?
5. How is truth communicated between ISAbdis?
6. As theories are instruments, is there any such theory of truth that
has significant contribution to the context of ISAbdi?
3.3.1 Truth Theories
In this section we discuss various truth theories and their possible applic-
ability to the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS.
The Coherence Theory of Truth
According to the coherence theory of truth a beliefp is true if and only if
it is a part of a coherent system of beliefsp [53]. In the context of ISAbdi
one of the key questions is the following one: what does coherence actually
mean, especially in the cases where ISAbdi is dealing with common–sense
beliefsp formed from perceptions or via testimony. Is it a logical or orderly
consistent relationship of beliefsp, or is it the lack of semantic contradiction
between beliefsp, or is it maximizing satisfaction of constraints between
beliefsp? There is no single, general answer to these questions. In context
of DIDS this may create a problem because each epistemic agent operating
in DIDS may implement its own interpretation of coherence. This may lead
to a situation where the coherent systems of each epistemic agent are not
coherent as a whole. For example, an epistemic agent in DIDS can have a
fully coherent system of beliefsp, but this system is totally incoherent with
the other epistemic agents’ coherent systems in DIDS. Therefore, this may
create a situation, where an epistemic agent believes a beliefp to be true,
but other epistemic agents do not believe it to be true based on their own
coherent systems of beliefsp. This is a logical incompatibility between the
epistemic agents operating in DIDS, and it breaks the law of contradiction.
Therefore, the coherence theory of truth creates design, implementation,
and dependability problems.
We claim that the coherence theory of truth falls short in the contexts of
ISAbdi and DIDS due to the ambiguous nature of coherence, the possibility
to break the law of contradiction, and the problems in communications of
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true beliefsp (propositions) between agents in DIDS. And it is possible to
establish a coherent world without any correspondence to the real world as
we perceive it.16
The Pragmatic Theory of Truth
According to pragmatism the idea of truth belongs only to the domain
of science, as C.S. Peirce expressed it [84, 103]: ”The ideas of truth and
falsehood, in their full development, appertain exclusively to the scientific—
experiential—method of settling opinion.” Peirce defined truth to be ”the
opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed by all who investigate, is
what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion
is the real.” Pragmatism provides an account of the relations between the
concepts of truth, beliefp, and inquiry. According to William James [76, 84]
”The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of
beliefp, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons. ’The true’, to put it
very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ’the
right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.” One interpretation
of the pragmatic truth theory is that beliefsp are made true by the fact that
they enable us to make accurate predictions of the future run of experience.
We claim that the definitions of pragmatic theory of truth are not exact
enough. For example, William James statement above allows every ISAbdi
to have its own interpretation and implementation of truth depending on
its environment and objectives. This, in turn, may create an environment
of DIDS, where one ISAbdi’s truth is not another ISAbdi’s truth despite
same perceptions and beliefsp. This may affect negatively the dependabil-
ity of IDS. Hence, the pragmatic theory of truth is either too difficult or
leave room for too many different interpretations to be modelled and im-
plemented properly for the environments of ISAbdi and DIDS. In addition,
the concept of truth is widely used in everyday communications outside the
domain of science. Therefore, we claim that the pragmatic theory of truth
falls short of being utilized in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS.
The Redundancy Theory of Truth
The basic idea of the redundancy theory of truth is that asserting that
p is true is completely equivalent to asserting that p itself. According to
16Though we see that there may exist virtual worlds, such as games, implemented using
ISAbdis, where the coherence theory of truth is quite feasible. In these cases a virtual
world can be fully coherent and yet a single beliefp is not true outside the world of the
game.
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redundancy theorists truth is a redundant concept, and the word truth does
not point to anything in reality [143]. In the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS
the problem with the redundancy theory of truth is that it deals mainly
with philosophy of language; therefore, it does not provide a proper theory
to implement a solution to infer the truth–value of a proposition. Therefore,
we claim that the redundancy theory of truth falls short of being utilized
in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS.
The Correspondence Theory of Truth
The fundamental idea of the correspondence theory can be expressed as the
following ontological thesis: a beliefp is true if there exists an appropriate
entity—a fact, a situation and a type of situation—to which it corresponds
[31, 53]. Thus, we see that truth is a world–to–world17 relation in the
context of ISAbdi, that is ISAbdi’s world models (social model, world model,
and mental model) correspond to the world, where ISAbdi operates. We
also claim that from the viewpoint of ISAbdi realism is closely related to
the idea of truth. In the context of ISAbdi the key features of realism can
be expressed in the following way [53]:
1. The world exists objectively, independently of the ways that ISAbdi
models or describes the world18 and
2. ISAbdi’s beliefs
p are about the world.
Now, the question is what kind of features are required by the world–to–
world relation in order it to be truth? We claim that reliabilism explains ad-
equately enough the required features in terms of the truth–conduciveness
of ISAbdi’s belief
p–forming process (see Sections 3.5.5 and 3.6.5).
We claim that the correspondence theory of truth is appropriate for the
contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS. It can be defined exactly and ubiquitously
enough for the specifications and implementations of ISAbdis and DIDS. It
does not raise any additional performance issues because the correspondes
between world–to–world is already a factor in the contexts of ISAbdis and
DIDS.
17In the case of human beings truth is a mind–to–world relation.
18The worlds created by virtual reality and augmented reality applications pose severe
problems to realism and we are of the opinion that those problems are worth of thorough
studies.
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The Identity Theory of Truth
The basic idea of the identity theory of truth states that the content of a
declarative sentence is true just if it is (identical with) a fact [14, 51]. And
a fact is defined to be, very generally, a way things are or a way the world
is. A variation of this definition is that declarative sentences are called
propositions, and all true propositions are identical with facts at the level of
reference. The identity theory of truth tries to make a connection between
language and reality.
The identity theory of truth is seen as a response to problems of the
correspondence theory of truth, but we see that this theory just shifts the
problem to the explication of the term fact. What actually is fact, and how
do we verify that something is a fact, for example, in the environments of
virtual reality and augmented reality. Therefore, we are of the opinion that
the identity theory of truth does not bring any benefits (clarity of defini-
tion, ease of implementation, etc.) compared to the correspondence theory
of truth; therefore, the correspondes theory of truth is more applicable in
the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS.
3.3.2 Speech Act Theory and ISA Asserting Propositions
In order to evaluate the concept of truth in the context of ISAbdi, we need to
explore cases where truth plays a role. There are two main components of
ISAbdi, where the concept of truth may play an important role. The first one
is the inference systems of ISAbdi, where truth is closely connected to various
logics, such as modal logics (e.g. the logics of belief, knowledge, time, and
action) (see Section 2.2.3). ISAbdi may also operate on natural languages
using various artificial languages and logical systems. The second one is
the communication system of ISAbdi, where truth deals with both ISAbdi’s
assertions to its co–operation partners and ISAbdi’s perceptions from its
co–operation partners. As truth is a complex concept, we concentrate only
on a sub–area of the concept that is when someone wants to carry out
an illocutionary act of asserting a true beliefp. Truth is related to acts
of saying something [43]. In the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS we can see
truth–communicative acts as a method of dependable communication. We
can compare ISAbdi performing an illocutionary act with human beings
performing an illocutionary act, even though ISAbdi does not usually use
any natural language to state the proposition but an artificial language
developed for ISAbdi–to–ISAbdi information exchange. The illocutionary
act of asserting a true beliefp serves to mark out contents that can be
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used as premises for inferences or as support for further acts based on the
assertion.
To understand the meaning of truth we need to comprehend the char-
acteristics of an act in which truth is ascribed. ISAbdi’s assertions can be
modelled using a theory of human–to–human communication called speech
act theory, which was developed by J.L. Austin and John R. Searle [127].
We follow the key idea of the FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical
Agents) standardization organization to model ISAbdi–to–ISAbdi informa-
tion exchange [39]. The type of illocutionary act we are interested in is the
type including assert, state that, and affirm any proposition p. Standard
speech acts in which truth typically plays a role are those that ascribe truth
to a propositional content by the use of a specific kind of sentence, a truth
ascription, and the truth ascription recovers a proposition already asser-
ted or assumed to be assertable. Truth is a property of things like claims,
assertions, beliefs, statements, or propositions; thus, it is not a property
of sentences [43]. When we model ISAbdi’s assertions using the speech act
theory, we assume that propositions are the truth bearers. Searle defines
the assert type of the illocutionary act as follows [127]:
1. Propositional content: Any proposition p.
2. Preparatory: First, S has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of p
and second, it is not obvious to both S and H that H knows p.19
3. Sincerity: S believes p.
4. Essential: Counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an
actual state of affairs.
Based on this definition ISAbdi’s assertion can be specified as follows [38]:
1. Communicative act: INFORM
2. Message content: Proposition
3. Description: INFORM indicates that the sending agent:
a) holds that the proposition is true,
b) intends that the receiving agent also comes to believe that the pro-
position is true, and
c) does not already believe that the receiver has any knowledge of the
truth of the proposition.
From the receiver’s viewpoint, the receiver believes that the sender
believes the proposition to be true.
19S = Speaker, H = Hearer
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4. Formal model: < i, inform(j, φ) >
FP: Bi φ ∧ ¬ Bi ( Bifj φ ∨ Uifj φ)
RE: Bj φ
Where:
i = agent i; j = agent j;
φ = proposition;
FP = feasibility precondition; RE = rational effect;
B = believe; Bif = believe if; and Uif = uncertain if.
An example: ISAbdi i informs (asserts) to ISAbdi j that (it is true that)
snow is white.
(inform
sender: (agent–identifier: name i)
receiver: (agent–identifier: name j)
content: ”white (snow)”
language: Prolog)
3.3.3 Thoughts about Truth and ISAbdi
Let us suppose the following hypothetical information exchange between
two ISAbdis S and R:
1. S asserts ”snow is white” to R.
2. R asks ”how do you know that it is true” from S.
3. S asserts ”I have knowledge of it” to R.
4. R asks ”what justifies your belief about it” from S.
5. S asserts ”I have a reliable perception of it and I obey reliabilism as
the knowledge theory” to R.
Now, what is the role of truth, here? Should we say that in this context
truth is sui generis or think in the same way as Frege expressed it: ”Truth
is obviously something so primitive and simple that it is not possible to
reduce it to anything still simpler.” [44] via [43]. Thus, there are no extra
benefits to be achieved, at all, by having a more advanced concept of truth
when we are dealing with ISAbdi’s assertions? So the reliabilism theory of
knowledge, as formulated, for example by Alvin Goldman, does the trick by
relying on a reliablep process of knowledge formation (truth–conduciveness
of a belief–forming process [57]). Or is truth just hiding in the background
as a higher order concept that is not needed explicitly to be taken care of
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in the acts of ISAbdi? Or should we agree with Mark Richard’s claim about
minimalism/deflationism that the most interesting thing about truth is that
it is not very interesting [118] via [43]. Should we be an inflationist or a
deflationist or a some kind of a bizarre combination of both of them when
we are dealing with ISAbdi?
We have an intuition that connects truth with a very high degree of
epistemic warrant. A truth ascription is an act in which an epistemic agent
attributes truth to a propositional content salient in the context [43]. Is
there any difference whether the epistemic agent is human being or ISAbdi?
We claim that there should be no difference, when for example, ISAbdi acts
on behalf of human being.
To understand the meaning of truth it is necessary to understand the
characteristics of the act in which a truth is ascribed [43]. We have a
very good ground to assume that descriptivism is one of the characterist-
ics. Descriptivism is the view that defends that all declarative sentences
describe a state–of–affairs, actual or possible and are thus true or false
[43]. As long as human beings are designing ISAbdi, this should be one of
the design principles to develop ISAbdi (the simpler the better principle).
Descriptivism and realism are close to each other. Realism supports the
idea that theoretical claims, as describing a mind independent (or world–
model independent) world, constitute knowledgep of the world. The cor-
respondence theory of truth is often associated with the external realism20
that involves the correspondes principle, according to which truth involves
a correspondence between beliefs and external things [25]. The principle
of correspondence claims that languages and theories speak and theorize
about mind independent entities. According to the correspondence theory
of truth, true theories do not aim to copy the world, but aim only at some
kind of structural similarity [25]. In the context of ISAbdi this means that
the theory according to which ISAbdi builds up its world model, mental
model, and social model must enable proper structural similarity between
the models and the world in which ISAbdi operates. If this requirement
is too strong (too difficult to implement or an implementation would not
fulfil performance requirements) then a truth–maker theory could be an
alternative approach because it abandons the requirement of the structural
relationship, but requires only that true propositions have some worldly
truth–maker [25].21
Another characteristic of an act is its context–sensitiveness. As Gottlob
Frege has advised in his book The Foundation of Arithmetic (page xxii)
20As such the correspondes theory does not require its supporters to be realists.
21This issue is worth of further study.
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”never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context
of a proposition” [45]. We can say that the meaning of ISAbdi’s proposition
is always depending on the context where the proposition is asserted. As
in contemporary pragmatics, the bearers of meaning and content are not
even identified with complete sentences but rather with complete speech
acts [43]. This implies that ISAbdi, in addition to asserting a proposition,
needs to inform a receiver/receivers of the context where speech acts take
place.22 This can be carried out in the metadata of propositions, which in
a way is equivalent to uttering a truth ascription such–and–such is true ’in
this context’ in natural language.
Truth is as much a semantic notion as it is a syntactic and pragmatic
instrument [43]. We see that in the context of ISAbdi truth is mostly the
semantic notion—unless ISAbdi deals only with logical and mathematical
applications—assigning some kind of value of meaningfulness to informa-
tion that ISAbdi is dealing with. Semantic expressiveness [43] is a view
on the type of contribution that a certain term makes to a proposition.
The meaning of truth is expressive in the semantic sense. Truth conditions
determine what is said. There are the conditions under which a partic-
ular content can be asserted, and also the conditions under which truth
can be correctly ascribed to it. In the context of ISAbdi this means that
ISAbdi must have relevant conditions at its capabilities. That is, in ISAbdi’s
world model, social model, and mental model there are required data about
the conditions, for example, contextual information, obeyed theories, used
algorithms, and truth value.
A very interesting question is as follows: What does ISAbdi do with truth
ascription? Asserting a content is offering it to others as true, putting for-
ward the content as something that can be used as a premise. Ascribing
truth to a content is presenting its status of ”usable” in an explicit man-
ner [43]. This thought presented by Frapolli is totally applicable in the
context of ISAbdi. When being true a justified belief
p expressed by a pro-
position is considered to be knowledgep23, and knowledgep provides ISAbdi
with a better chance to carry out its responsibility compared to—maybe
poorly—evaluated trustworthiness of information providing ISAbdi. Thus,
when asserting a truth ascription ISAbdi S provides ISAbdi R with a higher
possibility to succeed and to be dependable in its operations.
22Note that the receiver is not always aware of the context of the sender; for example,
in social media the sender’s context is not always known or the context may change from
time to time.
23There are also other requirements, as discussed in Section 3.6.
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3.3.4 Conclusions about Truth in the Context of ISAbdi
As truth is in general applied to ordinary beliefsp—except applications in
the domains of mathematics and logic—it is a difficult issue in the context
of ISAbdi. The question is, does truth as an explicit concept introduce as
such any real benefits that motivate to solve the problems? The answer
is an application–dependent issue; hence, it is outside of the scope of this
thesis. If truth really needs explicitly to be taken into account, we see two
possible approaches. First, a minimalist approach to truth ”Tr(snow is
white) if and only if snow is white” and this is all there is to say about the
concept of truth could be the appropriate solution for applications that have
minimal connections to the real world. Second, the correspondence theory
of truth could be the appropriate solution for applications that depend on
perceptions from the real world. We argue in Section 3.6 that a form of
the reliabilism theory of knowledgep—as well as justification—is the most
appropriate one in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS. We are of the opinion
that reliabilism scopes truth adequately enough—reliablep correspondence
as the world–to–world connection—in terms of the truth–conduciveness
of ISAbdi’s belief
p–forming process. The correspondence theory of truth
satisfies most of the requirements for truth theories discussed in the article
What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be) [86].
3.4 Belief
In this section we analyse what kind of entity beliefp is in the context
of ISAbdi. There are two main questions: First, what is the structure of
beliefp? And second, what is the role of beliefp?
Beliefp is considered to be an attitude that a human being has whenever
she/he takes something to be the case or regards to be true. In addition, in
a standard philosophical usage the term beliefp does not have uncertainty
about the matter in question. In general, beliefp is characterized to be
a propositional attitude, which is the mental state of having an attitude,
stance, or opinion about a proposition to be true. Thus, beliefp is the
state of having a representation of a proposition stored and believing the
proposition to be true [126].24 At a general level this indicates that ISAbdi
has a beliefp when it is in a state, where first, there is a proposition stored
(using appropriate representation) in its memory, and second, the truth–
value of the proposition is also stored in its memory.25
24The word beliefp is ambiguous between the state and the content of state, i.e. the
proposition.
25Another option instead of storing the truth value is an algorithm that enables storing
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Beliefp is generally considered to play a causal role in the production
of behaviour. This is called as a representational approach to beliefp. As
one flavour of representationalism Jerry Fodor sees mental representations
to be sentences in an internal language of thought (LOT, LOT2): mental
representations are structured and they have a compositional semantic [41].
The representational structure is linguistic. A subject believes that p only
in the case of having a representation of p that plays the right causal role in
hers/his/its cognitions. In the context of ISAbdi we see that the language
of thought is a prominent approach because various artificial languages,
such as Prolog, RDF, and OWL, are already used in the representations of
propositions, and representations are structured, stored, and deployed in
the processes executed by ISAbdi.
There are several other approaches in addition to representationalism
such as dispositionalism, interpretationism, functionalism, and instrument-
alism. Next we discuss briefly each of these approaches and their applicab-
ility in the context of ISAbdi.
According to dispositionalism [126] the pattern of actual and potential
behaviour is the fundamental thing in beliefp. People having this view of
beliefp argue that for someone to believe a proposition that p is for that
person to possess one or more particular behavioural dispositions pertain-
ing to p. In the context of ISAbdi this raises some design issues. One
issue is related to the status of a proposition: is it the object of a beliefp
or not? In order a proposition to be the object of a beliefp dispositional-
ism requires that there is an explicit connection between the proposition
and both options (potential behaviour) and actions (actual behaviour) (see
Figure 2.6). This creates at least three problems. First, the connection
structure may unnecessarily complicate the architecture and implementa-
tion of ISAbdi. Second, either there are two kinds of propositions in the
beliefc database (the models of the world): the objects of beliefsp and ones
that are not associated to any beliefp, or in the beliefc generation phase all
the propositions need to be connected to options in order to be stored in
the beliefc database. Both these cases are unsatisfactory because the first
one requires some kind of an update mechanism and the second one may
lead to a situation where important beliefsc is not stored, at all. Third, an
interesting question concerns a beliefc that is stored in the beliefc database
of ISAbdi, and which has not yet connected to any behavioural disposition,
but may be connected in a later phase when ISAbdi learns more about its
environment and changes its behaviour. What is the motivation of storing
the beliefc (proposition) if ISAbdi does not have any idea of the epistemic
only propositions that ISAbdi considers to be true.
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status of the beliefc? How do we track and update possible state changes
when ISAbdi learns more? The required mechanisms might be too expens-
ive from the viewpoint of performance requirements. We are of the opinion
that these kinds of problems cause dispositionalism to be unsuitable in the
context of ISAbdi.
Interpretationism [126] is similar to dispositionalism in the way that
patterns of actions and reactions are important factors instead of internal
representational structures. But interpretationism focuses on observable
behaviour, which is interpreted by an outside observer. This approach is
even more unsuitable in the context of ISAbdi, as it requires a feedback
mechanism in order to know whether a stored beliefc is a beliefp or not.
Using an external feedback mechanism based on the behaviour of an ISAbdi
could be an unnecessarily expensive operation, and the feedback mechanism
may have a severe affect on the possibility of ISAbdi to fulfil its performance
requirements.
Functionalists argue that mental states, beliefp in particular, are cre-
ated by their actual and potential causal relations to sensory stimulations,
behaviour, and other mental states. There are several causal relationships
that can be considered as characteristic of beliefp [126]:
1. Reflection on propositions from which p directly follows, if one be-
lieves those propositions, typically causes the beliefp that p.
2. Directing perceptual attention to the perceptible properties of things,
events, or states of affairs, in conditions favourable to accurate per-
ception, causes the beliefp that those things, events, or state of affairs
have those properties.
3. Believing that performing action A would lead to event or state of
affairs E, together with a desire to achieve E, will generally cause an
intention to do A.
4. Believing that p, in conditions favouring sincere expression of that
beliefp, will generally lead to an assertion of p.
The first case is straightforward in the context of ISAbdi because ISAbdi
usually implements various logics, such as propositional, predicate, and
modal logics (knowledge, time, event, etc.). However, there are some open
issues. For example, omniscience is one of them, that is, does ISAbdi need
explicitly to deduce all the logical results, which it believes, or does ISAbdi
believe propositions, which are not stored in its beliefc databases but could
be deduced, to be true or false? The second case is equally straightforward
because typically ISAbdi should be designed and implemented to utilize such
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input mechanisms that provide ISAbdi with adequate reliable
p perceptions
of matter and information to form beliefsp. The third case is the key com-
ponent of the belief–desire–intention architecture, thus, it is self–evident.
The fourth case is more difficult because the phrase ”sincere expression of
that belief ” is an open issue in the context of ISAbdi. What does ”sincere”
actually mean in the context of ISAbdi? Can ISAbdi by itself be malicious?
Functionalism requires a causal relationship either between the beliefp
state and its manifestations in behaviour (forward–looking causal relation)
or the beliefp state and the causes of the state in question (backward–
looking causal relation), and representationalism requires that beliefp is
the state of having such a representation stored [126]. In the context of
ISAbdi we can combine these two approaches
26 by stating that functionalism
expresses an external, process viewpoint to beliefp and representationalism
expresses an internal viewpoint to beliefp. But, there are epistemological
issues to be resolved, as it is not the same thing to say 1) to believe is to
be in a state that fills a particular causal role and 2) beliefs are states that
represent how things are in a world [126].
According to instrumentalism beliefp attributions are useful for certain
purposes, but there are no underlying facts that people really believe and
belief attributions are never in the strictest sense true [126]. We do not
see that instrumentalism would be a beneficial approach in the context of
ISAbdi, as it would make it difficult to analyse the status of a proposition,
which is used in two different purposes. In one purpose a beliefc could be a
beliefp (the proposition in question is the object of the beliefp) and another
purpose the same beliefc is not a beliefp, but something undefined.
Beliefsp can be classified to be either explicit or implicit: Proposition
p is explicitly believed if the representation of p is actually present in the
mind in the right sort of way [126]. In the case of ISAbdi this means that
the representation of p is stored in ISAbdi’s belief
c database coded with
appropriate semantic language. Proposition p is implicitly believed if the
mind does not possess the representation of p [126]. In the case of ISAbdi
this means that ISAbdi must somehow infer belief
p that p from other beliefsp.
Implicit beliefp faces two problems in the context of ISAbdi. The first one
is the omniscience problem and the second one deals with the performance
requirements of ISAbdi. Can we assume that ISAbdi has an implicit belief
p
which inferring time exceeds the available execution time t on one occasion
but does not exceed on another occasion? Therefore, implicit beliefsp pose
26Forward–looking causal relation is more difficult to implement, as it requires some
kind of feedback mechanism between the environment of ISAbdi and ISAbdi itself. Thus,
we prefer backward–looking causal relation.
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problems in the context of ISAbdi.
It is possible to have different degrees of confidence in a beliefp [126].
This actually implies that beliefp may not necessarily be true. Now we can
ask whether this is connected to the justification of beliefp or is it some-
how irrelevant to justification? If the degrees of confidence is connected
to justification, then justification may also have degrees, other than just
not justified and justified. If the degrees of confidence is not connected to
justification, then in the context of ISAbdi this implies a requirement of
two different beliefp evaluation mechanism: confidence evaluation, which
is based, for example, on recommendations and justification evaluation,
which is based, for example, on reliabilism. This approach may create
severe problems, for example, when the mechanisms do not cohere. We are
of the opinion that the degrees of confidence of the beliefp is connected to
the degrees of justification for the beliefp.
There are several definitions of beliefp, such as the following ones:
1. Beliefp is a propositional attitude that takes the proposition in ques-
tion to be true.
2. Beliefp is a propositional attitude that aims at truth.
3. Beliefp is a propositional attitude that is individuated by its actual and
potential causal relations to sensory stimulations, behaviour, and/or
other propositional attitudes.
When we adapt these definitions to the context of ISAbdi, we need to con-
sider the following two issues: first, the problems with the concept of truth
(see Section 3.3), and second, the representation of beliefp. In the context
of ISAbdi we assume that propositional attitudes are represented in a lin-
guistic form. We summarize our basic thoughts about beliefp in the context
of ISAbdi by the following definition:
Definition. Beliefpc is a propositional attitude,
1. which is the state of having an opinion about something
to be the case;
2. which is created by its actual and potential causal re-
lations to sensory stimulations, behaviour, and/or other
propositional attitudes; and
3. the representation of which—structured if necessary—is
stored in a linguistic form.
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3.5 Justified Belief
In this section we discuss the concepts of justification and justified beliefp
by analysing what is justification and what kind of entity is justified beliefp
in the context of ISAbdi. We explore various theories of justification, such
as foundationalism, coherentism, evidentialism, and reliabilism.
Justification is the key motivation for why an epistemic agent holds a
beliefp (proposition) to be true; thus, the role of justification can be seen
to help with reaching the truth of a beliefp.27
Our argument for ISAbdi to have justified beliefs
p focuses on the scenario
presented in Section 3.1 (page 12), which we consider to be representative
enough. Using the scenario we argue that if we think a human being having
justification for his/her beliefsp, then we should also think that ISAbdi has
justification for its beliefsp, as well. If we consider that the man in the
scenario has the justification for his beliefp ”A pedestrian is crossing the
road.” to be true by perceiving via his reliablep visual capability, then what
would be a reason for us to consider that ISAbdi could not have a similar
kind of justification for its beliefp ”A pedestrian is crossing the road.” to
be true. The perceptual capabilities—their reliabilityp—are at equal level
in both cases; hence, both recognize at equal level of reliabilityp the pedes-
trian and her/his movement. There is no difference regarding justification
in this case.28 Both epistemic agents have equal capabilities regarding the
memory containing the traffic laws; hence, the role of the pedestrian re-
garding justification is the same. Again, there is no difference regarding
justification. The inferring methods of the epistemic agents are not sim-
ilar, but their reliabilityp is at equal level; hence, once again, there is no
difference regarding justification. Then, the question is ”Has justification
itself a property that is possible only for a human being to manage?”. Cur-
rently we have not recognized any such property. Thus, we argue that
ISAbdi can have justifications for its beliefs
p.
When we consider a suitable justification theory for the environment of
ISAbdi, in addition to traditional epistemological issues we also have a differ-
ent kind of problems to be resolved, problems of which affect usability and
usefulness of a selected justification theory. First, how can we implement
ISAbdi that obeys the selected justification theory? Second, what are cog-
nitive requirements of ISAbdi that obeys the selected justification theory?
Third, can ISAbdi satisfy its performance requirements
29 when processing
27We assume here that beliefp aims at truth.
28This is based on reliabilism.
29Requirements such as response time, the amount of memory, usability, etc.
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justification for beliefsp and beliefsp themselves? In addition, there is a
question regarding contextualism: is justification dependent upon the con-
text where beliefp is obtained and/or used as a factor in decision–making
processes? We are of the opinion that this will be the case because ISAbdis
need also to be aware of the consequences of its actions. This will be the
case especially in the future where there are ISAbdis that learn new skills.
One of the first problems to which we must find a solution is whether
any of the traditional justification theories can be adopted or should a new
theory be developed to be utilized in the context of ISAbdi. The issue is
that in the context of human epistemology a justification theory could be a
proper one, but it cannot be implemented using the methods provided by
contemporary computer science and AI. Hence, the key factors are related
to the capability of implementing a possible justification theory. These
factors deal with the issues such as exactness and vagueness of the justi-
fication theory and the execution requirements of the implemented theory.
The first one means that it may not be possible to make a proper imple-
mentation model and specifications based on the theory, or there could
be several different implementations of the theory resulting contradictory
status of justification.30 The second one means that even though a se-
lected theory could be implemented its processing requirements (memory,
processor, response time, representation languages, logics, etc.) exceed
available computing resources.
We start with traditional justification theories. There are several dif-
ferent kinds of definitions of justification (justified beliefp), which could be
proper in the context of ISAbdi. At first, we discuss internalism and ex-
ternalism, then we continue with the following topics: 1. Foundationalism,
2. Coherentism, 3. Evidentialism, and 4. Reliabilism. The first two ones
discuss the structure of justification and the last two ones define the ways of
beliefsp to be justified. We discuss also the role of testimony in exchanging
justified beliefsp between ISAbdis and between ISAbdi and a human being.
There are two notions of justification, which are the doxastic sense of
justification and the propositional sense of justification. The doxastic sense
refers to the justificational status of beliefp held by a cognizer, and the
propositional sense refers to the cognizer’s epistemic situation that makes
her/him justified in believing a proposition even if she/he does not adopt
an attitude of beliefp towards it.
30This may raise problems in the environment of DIDS.
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3.5.1 Internalism and Externalism
Justification is categorized to be either internalist or externalist. There are
several slightly different definitions of internalism. For example, Laurence
BonJour defines it as follows [17]: ”A theory of justification is internalist
if and only if it requires that all of the factors needed for a belief to be
epistemically justified for a given person be cognitively accessible to that
person, internal to his cognitive perspective.” Furthermore, Laurence Bon-
Jour defines externalism with the help of internalism as follows [17]: ”A
theory of justification is externalist, if it allows that at least some of the
justifying factors need not be thus accessible, so that they can be external
to the believer’s cognitive perspective, beyond his ken.”
Internalism and externalism have raised a lot of discussions, where sup-
porters of both approaches have tried to prove their ideas to be the valid
ones and the opposers’ ideas to be the invalid ones. Critics on internal-
ism point out that most of the problems with internalism arise from the
knowability constraints. Strong internalism, which restricts justifiers to
conscious states, is stuck with the problem of stored beliefsp. Weak inter-
nalism, which allows stored beliefp as well as conscious beliefsp to count
as justifiers, faces the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of
concurrent retrieval [60]. We see these critics on internalism to be valid
also in the context of ISAbdi.
In the case of weak internalism Alvin Goldman points out in his art-
icle Internalism Exposed [59] a problem, which is severe also in the case
of ISAbdi. He calls this problem the problem of concurrent retrieval. In
weak internalism only conscious and stored mental states are justifiers, but
it does not express that all sets or conjunctions of such states qualify as
justifiers. If a certain set of stored beliefs can all be concurrently retrieved
at time t and concurrently introspected, then they could qualify as justi-
fiers under the principle of indirect knowability. But if they cannot all be
concurrently retrieved and introspected at t, they would fail to be justifi-
ers. Alvin Goldman claims that concurrent retrieval and introspection is
not possible for human beings because such concurrent retrieval is psycho-
logically impossible [60]. Now, in general, the same applies to ISAbdi by
requiring an environment, where concurrent retrieval31 of ISAbdi’s epistemic
responsibilities might be in strong contradiction with ISAbdi’s performance
requirements (e.g. response time, processors and memory usages).
Alvin Goldman sees strong internalism as follows [59]: At first, ”The
only facts that qualify as justifiers of a person’s believing p at time t are
31In the context of ISAbdi concurrent retrieval is not an exact term: at what level of
the architecture of ISAbdi system concurrency is thought to be.
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facts that the person can readily know by introspection, at t, to obtain or
not to obtain.” Then, ”Only facts concerning what conscious states the
person is in at time t are justifiers of the person’s belief at t.” According
to Alvin Goldman, this faces the problem of stored beliefsp. Normally, the
majority of the person’s beliefsp are stored in memory rather than occurrent
or active. Furthermore, usually in the person’s consciousness at the time
t there is nothing that justifies those stored beliefsp. Thus, according to
strong internalism, then, none of these beliefsp are justified at the time t.
This is a major argument against strong internalism. Now, in the case of
ISAbdi it could be theoretically possible to store and retrieve at the time
t32 all the justifiers of every beliefp of every ’conscious’ state of ISAbdi
33;
thus, to avoid the problem of stored beliefsp. However, in practice this
would require huge real–time databases of beliefsc and metadata,34 which,
in turn, would cause severe performance and storage problems because
every possible justifier should be verified. And this once again may lead
to ISAbdi’s epistemic responsibilities being in strong contradiction with its
performance requirements.
Thus, we can argue that internalism is not a proper approach to justi-
fication in the context of ISAbdi.
Externalism [17] does not require that a person whose beliefp is justified
has any sort of cognitive access to factors that provides justification. For
example, in reliabilism the main requirement for justification is that beliefp
must be produced in a way or by a process that makes it objectively likely
that beliefp is true. In this case a person has no reason to consider that
beliefp is true or likely to be true, but will be epistemically justified in
accepting beliefp. In the context of ISAbdi this approach to justification
has a significant benefit compared to internalism: The requirements of the
cognitive skills of ISAbdi are much lower meaning that an implementation
of ISAbdi is far less complicated—the more simple the solution is, the more
beautiful it is. Reliabilism is one of the prominent externalist theories. We
discuss process reliabilism in more detail in Section 3.5.5, and we argue
that it is the appropriate justification theory in the context of ISAbdi.
Critics on externalism have judged it to be unsuitable for realizing the
true and original goals of epistemology [19]: ”In the end it may be possible
to make intuitive sense of externalism only by construing the externalist as
simply abandoning the traditional idea of epistemic justification or ration-
ality and along with it anything resembling the traditional conception of
32Time t is vaguely defined, here. It is not clear what is the duration of t. Is it
measured in nanoseconds, milliseconds, or minutes?
33For example, future quantum computers may have required performance capabilities.
34Of course, this is application dependent factor.
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knowledge”. We see this critique on externalism not to be meaningful in
the context of ISAbdi because our idea of ISAbdi having justified beliefs
p is
itself also outside the traditional idea of epistemic justification.
We see that in the context of ISAbdi there are four possible justifica-
tion theories: foundationalism, coherentism, evidentialism, and reliabilism.
Now, we consider each of these theories from the viewpoint of implementing
it as the theory of ISAbdi’s beliefs
p justification. In addition, we evaluate
testimony in the context of ISAbdi.
3.5.2 Foundationalism about Justified Belief
Foundationalism is a theory of the structure of justification. According
to this theory justified beliefsp form a hierarchical structure, where basic
beliefsp establish a base on which other beliefsp can be justified. Founda-
tionalism is seen as a solution to the regress problem. A version of founda-
tionalism (Doxastic Basicality) defines [142]: A person’s justified belief that
p is basic if and only if the person’s belief that p is justified without owing
its justification to any of person’s other belief. There are two primary ques-
tions: 1. What are methods for ISAbdi to obtain basic beliefs
p? In other
words, what is the direct justification of ISAbdi’s beliefs
p? 2. How can
ISAbdi’s basic beliefs
p justify ISAbdi’s non–basic beliefs
p? In other words,
what is the indirect justification method of ISAbdi’s non–basic beliefs
p? To
the first question there are two primary options:
1. Human beings designing and implementing ISAbdi, and
2. ISAbdi’s perceptions.
In the first option the solution would be a ”creator’s view” to ISAbdi’s
justified beliefsp meaning that human beings designing and implementing
ISAbdi provide it with default, basic justified beliefs
p. This, in turn, trans-
fers the requirement of the justification of basic beliefsp to the next level:
How are basic beliefsp justified to human beings designing and implement-
ing ISAbdis? This has been discussed in more detail, for example, in the
articles [16, 18, 49, 55, 132]. In the BDI architecture discussed in Section
2.2.1 the direct justification means that there should be a default semantic,
structured data (propositions and their semantic), and foundationalistic
status of beliefp coded into the world model, the mental model, and the
social model. This raises a question: If ISAbdi perceives a defeater for a
basic beliefp and the basic beliefp looses its justification during runtime,
then what should be done? Should the operation be halted, and let design-
ers and implementers resolve the situation and correct the whole beliefp
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database or should ISAbdi by itself resolve the situation and update the
whole beliefp database during runtime? There is no simple answer. The
first one may lead to serious dependability problems, especially reliabilityc
would be low. The second one may lead to performance problems because
the correction of the whole beliefp database could be an expensive, time
consuming operation. In the second option we may consider that percep-
tions are such that they fulfil requirements for basic beliefsp. Naturally this
leads to the question: What are those requirements? For example, we do
certainly not consider perceptions from a defective instrument to be basic
beliefsp. One approach could be reliabilism (see Section 3.5.5). Alvin I.
Goldman [60] introduced belief–independent processes that could produce
justified beliefsp. These beliefsp are justified by virtue of being the product
of reliablep processes.
Other proposals for the basic beliefsp, such as self–evidence, self–justifica-
tion, self–warrant, justification by a direct awareness of what a belief is
about, are problematic because those terms are not exact enough for spe-
cifying them to be implemented. For example, what kinds of beliefsp are
self–justifying: logical, mathematical, ethical, political, etc. or is it even
possible to specify such a categorization? In order to evaluate whether a
beliefp is justified by being self–’something’ actually requires a lot of back-
ground understanding of the matter, which may lead to an unnecessar-
ily complicated implementation of ISAbdi, for example, in the cases where
learning new skills is required. Therefore, we argue that these options do
not seem to be appropriate for ISAbdi.
To the second question one obvious answer could be deductive infer-
ence35(see Section 2.2.3). Therefore, we may consider that these logics
may transfer justification from basic justified beliefsp to non–basic beliefsp.
But the logic of justification is not yet advanced enough, even thought a
form of justification logic has been developed [7, 8]. Epistemic logics really
work only with beliefp and knowledgep [8]. Probabilistic inference could
also be used, for example Bayesian probability, and classical enumerative
induction may also satisfy the requirement [48]. But in the context of
ISAbdi the parallel use of several epistemic logics (belief
p, knowledgep, and
justification) might cause the implementation of ISAbdi to be unnecessarily
complicated and might also create problems to fulfil ISAbdi’s performance
requirements.
Based on the problems presented above we are of the opinion that in
general, foundationalism falls short of being the overall theory of the struc-
ture of justification in the context of ISAbdi. But there is an exception,
35 Such as modal logics or other appropriate logics that maintains truth.
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namely reliabilism that can be categorized to be a form of foundationalism
(see Section 3.5.5). A reliabilist foundationalist can think that basic percep-
tual beliefsp are justified by reliablep sensory experiences or appearances.
But there is a question about whether justification could be achieved too
easily in the context of ISAbdi.
3.5.3 Coherentism about Justified Belief
Coherentism is a theory of the structure of justification. According to this
theory there are no basic justified beliefsp [142]. Justified beliefsp form a
web–like structure, where each beliefp is justified only if it is coherent with
other beliefsp in the system. Hence, every beliefsp must be coherent with
each other in a system formed by this web–like structure. As Keith Lehrer
states the role of coherence [85]: ”The input of perception and the output
of action supplement the central role of the systematic relations beliefp has
to other beliefsp, but it is the systematic relations that give the specific
justification it has.”36
There are two forms of coherentism [85]: weak coherence theories and
strong coherence theories. Weak coherence theories define that the way,
in which beliefp coheres with the background system of beliefsp, is one de-
terminant of justification; others being perception, memory, and intuition.
Strong coherence theories define that justification is solely the matter of
how beliefp coheres with the system of beliefsp.
A version of coherentism (Doxastic Coherentism) defines [142]: Every
justified beliefp receives its justification from other beliefsp in its epistemic
neighbourhood. This definition raises two important questions: First, what
is the epistemic neighbourhood of beliefp in the context of ISAbdi? And
second, what does coherence mean in the context of ISAbdi? The epistemic
neighbourhood seems to be an application dependent factor. It can be the
structure of ISAbdi’s beliefs
p as a whole including the world model, the
mental model, and the social model; or it can start from, for example, a
sub–part of the world model ending at the structure of beliefsp of the so-
ciety of multiple ISAbdis. In addition, there is the question whether the
epistemic neighbourhood is static or dynamic throughout ISAbdi’s exist-
ence. A dynamic epistemic neighbourhood seems to be challenging to im-
plement. The verification of a beliefp being coherent with other beliefsp
in the dynamic epistemic neighbourhood can require so much processing
36According to semantic coherentism beliefp has the content that it does because of
the way in which it coheres within a system of beliefsp.
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power that it would cause severe problems to ISAbdi’s performance require-
ments. Therefore, the scheme of the epistemic neighbourhood requires more
study, before it is properly understood and could be implemented in the
context of ISAbdi.
The second question is even more difficult to cope with. We have already
dealt with coherence in Section 3.3.1, where we discussed the coherence the-
ory of truth. Very much same problems are valid in the case of justification.
Is coherence a logical or orderly consistent relationship of beliefsp, or is it
the lack of semantic contradiction between beliefsp, or is it maximizing
satisfaction of constraints between beliefsp? There is no single, ubiquitous
solution to these questions. There are some proposals [100], but it is still
very much an open issue; unless we interpret coherence purely logically.
Coherence can be defined as the quality or the state of cohering—forming
a whole—meaning especially a logical or orderly consistent relationship of
beliefsp. But actual beliefsp quite often do not seem to obey any formal lo-
gic. One interpretation is to consider coherence as the lack of contradiction;
especially, the lack of semantic contradiction. In the context of ISAbdi we
can interpret this as maximizing satisfaction of constraints between beliefsp.
This approach is presented in more detail by Joseph Sindhu [133].
In DIDS the possibility of ambiguous interpretations of coherence may
create problems because each epistemic agent operating in DIDS may im-
plement its own interpretation of coherence. This may lead to a situation
where a beliefsp justified by being coherent with other beliefsp in the beliefp
database of one ISAbdi is not coherent (therefore, not justified) with other
beliefsp in the beliefp database of another ISAbdi. This creates a problem
at the DIDS level whether the beliefp is justified or not?
Coherence theory may also create an environment, where the epistemic
responsibilities of ISAbdi are in conflict with the performance responsibilities
of ISAbdi—in particular, this is valid in real–time DIDS—especially, if it
requires that every time when a new beliefp is generated coherence has to
be verified in order to justify the beliefp. Hence, whenever ISAbdi perceives
a beliefp, it needs go through every justified beliefp it has at the moment and
verify coherence between the existing justified beliefp and the new beliefp.
In addition, what is the role of implicit beliefsp? Should they be taken into
account, as well? If so, it could be an overwhelming operation.
Due to the challenges, that coherentism faces in the context of ISAbdi,
we argue that coherentism is not suitable for the general justification theory
for ISAbdi.
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3.5.4 Evidentialism about Justified Belief
The topic of evidentialism is to define factors based on which an epistemic
agent is justified in believing a proposition. Evidentialism is not about when
the epistemic agent’s believing is justified. The basic idea of evidentialism
is expressed in the following definition [96]: Epistemic agent is justified in
believing proposition p at time t if and only if epistemic agent’s evidence
for p at t supports believing p.
The main questions of evidentialism are as follows: First, what sorts
of things can be considered to be evidence, and second, how can evidence
support in believing a proposition? To the latter question our intuition
says an epistemic agent must have good, adequate reasons for considering
the proposition in question to be true. Hence, the dependence on reasons
is central to concept of justified belief [96]. To former question there are
many different answers—several different evidentialist theories—depending
on how the concept of evidence is explicated. In general, evidence for or
against a proposition is any information relevant to the truth or falsity of
the proposition. For example, according to the above definition ”only facts
that an epistemic agent has are relevant to determining what the epistemic
agent is justified in believing meaning that epistemic agent must be aware
of, to know about those facts” [96].
There are objections to evidentialism, such as (1) forgotten evidence, (2)
evidentialism, which bases on evidence making a proposition to be probable,
is false, and (3) pragmatic reply [96]. The first one deals with the cases in
which at first an epistemic agent has had an evidence for a proposition but
later on she/he/it has forgotten the evidence, but nevertheless continues
to believe justifiably without possessing any other evidence. The second
one argues that the possession of reasons that make p probable, all things
considered, is not sufficient for p to be justified [96]. The third one is based
on William James argument that having adequate evidence is not necessary
for an epistemic agent to believe justifiably. Our hopes, fears, and desires
do influence what we believe [96]. In the context of ISAbdi the first objection
is also a valid one. Evidentialism is considered to be an internalist theory,
and we have already discussed the case of forgotten evidence related to
internalism in Section 3.5.1. The second objection is interesting because if
it is true then evidentialism is false also in context of ISAbdi. However, the
discussion of truth or falsity of evidentialism is outside the scope of this
thesis. The third object raises a question of ISAbdi having hopes, fears, and
desires which can influence what ISAbdi believes. We are of the opinion
that ISAbdi is not yet capable to have those kinds of attitudes. Hence, the
third objection is not valid in the context of ISAbdi.
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We argue that evidentialism is not good enough theory to be used in the
context of ISAbdi. First, the concept of evidence is not explicated exactly
enough and this may lead to various, incompatible kinds justifications in
the context of DIDS. Second, evidentialism is considered to be an internalist
theory, and we have already argued that externalism is a better approach
than internalism.
3.5.5 Reliabilism about Justified Belief
Reliabilism explains important epistemic concepts in terms of the truth–
conduciveness of an epistemic agent’s reasoning, beliefp–forming processes,
methods, faculties, etc. [57]. The epistemic agent’s truth–conduciveness
is its likelihood to produce true beliefsp, thus to avoid false beliefsp. The
fundamental idea is that beliefp that p is justified on the basis of a reason or
ground r just in case r is a reliablep indication that p to be true [57]. There
are reliabilist theories of knowledgep and justification; as well as reliable–
indicator theories and reliablep–process theories [57]. In this section we
concentrate on the reliablep–process approach to justification. Process re-
liabilism is able to manage justification of beliefp in both the doxastic and
propositional sense of justification [57].
Alvin Goldman argues in his article What is justified belief? [60] that
reliabilism should specify non–epistemic conditions for the epistemic qual-
ity of being justified in order to avoid circularity. Thus, only non–epistemic
concepts such as psychological (belief and experience), metaphysical (caus-
ation), and relations between propositions (logical deductibility, probab-
ilistic coherence, and degrees of confirmation or support) can be used to
evaluate justification for beliefp. A beliefp–generation process that is highly
reliablep—that is, has a high truth–ratio—confers justifiedness on its out-
puts; hence, a beliefp–generating process that is not highly reliablep does
not confer justifiedness on its output.
Reliabilityp can be understood in the frequency sense (pertaining to
what occurs in the actual world) or a propensity sense (pertaining both
to actual world and possible world outcomes) [57]. What is a reliablep in-
dication for beliefp to be true in the context of ISAbdi? First, the reason
must make the probability of beliefp to be true high in ISAbdi’s normal
world37 [57]. ISAbdi’s normal world is the environment where ISAbdi has
been designed and implemented to operate. The probability factor connects
37A. Goldman argues that the approach of normal worlds is problematic; thus, this
needs to be explored more.
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justification to both the dependability theories of computer science and war-
rant/certification systems in human society. We claim that this connection
forms a valid relationship between ISAbdi’s perception (inference, memory)
and the justification of formed beliefp (created when processing ISAbdi’s
perception, when inferring from existing justified beliefsp, or recalling from
memory). The dependability theories of computer science form the basis
to specify the requirement of safetyp. Safetyp can be explained as follows:
If ISAbdi believes that p, then p would not easily have been false [107, 139].
Now, using the dependability theories of computer science it can be eval-
uated whether p would not be easily false. In this case human beings can
have ”a creator’s view” to ISAbdi’s normal world and can specify based on
the application requirements the probabilistic limit of safetyp or ISAbdi can
itself by learning specify the requirement of safetyp. One approach could
be Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrants in the context of human society:
A belief has warrant only if it is produced by cognitive faculties that are
functioning properly in an appropriate epistemic environment [105]. And
it is up to a society to decide whether cognitive faculties function properly
or not (what is the expected probability to produce correct results) in the
appropriate environment.38
Alvin Goldman advocates for process reliabilism and he discusses and
motivates it in his article What Is Justified Belief? [60]. From the view-
point of ISAbdi he has three important hypothesis:
1. Justification is necessary for knowing, and closely related to it.
2. A theory of justified beliefp shall be specified in non–epistemic terms
when a beliefp is justified.
3. There is no such assumption that when a person has a justified beliefp,
he knows that it is justified and knows what the justification is, and
he can state or explain what his justification is.
All these hypotheses have significant effects on the implementation and
operation of ISAbdi including belief
p management, situation management
and goal activation, planning, and scheduling activities. One of the crit-
ical factors is the requirements of ISAbdi’s cognitive capabilities. The first
hypothesis establishes a relation between knowledgep and justified beliefp,
which may help ISAbdi to better evaluate the epistemic quality of inform-
ation. The second hypothesis enables the evaluation of justification to
be based on, for example, probabilities, causal relations, and semantics,
38For example, a society has norms to decide when a person has cognitive faculties
functioning correctly in the disciplines of medicine, legal affairs, etc.
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implementations of which are less complex, because there exist already
many examples of their implementations. The third hypothesis—the re-
jection of knowability requirement—simplifies significantly the structures
of world model, mental model, and social model; in addition to processing
justification, justified beliefsp, and beliefsp. For example, the knowability
requirement might cause an ISAbdi’s world model to comprise a proposi-
tion, a metadata describing the justification status of the proposition, and
a metadata of the metadata describing how ISAbdi knows the justification
(regress problem). This might create ISAbdi’s world, social, and situation
models to be complicated. The abandonment of knowability requirement
shifts the challenge to the decision making about when there really exists
the first level justification for a beliefp. We currently consider that the
philosophical regress problem is not so important in the context of ISAbdi;
hence, we do not require that justification needs justification.
The next important point that Alvin Goldman raises in his article is
that if we agree that principles of justified beliefp must make a reference to
causes of beliefp, then what kind of belief–forming process is acceptable to
justifiedness [60]. We argue that in the context of ISAbdi (as well as human
being) reliabilityp is the key factor. As Alvin Goldman expresses it [60]:
”The justificational status of a beliefp is a function of the reliabilityp of the
process or processes that cause it, where reliabilityp consists in the tendency
of a process to produce beliefsp that are true rather than false”. When we
are using the term tendency of process, we also imply that some beliefsp
can be more justified than others; hence, the degree of justifiedness seems
to be a function of reliabilityp. In the context of ISAbdi different degrees of
justifiedness of various beliefsp may play an important role, when planning
and deciding intentions to be carried out.
Let us have an example of ISAbdi trying to achieve a goal G. There are
two different beliefsp A and B which lead to different intentions I1 and I2
to achieve the goal G:
1. Beliefp A (reliabilityp: 0.99) ⇒ intention I1 ⇒ goal G.
2. Beliefp B (reliabilityp: 0.55) ⇒ intention I2 ⇒ goal G.
According to our intuition and experience more reliablyp created beliefsp
will more likely result in selecting correct intentionsc to be carried out
in order to achieve the goal. Therefore, in this example the beliefp A
should have more weight in the decision making than the beliefp B, and
the intention I1 should to be selected to be carried out to achieve the
goal G. The higher the degree of justifiedness of a beliefp is, the higher its
importance is in decision making.
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There is a relation between the degree of justifiedness and the degree of
trustworthiness. The question is how reliablep must a belief–forming process
be in order for beliefsp supported by it to be justified? [60].39 This question
is related to contextualism: the criticality of the consequences of ISAbdi’s
actions affect the reliabilityp requirements. This, in turn, requires ISAbdi
to be aware of the consequences of its actions.
As a variant of process reliabilism—high probability of truth—is Alvin
Plantinga’s functionalist theory of warrant. According to this theory, there
must be a design plan. A beliefp having warrant requires that the segment
of the design plan governing the production of beliefsp is aimed at truth
[56]. We claim that human beings (computer scientist, engineers, system
designers, and programmers) can build ISAbdis whose beliefs
p are warran-
ted. This issue can be based on the dependability theories of computer
science, which basis is presented, for example, in Jean-Claude Laprie’s art-
icle Dependable Computing. Concepts, Limits, Challenges [83]. We discuss
the dependability theories more in Section 2.1.2 and Chapter 5. Of course,
the dependability requirements of ISAbdi’s application—what are the actual
uses of justified beliefsp and consequences of using unjustified beliefsp—set
the ultimate reliabilityp requirements for the belief–forming process or pro-
cesses to produce justification.
There are three main sources of ISAbdi’s perceptions: 1. sensors, 2.
other ISAbdis, and 3. human beings. In addition to these three external
sources, ISAbdis can obtain justification for its belief
p by an inferring pro-
cess. Each of these sources form quite a different environment to evaluate
the probability of a beliefp to be true.40 In the case of sensors the reliab-
ility can mostly be computed, for example, based on the data provided by
equipment manufacturers, dependability theories of computer science, and
previous observations of the behaviour of sensors. The second and third
case are discussed in more detail in Section 3.5.6.
Based on this brief discussion we argue that in the context of ISAbdi a
version of process reliabilism is the most proper justification theory in the
group of traditional justification theories. It is an intuitive way of thinking
justification of beliefsp in the context of ISAbdi. In addition, process reli-
abilism is able to manage justification of beliefp in both the doxastic and
propositional sense of justification [57]. It does not create similar kinds of
design and implementation challenges like other forms of foundationalism
and coherentism do; hence, its implementation is the least problematic.
And we claim that process reliabilism will not cause such performance
39The Sorites paradox causes severe challenges to specify any valid reliabilityp value.
40Each of these sources need to be evaluated separately, which is a future topic.
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problems like the other justification theories do because it more close to
the dependability concepts of computer science and their implementations
(e.g. correctness of actions) compared to other justification theories.
3.5.6 Testimony about Justified Belief
In multi–agent systems ISAbdis do not usually operate in isolation, but
they establish a (social) network of co–operating ISAbdis and human beings.
Hence, other ISAbdis and human beings are important sources of ISAbdi’s
beliefsp. Testimony has caused a lot of discussion in epistemology during
the last decades. The problem of testimony is related to the problem of
justification: What makes a receiver of a beliefp justified in accepting the
beliefp that a sender has asserted [1]. There is a kind of default rule for
testimony: If the speaker S asserts that p to the hearer H, then, under
normal conditions, it is correct for H to accept (believe) S’s assertion, unless
H has special reasons to object [1]. In this rule accept can be considered
to be a short form of acceptance as true. This can be connected to the
knowledge norm of assertion that states: One correctly asserts that p only
if one knows (or represents oneself as knowing) that p41 [1].
Another question is that what is the real role of testimony: is it the
actual source of justified beliefsp for the receiver or is just a method to ex-
change justified beliefsp between the sender and the receiver? If testimony
is the source of justified beliefsp then what justifies testimonially–based
beliefsp? If testimony is the method of exchanging justified beliefsp, then
first, is there a requirement that the sender is allowed to transmit only jus-
tified beliefsp (or knowledge42), and second, how is justification transmitted
from the sender to the receiver?
There are several attitudes toward testimony, such as reductionism
versus anti–reductionism and inferentialism versus non–inferentialism. Re-
ductionism is similar to inferentialism and anti–reductionism is similar to
non–inferentialism. The key difference between inferentialism and reduc-
tionism is that inferentialists rely only on inferentially–based justification
and reductionists allow other types of justification to be taken into account.
Reductionists argue that testimony–based justification is based on a com-
bination of inferentially–based, memorially–based, and perceptually–based
justification; thus, it is not actually one of its own kind [62]. In other words,
41There are many objections to and variations of these principles, such as Acceptance
Principle, Principle of Charity, and Co–operative Principle.
42This requirement has been set, for example, by John R. Searle in his speech act
theory and in the communicative act specifications of FIPA.
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reductionists believe that the justification of a beliefp is the result of other
confirmed sources.
Michael Dummett [35] argues that ”Testimony should not be regarded
as a source, and still less as a ground, of knowledge: it is the transmission
from one individual to another of knowledge acquired by whatever means.”
If testimony is not the source or ground of knowledgep, then can it be the
source or ground of justified beliefp? We consider that it is not possible
because we are of the opinion that there is no such factor F, which would
make such a distinction between justified beliefp and knowledgep that testi-
mony could be the source or ground of justified beliefp but not the source
or ground of knowledgep. In the context of ISAbdi reductionism implies
that the testimonially received beliefp should be processed in the same way
as other perceptions. As we support a form of process reliabilism this in-
dicates that the justification of the testimonially received beliefp is based
on the reliability of the belief–forming processes that produced beliefp at
an original source of the justified beliefp, the reliabilityp of transmission
media, and the reliabilityp of beliefp perception processes of the receiver
(see Section 3.5.5).
Anti–reductionists argue that testimony–based justification is based on
the reliabilityp of an innate cognitive feature of the mind, which causes us
to trust people who testify [62]. In the case of anti–reductionism we have
to ask what could be the innate cognitive feature of ISAbdi, if ISAbdi has
any? For example, could it be an algorithm with which the trustworthiness
of collaborating partners is evaluated? Anyhow, the term innate cognitive
feature is very vague; hence, we are of the opinion that it does not form
any sound base for justification to be implemented in the context of ISAbdi.
Inferentialists consider testimony–based beliefp to obtain justification
through the following argument [62]:
1st: S informs R that p;
2nd: S has generally been reliable in the past when informing things
like p;
3rd: S is probably reliable on this case;
Conclusion: For R p is justified belief.
As a related issue in computer science the evaluation of the trustworthi-
ness of S has gained a lot of interest, especially in the domain of commerce
in the Internet, and several solutions have been proposed [120]. There is
an open question: how can justification for trustworthiness be obtained in
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the case, where there is no past history? In the context of ISAbdi we see
inferentialism to be a part of justification as a supporting factor.
Non–inferentialists consider that S informing that p itself can be ad-
equate for R to have p as a justified beliefp. Thus, non–inferentialism leads
to the requirement that the sender S is allowed to transmit only justified
beliefsp (knowledgep), otherwise the sender S is malicious. We consider this
not to be an ideal approach to the exchange of beliefsp between ISAbdis and
between human beings and ISAbdis in the environment of DIDS. Because
this is not realistic in the actual world, where there are many malicious
sources of information. However, there are models that rely on the premise
that ISAbdi is allowed to transmit only knowledge
p, for example, the FIPA
agent communication model, which is based on John R. Searle’s speech act
theory [38].
Robert Audi [9] argues that testimonially–based beliefsp are formed
directly, but they are justified on the basis of other beliefsp in a way that
the other beliefsp only support the testimonially–based beliefsp and are not
necessarily closely linked to the supported beliefsp. Jennifer Lackey [79, 80]
argues that R comes to know that p via S ’s statement that p only if (i) S ’s
statement that p is appropriately connected with the fact that p; and (ii) R
has no defeaters indicating the contrary. Jason Stanley [141] suggests that
the amount of required certainty may affect justification; thus, the level
of stake should be taken into account when evaluating the requirement of
justification.
When we consider the role of testimony in the context of ISAbdi, we need
to separate the transmission of justified beliefp into components, whose roles
in justification is analysed below. There are five main components involved,
when a justified beliefp is transmitted from a sender S to a receiver R:
1. Justified beliefp JB,
2. Sender of beliefp S,
3. Possible intermediate proxy distributors PD,
4. Receiver of beliefp R, and
5. Transmission media TM.
We have already discussed justified beliefp above, but in this context
we see that the important questions related to the first component JB are
the following ones: What kind of entity is justification in the context of
ISAbdi? How is justification expressed? The key question in the context
of the second component S deals with justification: What is the status
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of the justification for the sender’s beliefp or is it actually needed? The
role of the third component PD raises a question: Does she/he/it need to
have justification for the beliefp or can she/he/it be ignorant of justifica-
tion? The fourth component R is the most interesting one from our point
view. And it is also most discussed having debates on reductionism versus
anti-reductionism and inferentialism versus non–inferentialism. The fifth
component TM is not discussed much in epistemology, as it seems to be
assumed that the content of a justified beliefp is not altered during trans-
mission, and the semantics of the justified beliefp remains the same in the
contexts of both S and R.43
There are two dimensions to consider what kind of entity justification
is: deontological versus non–deontological and evidence versus reliability.
According to deontological justification S is justified in believing that p if
and only if S believes that p while it is not the case that S is obliged to
refrain from believing that p [142]. In the context of ISAbdi this approach
is difficult because the meaning of to be obliged is quite ambiguous: does
it mean that that p is not coherent with another justified beliefp, or does
it mean that the performance of ISAbdi is not adequate to carry out the
verification of to be obliged, or does it mean that there is a defeater? This
may create a situation where there are several different kinds of justifica-
tion. Therefore, we argue deontological justification is not suitable in the
contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS. According to non–deontological justification
S is justified in believing that p if and only if S believes that p on a basis that
properly probabilifies S’s belief that p [142]. As non–deontological justific-
ation is closely linked to reliabilism when specifying properly probabilifies,
we consider it to be appropriate justification in the contexts of ISAbdi and
DIDS. Properly probabilifies can also be linked to the dependability theory
of computer science.
The difference between requiring evidence for justification or reliabilityp
for justification is that when both of them require some kind of warrant
for justification, reliabilityp for justification requires that a beliefp is justi-
fied if and only if it is a result of a reliablep, cognitive origin [142]. But
what does cognitive origin mean in the context of ISAbdi? Can we say that
ISAbdi transmitting a belief
p stating that ’The temperature is 8 degrees
Celsius.’ exhibits a reliable cognitive origin? We consider that reliabilityp
can be derived from the dependability theory of computer science, and the
reliabilityp of the thermometer (based on the certificate of the manufac-
turer), and cognitive origin can be derived from artificial intelligence. We
43Note! Hearing wrongly is quite common in verbal communication between human
beings.
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Figure 3.3: Justification.
claim that the reliabilityp of a beliefp–forming process for justification is
the proper approach.
The question How is justification expressed? is an interesting one, as
whenever there is a need to evaluate in the context of ISAbdi whether or
not there is justification for a beliefp, there must be some kind of represent-
ation of justification.44 First, we argue that just like truth45 justification
should be expressed by a predicate, for example, ’is justified’ or ’Ju’. The
predicate can be expressed in a metadata describing the world where the
proposition (for example, Snow is white) is stated. An example using RDF





44An evaluator can be either ISAbdi itself, another ISAbdi, or human being.
45See Section 3.3.
46This example is a hypothetical one.













Related to the second component the sender of beliefp S, we argue that
in the context of ISAbdi S must have the justification for a belief
p in order
to transmit it as a justified beliefp to a receiver R.47 Otherwise S distributes
incoherent information, for example, by implicitly implying that the beliefp
is justified, even though it has no justification for it.48 The case of possible
intermediate proxy distributor PD is a different one. As PD does not add
or decrease any value to the epistemic quality of a beliefp, it can be ignorant
of the justification.
If we consider testimony as the method of distributing justified beliefsp,
then the sender S must have justification for hers/his/its beliefsp. Now,
the question is how this justification is transmitted to a receiver R? We
can model the transmission of justified beliefsp from ISAbdiS to ISAbdiR
using the speech act theory [127]. We can compare ISAbdi performing
an illocutionary act with a human being performing an illocutionary act,
even though ISAbdi does not usually use any natural language to state
the proposition, but an artificial language developed for ISAbdi–to–ISAbdi
information exchange. When we model ISAbdi’s assertions using the speech
act theory, we thus assume here that propositions represent the objects
of justified beliefsp. Speech acts, in which justified beliefsp are typically
transmitted, are those that ascribe justified beliefsp by the use of a specific
kind of sentence, a justified beliefp ascription.49 Based on Searle’s definition
we can define the assert type of illocutionary act as follows [127]:
47Though the beliefp may not be justified in the context of the receiver R.
48Another way to distribute incoherent information is to implicitly imply that the
beliefp is not justified, even though S has justification for it.
49In the context of communication between human beings this is like a speaker saying
I believe instead of saying I know.
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1. Propositional content: Any justified belief p.
2. Preparatory: First, S has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the justification
of p and second, it is not obvious to both S and R that R has justified
belief p.
3. Sincerity: S has justification for p.
4. Essential: Counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents a
highly probable state of affairs.
Based on this definition ISAbdi’s assertion of justified belief
p can be
specified as follows50:
1. Communicative act: INFORM
2. Message content: Proposition
3. Description: INFORM indicates that agent S:
a) holds that the belief is justified,
b) holds the evidence (e.g. reliability factor) of justification,
c) intends that the receiving agent also concludes that the beliefp based
on the proposition is a justified beliefp, and
d) does not already believe that R has any knowledge of the justified
beliefp.
From the R’s viewpoint, R believes that S has the justified beliefp based
on the proposition, and after evaluation the evidence of justification
R either considers the beliefp based on the proposition to be or not to
be a justified beliefp.
4. Formal model: < i, inform(j, φ, τ) >
FP: JBi φ ∧ ¬ JBi ( Bifj φ ∨ Uifj φ)
RE: JBj φ ∨ Bj φ
Where:
i = agent i; j = agent j;
φ = proposition;
τ = justification;
FP = feasibility precondition; RE = rational effect;
JB = justifiably believe; B = believe; Bif = believe if; and
Uif = uncertain if.
We claim that testimony is not the actual source of justified beliefp,
but just the transfer method. And in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS
justification itself shall be expressed along with beliefp.
50This example is modified from a definition made by FIPA [38].
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3.5.7 Conclusion about Justified Belief in the context of
ISAbdi
We argue that an externalist theory of justification is the proper one in
the context of ISAbdi because we cannot assume that it would be feasible
or in some cases even possible to design and implement ISAbdi that would
hold cognitively available internally all the factors needed for a beliefp to
be epistemically justified.51
Process reliabilism provides the best theoretical (and also practical)
foundations to evaluate justification in the context of ISAbdi because the
justification status of a beliefp can be derived from the reliabilityp of sensors,
dependability of hardware equipment and software components, and ob-
servation of previous behaviour. The requirements of reliabilityp can be
derived from the dependability theory and requirements of computer sci-
ence (application specific requirements). Reliabilism provides also truth–
conduciveness.
We also support that justification is context–sensitive depending on the
stake in question; the higher the stake is the higher the reliabilityp require-
ment is for justification [63, 91]. This approach may lead to a situation
where in one context a beliefp is justified but in another context there is no
justification for the beliefp.
As there is always a possibility of a software error and hardware failure,
we also support fallibilism in the context of ISAbdi. In the case of testimony,
we consider it to be just the transmission media of justified beliefp and
justification itself [1].
We summarize our basic thoughts about justification in the contexts of
ISAbdi and DIDS with the following definition (we call it pragmatic process
reliabilism, PPR):
Definition. An epistemic agent’s beliefpc that p is justified if and
only if,
1. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
2. The beliefpc was produced by sufficiently reliablep pro-
cesses Pi; and
3. The required degree of reliabilityp of the processes Pi is
determined by the context where the epistemic agent uses
his/hers/its beliefpc in reasoning and actions.




In this section we discuss the concept of knowledgep by exploring what is
knowledgep and what kind of entity is knowledge p in the context of ISAbdi.
We discuss various theories of knowledgep, such as virtue epistemology,
knowledge first, and reliabilism. We also discuss the role of testimony in
the communication of knowledgep.
There are several different kinds of knowledgep: 1) propositional know-
ledgep (Snow is white.), 2) knowledgep of acquaintance (Matti knows Maija.),
and 3) knowledgep–how (Matti knows how to ride a bicycle.) [72, 99]. In
the context of ISAbdi we deal with propositional knowledge
p, which has lin-
guistic representations. Along with the development of AI, ISAs, and ro-
botics the question can be raised, to what extent and benefits will and could
knowledgep–how and knowledgep of acquaintance be transformed to pro-
positional knowledgep. Other representations, such as neural networks, are
better solutions to represent knowledgep of acquaintance and knowledgep–
how. For example, it might be quite feasible that in the future A robot
Biker knows how to ride a bicycle.
There have been many attempts to analyse knowledgep in the late 20th
Century, but so far there is no single, ubiquitously accepted definition.
Therefore, there are also doubts whether knowledgep is susceptible to ana-
lysis, at all [72]. We are of the opinion that if knowledgep is susceptible to
analysis, then it is also susceptible to an implementation based on AI. It
is difficult to model and implement a concept without a proper analysis of
the concept.52
In history philosophers have been of the opinion that knowing a thing
involves, as well, knowledge of the limits of the thing: the limits that define
both what the thing is and what it is not [40]. In the context of ISAbdi this
requirement is interesting. As an example we can mention the scenario ”A
pedestrian is crossing the road.” (see page 52) where, for example, ISAbdi
must know whether the pedestrian–like feature nearby the road is a human
being or a human–like statue.
When discussing knowledgep in the context of ISAbdi we need to consider
what it is for ISAbdi to know p. Is it just a list of conditions involving
ISAbdi and p to hold or should it also comprise issues like the value of
knowledgep? Are there any benefits to ISAbdi having knowledge
p compared
to ISAbdi having justified beliefs
p or mere beliefsp? If there is, then how do
we evaluate such things? We have already discussed the value of knowledgep
52Timothy Williamson’s approach knowledge first leads to a situation, in which other
epistemic concepts are analysed on the basis of knowledgep.
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and the value problem of knowledgep in the context of ISAbdi in Section
3.2.
First, we evaluate different knowledgep theories and we also discuss the
role of testimony in acquiring knowledgep in the context of ISAbdi. When we
carry out the analysis of knowledgep in the context of ISAbdi, it is important
to explore what are the main differences between ISAbdi to know something
and a human being to know something? The epistemic literature comprises
a huge number of analyses of knowledgep in the context of human being;
hence, when we are aware of the differences, we can adapt suitable ideas to
the theory of knowledgep for the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS.
ISAbdi’s main—most often only—purpose is to provide its users with
services for which ISAbdi is designed and implemented. The requirements
of the services determine what information is needed, and nothing else
is inquired or inferred. Thus, the main reason to inquire, perceive, and
infer information is to use it to provide the services, and ISAbdi has no
information—beliefp, justified beliefp, and knowledgep—for its own sake.53
Based on this we argue that ISAbdi does not have intrinsic knowledge
p, but
only instrumental knowledgep to be utilized for practical reasons.
Knowledgep as justified true beliefp (hereinafter JTB) is the base of
almost all definitions of knowing [72]: Subject S knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
2. Subject S believes that p; and
3. Subject S is justified in believing that p.
The truth condition (1) is generally accepted; it is intuitively plausible that
false beliefsp cannot be known. Know in the instance of the locution ”x
knows that p” is factive: if x knows that p, then p [98]. In the context of
ISAbdi the truth condition raises the following question: If know is a factive
verb—is knowledge that p knowledge of facts—then how does ISAbdi ensure
the truthfulness of that p? For example, how does ISAbdi ensure that in
our car driving example in Section 3.1 the beliefp established based on the
perception of the pedestrian is true?
Jonathan Ichikawa and Matthias Steup discuss in their article The Ana-
lysis of Knowledge [72] that the truth of a proposition does not always
require that anyone can know or prove that it is true. Not all truths are
established truths. Truth is a metaphysical—not epistemological— notion:
53This will be the situation at least in the near future, as currently it is difficult to see
how to design and implement an ISAbdi that would have some kind of intrinsic motive
to value knowledge for the sake of knowledge itself.
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truth is a matter of how things are, not how they can be shown to be.
Knowledge is a kind of relationship with the truth—to know something is
to have a certain kind of access to a fact. In the context of ISAbdi this
implies that it is not always required for ISAbdi to prove the truthfulness
of p.
There are three questions. First, what would be the right truth theory
to be adopted? Second, what would be the certain kind of access to a fact?
Third, which one is a better approach: infallibilism or fallibilism?
The first two questions are linked together, and we have discussed those
above in Section 3.3. The reasoning of the proper truth theory results
also in a certain kind of access to the fact. We have argued that the
correspondence theory of truth is the most appropriate one in the context of
ISAbdi; therefore, a reliable correspondence as the world–to–world relation
is the required kind of access to the fact.
Infallibilism and fallibilism are still open problems as Markus Lam-
menranta discusses in his article We can’t know [81]. Fallibilism leads to
paradoxes in some example cases, such as in the case of the brain–in–a–vat.
And infallibilism leads to scepticism. Lammenranta settles this problem by
taking into account the role of presuppositions. The sceptical hypothesis,
for example the brain–in–a–vat, are ruled out in everyday contexts by the
mutually accepted presuppositions. There is a distinction between what
is said and what is meant by uttering a proposition. When knowledgep is
attributed to someone, we say that the evidence rules out all possibilities
of errors (this is false), but what we mean or implicate is that the evidence
rules out all the relevant possibilities of errors (this may be true). Now,
the fallibilist explains ordinary uses of the term know by assuming that
what is said and what is meant are both typically true. The infallibilist ex-
plains ordinary uses of the term know by assuming that what is said is false
while what is meant is typically true. Infallibilism requires a failure–free
implementation of ISAbdi and its infrastructure. We claim that in the con-
texts of ISAbdi and IDS infallibilism is not feasible because there is always
a possibility of software and hardware failures. Therefore, there is always
the possibility of p is not true even though it seems to be true.54 Hence,
infallibilism leads to scepticism in the context of ISAbdi. Scepticism is not
a good option, as the concept of knowledgep is most likely beneficial in
the context of beliefp exchange between human being and ISAbdi as well as
between ISAbdis. In addition, we are of the opinion that scepticism about
ordinary knowledge is false. As pragmatists emphases that ”When we do
go wrong, further discussion and investigation can identify and eliminate
54We see that this is a similar kind of problem as Descartes’ problem of certainty.
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Figure 3.4: Truth condition.
errors, which is our best hope for escaping their damaging effects. ..... The
focus of epistemological inquiry should not be on showing how we can pos-
sess absolute certainty, but on how we can develop self–correcting methods
of inquiry that make fallible progress.” [84].
We can summarize our approach to truth concerning knowledgep in the
context of ISAbdi as follows (illustrated in Figure 3.4):
1. The truth condition is essential in the definition of knowledgep.
2. The concept of truth is metaphysical.
3. The concept of truth is not unambiguously defined.
4. The truth of a proposition does not always require that anyone can
know or prove that it is true. Not all truths are established truths.
5. It is not always possible to verify the truth of a proposition in an
infallible way, thus infallibilism leads to scepticism.
6. Scepticism is not an option.
7. Infallibility is not feasible.
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Fallibilism denies that knowledge requires the impossibility of error.
Therefore, unlike infallibilism fallibilism does not require absolutely failure–
free implementations and services of ISAbdis. The history of computer
science and computer–based services has clearly indicated that failure–free
implementations and services are almost impossible to achieve; hence, we
support fallibilism.
We have already discussed the beliefp condition (2) in Section 3.4 and
the justification condition (3) in Section 3.3.
Since Gettier’s article [52] Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?—luck
should not have any role in achieving knowledgep—several additional con-
ditions have been proposed, such as the following ones [72]:
1. No false lemmas: an epistemic agent’s beliefp that p is not inferred
from any falsehood.
2. Sensitivity: an epistemic agent’s beliefp that p is sensitive if and
only if, if p were false, then epistemic agent would not believe that p.
3. Safetyp: if an epistemic agent were to believe that p, p would not be
false, that is, in all nearby worlds where an epistemic agent believes
that p, p is not false.
4. Rule out all relevant alternatives: an epistemic agent knows
that p if only if the epistemic agent has ruled out relevant competing
hypotheses to p.
5. Anti–luck: an epistemic agent’s beliefp that p is not true merely by
luck.
In the context of ISAbdi every one of these conditions have problems. The
no false lemmas condition is a strong requirement. It does actually require
infallibilism when implementing it. And this requires, in turn, the failure
free implementation of ISAbdi that is utilized to create the lemma. We are
of the opinion that this is not feasible. The sensitivity condition is difficult
to model exactly for an implementation unless using probability because
the concept ’if p were false’ is otherwise a vague term to be implemented
in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS. And if probability is used, then we
argue that reliabilism is a more proper approach (see Section 3.6.5). The
safetyp condition requires the implementations of the concepts of possible
worlds and nearby worlds. But possible worlds and nearby worlds cre-
ate complexity and are difficult to implement. This can, in turn, make it
problematic to evaluate properly during runtime the epistemic quality of
beliefp, for example, because of performance requirements and difficulty to
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infer and instantiate real–time possible worlds. If the implementation of
possible worlds and nearby worlds is required, then we claim that this shall
be combined with reliabilism and the evaluation of possible consequences
(see Section 3.6.5). The ruling out all relevant alternatives condition has, at
least, two problems: how to decide what all alternatives are and which ones
are not relevant (the concept of relevance is vague) [6], and performance—
especially response time—can be severely affected when analysing relevant
alternatives.55 The anti–luck condition has, at least, two problems. The
first problem is that luck is a vague term. Knowledgep excludes luck, but
luck comes in degrees. Then, how much luck does it take to be incon-
sistent with knowledge? And a distinction between different kinds of luck
should be done [72]. Let us have an example: There is a reliablep ISAbdi,
which predicts future occurrences. There are two cases. In the first case, a
programmer of the ISAbdi has coded an algorithm correctly without prop-
erly understanding the algorithm; thus just being lucky. In the second
case there is a fault in ISAbdi which causes an untrue proposition to be
considered true, except in a certain case. The error causing the fault is
unknown, thus the fault cannot be prevented. The possibility of the fault
to occur is 10−1000000. But the proposition is true, if a certain proposition
is used (probability 10−1000 in the fault case) in inferencing. Luck has a role
in both these cases. Now, according to our intuition in the first case ISAbdi
has knowledgep based on the proposition, but not in the second case. The
second problem is whether there is any possibility of ISAbdi to be aware of
the role of luck when it evaluates the epistemic quality of the information
based on the proposition.
3.6.1 Testimony about Knowledge
We have already discussed testimony in Section 3.5.6, where we discussed
the basic ideas of testimony. In this section we discuss briefly the role of
testimony in knowledgep in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS. As in the case
of justification we regard testimony as the transmission of knowledgep from
one epistemic agent to another one. The semantic character of testimony
is important. It implies that without understanding the meaning of the
symbols in which that p is asserted, an epistemic agent does not receive
knowledgep via testimony.
Robert Audi argues that testimony is essential for the spread of knowl-
edgep [10]. This is also the case in the context of DIDS. As already men-
tioned, Michael Dummet argues that ”Testimony should not be regarded
55We are of the opinion that these kinds of solutions may violate the principle ”keep
it simple” a.k.a. Ockham’s razor.
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as a source, and still less as a ground, of knowledgep: it is the transmis-
sion from one individual to another of knowledgep acquired by whatever
means.” [35]. On the other hand, Robert Audi also states [10]: ”Although
I know that p on the basis of your testimony only if you know that p, and
I believe that p because you told me that p, your knowing that p is no
more the (epistemic) basis of my knowledgep than copper wire is the basis
of electric current flowing through it to a light bulb. Your knowledgep that
p is required for successful transmission, but my knowledgep is not based
on your knowledge, if this entails more than its appropriately depending
on it.” These contradictory statements raise the questions which one is the
better approach in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS, and what would be
the requirements for testimony to transmit knowledgep from one epistemic
agent to another.
Jonathan Adler expresses default rules for testimony (anti–reduction-
ism) in the following way [1]: ”If a sender S asserts that p to a receiver R,
then, under normal conditions, it is correct for R to accept (acceptance as
knowledgep) S’s assertion, unless R has a special reason to object.” And
the knowledgep norm of assertion states [1]: ”The sender S correctly asserts
that p only if S knows (or represents oneself as knowing) that p.” Thus,
according to the knowledgep norm, if S does not know that p, S should
not assert it as knowledgep. For example, FIPA standards follow this anti–
reductionist approach [39]. When there are one or more proxy epistemic
agents in knowledgep transmission, then, at least, the first epistemic agent
in the chain of testimonial transfer must know that p; not every epistemic
agent in the chain.
What is the difference between transmitting justified beliefp and trans-
mitting knowledgep in the testimonial transfer of information? First, what
is the differentiating factor between knowledgep and justified beliefp? As
we support pragmatic process reliabilism, we claim that the reliabilityp of
a beliefp–forming process is the differentiating factor. The reliabilityp (e.g.
0.999999) of the beliefp–forming process resulting in knowledgep must be
sufficiently higher than the reliabilityp (e.g. 0.500000) of the beliefp–forming
process resulting in mere justified beliefp.56 Second, how does a receiver R
differentiate whether it perceives justified beliefp or knowledgep? A solution
is that we add a reductionistic rule that requires a sender S to show the
justifications for S’s knowledgep.57 This can be done, for example, using
56Of course, there is a threshold between justified beliefp and knowledgep, where the
reliabilitiesp close to each other. This creates problems (for example, the Sorites para-
dox); however, we believe that the problems can be resolved based on the application
dependability requirements.
57This requirement is outside the original spirit of reliabilism.
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metadata of knowledgep (and justified beliefp, see Section 3.5). In addition,
the transmission of knowledgep must be dependable in a way that neither
beliefp or the justification for beliefp is altered in any way.
A receiver R should always engage in some assessment of a sender S for
trustworthiness. To believe what is asserted without doing so is to believe
blindly, uncritically. The receiver R should always take a critical stance
to the sender S, to assess it for trustworthiness. In the context of ISAbdi
there are two possibilities. Either ISAbdi continuously evaluates the trust-
worthiness of the sender S, for example, using the methods presented by
Sini Ruohomaa in [120] or having prima facie trustworthiness of the sender
S based on the metadata describing justification—some kind of evidence,
for example, the reliabilityp of beliefp–forming processes—for knowledgep.
Jennifer Lackey [80] argues that the absence of defeaters is a necessary
condition for testimonial knowledgep. The defeaters can be of the following
types (S=sender, R=receiver):
1. A defeater is a proposition which is believed by R to be true, yet
indicates that R’s beliefp that p is either false or unreliably formed or
sustained.
2. A defeater is a proposition which R is justified in believing to be
true, yet which indicates R’s beliefp that p is either false or unreliably
formed or sustained.
3. A defeater is a true proposition such that if the proposition was added
to R’s beliefp system, then R would no longer be justified in believing
that p.
What could the role of defeaters be in the context of ISAbdi, as we consider
that testimony is the transmission of knowledgep, not the source of it.
There can be new types of defeaters. For example, as we support pragmatic
process reliabilism, a defeater could be a higher requirement of reliabilityp
for knowledgep. The importance of consequences of R’s action based on
knowledgep demands a higher reliabilityp than the reliabilityp of S’s beliefp–
forming process.
Sanford Goldberg [54] argues that the presence of an external defeater–
detection system is critical for testimonially–based knowledgep in the con-
text of handicap receivers, such as children. We can consider ISAbdi to be
a handicap receiver in the same sense and the same argument to be applied
to testimonially–transmitted knowledgep. In the context of ISAbdi there
is an obvious requirement of a knowledgep warranting/certifying service;
especially when information comes from human beings.
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3.6.2 Causal Theory about Knowledge
The main idea behind the causal theory of knowledgep is to require a causal
connection between a beliefp and a fact believed. A simple definition is as
follows [72]:
Subject S knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
2. Subject S believes that p;
3. Subject S’s beliefp that p is caused by the fact that p.
According to this definition knowledgep does not demand justification;
instead, a causal connection between the beliefp and the fact believed. In
the context of ISAbdi there is the question of what kinds of connections
represent the right kinds of causality and are adequate. As the long history
of discussions, numerous articles, and books about causality clearly advice,
the issues related to causality are difficult, and the concept of causal con-
nection is not well enough explicated to be generally implemented. And
how to find out whether it is really a fact that caused the beliefp that p.
We may ask, for example, in the environment of augmented reality, what
is a fact. Therefore, we consider that the causal theory of knowledgep falls
short in the context of ISAbdi.
3.6.3 Virtue Epistemology about Knowledge
Virtue epistemology defines that S knows that p only if S acquires her belief
in p by exercising some epistemic virtue and furthermore that a person who
knows can be credited for her true belief in a way in which a person who has
a mere true belief cannot [147]. In other words, knowledge is true beliefp
out of intellectual virtue [37].
In the context of ISAbdi the concept of intellectual virtue is definitely
too vague to be modelled and implemented in general; unless we consider
reliabilityp to be the intellectual virtue. It is not clear what does intel-
lectual virtue actually mean? There are several examples, such as Linda
Zagzebski’s definition [147, 168]: ”An act of intellectual virtue A is an act
that arises from the motivational component of A, is something a person
with virtue A would (probably) do in the circumstances, is successful in
achieving the end of the A motivation, and is such that the agent acquires
a true belief (cognitive contact with reality) through these features of the
act. Knowledge is a state of true belief through these features of act.” As
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we can see, this definition is not clear—actually quite far from being accur-
ate enough—to be successfully modelled and implemented in the contexts
of ISAbdi and DIDS. This definitions would likely lead to a situation that
there were many different kinds of implementations of the theory causing
contradictory results of determining what is knowledgep.
Ernest Sosa defines intellectual virtue using a AAA structure: accur-
acy, adroitness, and aptness [140]. He counts beliefsp as performances, and
therefore, beliefsp can also be evaluated using the AAA structure. Accord-
ing to him ”we can distinguish between a belief’s accuracy, i.e., its truth;
its adroitness, i.e., its manifesting epistemic virtue or competence; and its
aptness, i.e., its being true because competent” [140]. Even though this
definition is more accurate approach to knowledgep, it leaves quite many
open problems to be solved when modelling and implementing it. The
problem of accuracy could be approached using the correspondes theory
of truth. The problem of adroitness is more difficult because the concepts
of epistemic virtue and competence are still vague. We could consider the
correctness of an algorithm and its implementation to be epistemic virtue.
This could be evaluated using the dependability measurements of computer
science. The problem of aptness could be approached using the dependab-
ility attribute reliabilityc of computer science, which defines that a correct
service is not interrupted in any way. Still, Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemo-
logy would require a totally new evaluating and categorising system of de-
pendability for ISAbdis and DIDS to be developed and implemented, which
would be a huge and challenging task.
Therefore, we argue that virtue epistemology falls short of being the
proper one in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS.
3.6.4 Knowledge First about Knowledge
Due to the unsolved problems of the analysis of knowledgep, Timothy Wil-
liamson has developed an approach to epistemology in which the notion of
knowledgep is explanatorily fundamental. He argues that knowledgep can-
not be analysed as a combination of truth, beliefp, and justification [164].
Thus, he turns the whole scheme of epistemology upside down. Beliefp and
justification are analysed on the basis of knowledgep.
We are of the opinion that this approach is very interesting, but it
is not yet mature enough even in traditional epistemology in order to be
considered as the knowledge theory for ISAsbdi and DIDS.
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3.6.5 Reliabilism about Knowledge
We have already examined the basic ideas of reliabilism when we discussed
justification in Section 3.5.5. We considered pragmatic process reliabilism
to be the proper theory of justification in the context of ISAbdi [63, 91]. The
central idea of knowledgep according to reliabilism is a reliablep connection
between the source and beliefp [55, 57]. A simple form of reliabilism about
knowledgep is defined as follows [72]:
Subject S knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
2. S beliefs that p; and
3. S’s belief that p was produced by a reliable cognitive process.
According to this definition knowledgep does not require justification, but
just a reliablep cognitive process. What kind of process is considered to be
a reliablep cognitive process in the context of ISAbdi? There are two issues:
reliabilityp and cognitivity. We can explicate reliabilityp issues with the help
of the dependability theories of computer science and warrant/certification
services in the case of human beings. However, cognitivity cannot be explic-
ated in the same way. We can say that ISAbdi itself may execute cognitive
processes. But what about a sophisticated thermometer, which informs
reliablyp ISAbdi about the temperature? Does it fulfil the requirements
needed for knowledgep when executing a ’cognitive’ process? Thus, the
requirement of processes in the forming of beliefp to be cognitive enough is
difficult to explicate precisely, and therefore, we argue that this definition
falls short in the context of ISAbdi.
The cognitivity requirement of the beliefp–forming process is put aside
in the definition of process reliabilism, and a fourth condition is added.
Process reliabilism defines knowing as follows [57]:
Subject S knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
2. S believes p to be true;
3. S’s belief that p was produced through a reliable process; and
4. A suitable anti–Gettier clause is satisfied.
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But as discussed above on the page 103 many of these anti–Gettier
conditions create complexity that causes them to be problematic in the
context of ISAbdi. This raises the question which one of the anti–Gettier
conditions is least problematic in the context of ISAbdi. We are of the
opinion that the safetyp condition combined with pragmatic encroachment
is the right approach. The pragmatic encroachment can be stated in the
following way: A difference in pragmatic circumstances can constitute a
difference in knowledgep [63, 72]. The basic idea is the following one: the
reliabilityp of a process together with the pragmatic importance of the
consequences of beliefp determines whether an epistemic agent knows. An
implementation of both safetyp and pragmatic encroachment can be done
using the concept of possible worlds.
Pragmatic Process Reliabilism (hereinafter PPR) defines knowing in the
contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS as follows:
Definition. An epistemic agent knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
2. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
3. If the epistemic agent were to believe that p, p would not
be false;
4. The epistemic agent’s beliefpc that p was produced through
reliablep processes Pi; and
5. The reliabilityp of the processes Pi either exceeds or is
equal to the reliabilityp requirements of the actions,
(a) where the epistemic agent utilizes the beliefpc that p
and
(b) which are set by the expected consequences of the
actions.
We have already discussed the first and second conditions above on
the page 100. The third condition excludes beliefsp, which are just lucky
guesses—either through inferring or perception, from knowledgep. The
fourth condition includes the argument that the justification for beliefp is
achieved through the reliabilityp of beliefp–forming processes. The fifth
condition brings into consideration possible factors created by the cir-
cumstances of an epistemic agent; especially, the pragmatic importance
3.6 Knowledge 111
of knowledgep and the environment of an epistemic agent.58 Knowledgep is
sensitive to the context.59
Let us evaluate PPR using our scenario in Section 2.1.1. As already
discussed, there are three different propositions:
1. P1: The correct diagnosis is lateral malleolus fracture.
2. P2: The correct diagnosis is bimalleolus fracture.
3. P3: The correct diagnosis is trimalleolus fracture.
Our intuition says that the belief, the object of which is proposition P1,
is not knowledge. Now, according to PPR: An epistemic agent knows that
p if and only if
1. p is true;
P1 is not true; therefore, it would be straightforward to claim that
PPR fulfils directly our intuition. But there is a viewpoint that de-
serves deeper consideration. The problem is following: Can an at-
tributer actually determine that whether there is such a reliablep
correspondes as the mind (world)–to–world connection that can be
considered to be the demanded truth–conduciveness of the beliefp–
forming process in order to decide whether p is true or not. But as
we support fallibilism, and we see that the role of truth is at the
background scene, we cannot argue that this is the dominant factor
in the determination whether PPR is according to our intuition.
2. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
The physician at the district hospital believes P1 to be true, but
other epistemic agents do not believe P1 to be true (except Matti
during the first phase). Hence, the context of the attributor affects
the evaluation of this requirement, and PPR either fulfils or does not
fulfil our intuition.
3. If the epistemic agent were to believe that p, p would not be false;
P1 is false in the actual world; therefore, excluding the role of luck is
not relevant in this case.
4. The epistemic agent’s belief that p was produced through reliablep pro-
cesses Pi ;
We are of the opinion that the imaging process exercised at the dis-
trict hospital is reliablep in general.
58In computer science this is called context–awareness.
59Hereinafter belief, justified belief, and knowledge without superscripts p and c refer
these terms in the contexts of both human being and ISAbdi.
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5. The reliabilityp of the processes Pi either exceeds or is equal to the
reliabilityp requirements of the actions,
(a) where the epistemic agent utilizes the beliefp that p
The belief is utilized to provide good medical care for Matti.
(b) which are set by the expected consequences of the actions.
The expected consequences include full recovery of Matti’s ankle
and smallest possible healthcare costs. Therefore, there is a
high requirement to avoid all the errors that would cause any
failures in the medical care, and this, in turn, demands very
high reliabilityp.
Despite of being reliablep in general, the imaging process does not ful-
fil the reliabilityp requirements that are high because of the potential
consequences of a failure.
We can conclude that according to PPR P1 is not knowledge. PPR is ac-
cording to our intuition.
Proposition P2 is more complicated, and it demands a more thorough
evaluation. Our preliminary intuition says that the belief, the object of
which is proposition P2, is knowledge, but after more careful thinking about
possible consequences of failure our intuition says that it is not knowledge.
According to PPR:
The epistemic agent knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
P2 is not true. But, again, the same applies as in the case of P1.
2. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
The CADx system as well as the physician at EMA, Matti, and TMA
application believe P2 to be true.
3. If the epistemic agent were to believe that p, p would not be false;
P2 is false in the actual world, therefore, excluding the role of luck is
not relevant in this case.
4. The epistemic agent’s belief that p was produced through reliablep pro-
cesses Pi ;
The imaging process exercised at the Finnish radiology center is
reliablep.
5. The reliabilityp of the process Pi either exceeds or is equal to the
reliabilityp requirements of the actions,
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(a) where the epistemic agent utilizes the belief that p;
The belief is utilized to provide the best possible medical care
for Matti and to reduce possible post–trauma costs.
(b) which are set by the expected consequences of the actions.
After all, the imaging process does not fulfil the high reliabilityp
requirements, which are set by the demand for Matti’s full re-
covery from the trauma. The consequences of partial recover-
ing would require both Matti to change his occupation and the
insurance company to pay Matti compensations, which would
otherwise be unnecessary.
We conclude that according to PPR that the information based on P2 is
not knowledge. PPR is according to our intuition.
Our intuition says that the belief, the object of which is proposition P3,
is knowledge. P3 is based on the result of the highly reliablep process, and
there exist no defeaters. According to PPR:
An epistemic agent knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
P3 is true. At least, it is based on the best available empirical prac-
tice, and therefore, we argue there is such a reliablep correspondes as
the mind (world)–to–world connection that can be considered to be
the demanded truth–conduciveness of the belief–forming process in
order to decide whether p is true or not. But, again, as we support
fallibilism in this kind of empirical contexts, there is a possibility that
P3 is untrue. However, we see that the role of truth is at the back-
ground scene in this kind of empirical contexts. Again, we cannot
argue that this is the dominant factor in this case.
2. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
All the epistemic agents involved believe P3 to be true.
3. If the epistemic agent were to believe that p, p would not be false;
P3 is true in the actual world, therefore, excluding the role of luck
is relevant in this case. The question is which are the nearby worlds,
that need to be taken into account. We can consider the following
possible worlds:
• Another orthopaedist at Helsinki University Hospital could have
operated on the ankle.
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We consider this case to be a nearby world. Another orthopaed-
ist would have come to the same conclusion. There is no luck
involved.
• Matti could have been transferred to another Finnish university
hospital.
We consider this case to be a nearby world. Another orthopaed-
ist at a different university hospital would have come to the same
conclusion. There is no luck involved.
• Matti could have been operated in a Finnish district hospital.
We consider this case to be a nearby world. Another orthopaed-
ist at a district hospital would have come to the same conclusion,
because of the high medical level of Finnish district hospitals.
There is no luck involved.
• The operation of the ankle could have failed.
We consider that this case is not a nearby world because the
failure of an ankle operation is very rare.
• Matti could have been operated on in a local hospital in Thail-
and.
We consider that this case is not a nearby world because Matti
was capable to travel back to Finland for the operation; there-
fore, Finnish travellers are normally transferred back to Finland.
• Matti could not have been operated, at all.
We consider that this case is not a nearby world because it would
have been erroneous medical care.
4. The epistemic agent’s belief that p was produced through a reliablep
process Pi;
The operation, which was carried out at Helsinki University Hospital,
can be considered to fulfil all the requirements of a reliablep process.
5. The reliabilityp of the processes Pi either exceeds or is equal to the
reliabilityp requirements of the actions,
(a) where the epistemic agent utilizes the belief that p
P3 is utilized to provide the best possible medical care for Matti
and to reduce possible post–trauma costs.
(b) which are set by the expected consequences of the actions.
The operation process does fulfil the high reliabilityp require-
ments, which are set by the demand of Matti’s full recovery of
the trauma. The consequences of partial recovering would re-
quire both Matti to change his occupation and the insurance
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company to pay Matti compensations, which would otherwise
be unnecessary.
We conclude that according to PPR P3 is knowledge. PPR is according to
our intuition.
PPR begs some questions in the context of ISAbdi. The first one deals
with planning and implementation of ISAbdi. What is actually required to
plan and implement ISAbdi fulfilling the requirements of PPR? The second
question deals with the runtime environment of ISAbdi. How can ISAbdi be
aware of expected (or potential) consequences of its actions? We discuss
these issues in more detail in Section 6.2.
3.6.6 Conclusion about Knowledge in the context of ISAbdi
We argued that JTB added with any of the anti–Gettier conditions (sens-
itivity, safetyp, or rule out all relevant alternatives) is not suitable in the
context of ISAbdi. The same applies also to the causal theory of knowledge,
virtue epistemology, and knowledge first.
Process reliabilism provides the best alternative when the fifth condi-
tion (pragmatic encroachment) is added. PPR defines knowing as follows:
An epistemic agent knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
2. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
3. If the epistemic agent were to believe that p, p would not be false;
4. The epistemic agent’s belief that p was produced through reliable pro-
cesses Pi ; and
5. The reliabilityp of the processes Pi either exceeds or is equal to the
reliabilityp requirements of the actions,
(a) where the epistemic agent utilizes the belief that p and
(b) which are set by the expected consequences of the actions.
The fifth condition begs, at least, two questions in the context of ISAbdi.
First, what is required to plan and implement ISAbdi? Second, how can
ISAbdi at runtime be aware of expected (or potential) consequences of its
actions? We give some answers to these questions in Section 6.2.
In the context of ISAbdi there exists only instrumental value of knowl-
edge, and the question of knowledge value concerns the value of knowledge
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over the value of justified belief; not the value of knowledge over the value
of true belief.
3.7 Trust
In this section we discuss the roles of trust and trustworthiness in the
contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS. We also enhance the explication of trust.
Trust is important because it is an essential attitude when forming a
relationship with others. We hope that others are trustworthy. Thus, trust
comprises an attitude that there is a risk that others will deceive us. In
the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS trust has a role in testimony. According
to Judith Baker there are three kinds of trust [13]. In the first kind, people
trust other people because they cannot check all the bases for establishing
a belief. The formed belief is not resistant to counter–evidence. The second
kind of trust involves more than people’s willingness to accept other people
or to assume things on trust. People may judge an individual or a thing
on the basis of a non–ordinary belief. For example, a person might think
a salesman is honest because he just looks honest. Once again, the formed
belief is not resistant to counter–evidence. A common feature among these
two kinds of trusts is that they do not directly rely on evidence. The third
kind of trust is the case in which people think it is rational to hold a belief
even though there is a counter–evidence. This kind of trust can be called
friendship trust.
Trust and trustworthiness are important because they are fundamental
concepts of relationships. But these terms are not easy to grasp. We
can approach them from several viewpoints: philosophy, computer science,
psychology, sociology, religion, etc. We will explore briefly the following
dimensions of trust:
1. The conceptual nature of trust and trustworthiness
2. The epistemology of trust.
For example, one of the definitions of trustworthiness in the context of
human beings is as follows: Trustworthiness is a moral value considered to
be a virtue [28, 93]. Thus, a trustworthy person is someone in whom you
can place your trust and rest assured that the trust shall not be betrayed.
As we can see in the discussion below, this definition is far from being an
accurate one. And in the context of ISAbdi moral values and virtues are out
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of scope, as we cannot argue yet that ISAbdi could have such properties.
60
However, there are other philosophical dimensions of trustworthiness that
are fruitful to explore in the context of ISAbdi. Trustworthiness and trust
need to be discussed together because they are strongly linked to each other
[65].
Trusting [93] requires that a trustor can tolerate some level of risk or
vulnerability to the failure by a trustee to do or to be what the trustor
depends on in the trustee. Hence, trusting requires that a trustor can 1)
be vulnerable to the trustee; 2) think well of the other, at least, in certain
domains; and 3) be optimistic that the trustee is competent in certain
respects. For trust to be warranted (well–grounded), both parties must be
trustworthy.
In the context of computer science the definition is as follows: The trust-
worthiness of a component is defined by how well it secures a set of func-
tional and non–functional properties, deriving from its architecture, con-
struction, and environment, and as evaluated as appropriate. This defin-
ition provides us with a better starting point in the context of ISAbdi. A
more precise definition comes from the Committee on Information Systems
Trustworthiness [125]: Trustworthiness of distributed systems asserts that
the system does what is required despite environmental disruption, human
user and operator errors, and attacks by hostile parties and that it does not
do other things. Design and implementation errors must be avoided, elim-
inated, or somehow tolerated. Addressing only some aspects of the problem
is not sufficient. Moreover, achieving trustworthiness requires more than
just assembling components that are themselves trustworthy.
In philosophy the terms trustworthiness and trust are usually used in
the context of the relationship between human beings (case 0 in Figure
3.5). Trust is generally a three–party relation: A trusts B to do X [66].
But when discussing those terms in the contexts of DIDS and ISAbdi, the
matter is not clear. Ori Freiman discusses some of these problems in the
context of Internet of Things in his article Towards the Epistemology of the
Internet of Things [46]. Do we have any grounds to extend the relationship
to include artificial intelligent agents and components. For example, how
does the trust–trustworthiness scheme change, when instead of stating that
’Juhani trusts Maria to inform him of the correct water temperature.’, we
state:
– ’Juhani trusts ISAbdi to inform him of the correct water temperature.’
60Though, for example, Nick Bostrom argues in his book Superintelligence: Paths,
Dangers, Strategies [21] that in the future these features are feasible.
118 3 Six Concepts
Figure 3.5: Cases of trust.
– ’Juhani trusts a justified belief of the correct water temperature.’
– ’ISAbdi trusts Maria to inform it of the correct water temperature.’
– ’ISAbdi trusts another ISAbdi to inform it of the correct water tem-
perature.’
In the environment of DIDS we can point out several different cases,
where the trust–trustworthiness scheme plays a role in addition to trust
between human beings. The cases are as illustrated in Figure 3.5:
1. Human being trusts ISAbdi.
2. Human being trusts a piece of information (e.g. knowledge or justified
belief) provided by ISAbdi.
3. ISAbdi trusts another ISAbdi.
4. ISAbdi trusts human being.
5. Human being trusts a piece of information (obtained, for example,
from some sort of a sensor).
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6. ISAbdi trusts a piece of information (e.g. knowledge or justified belief)
provided by ISAbdi.
7. ISAbdi trusts a piece of information (e.g. knowledge or justified belief)
provided by human being.
8. ISAbdi trusts a piece of information (obtained, for example, from some
sort of a sensor).
We argue that the first case ”human being trusts ISAbdi” is similar
to the case of ”human being trusts human being”. The above–mentioned
three requirements are fulfilled. First, human being is vulnerable to ISAbdi.
Second, human being usually thinks well of ISAbdi, the services of which
she/he uses at least in a specific domain. And third, human being is op-
timistic that ISAbdi is competent in required respects.
The second case is interesting, for example, in a case where human be-
ing has no trust–related information about ISAbdi, which is the source of
the piece of information. What does trust a piece of information actually
mean? As mentioned above trust is generally a three–party relation: A
trusts B to do X. We can enhance this in the following way: A trusts B to
have a property X. We can explicate it in the following way: Human being
has strong confidence that the piece of information has a certain property,
which in the case of a proposition is truthfulness and/or justifiedness. Now,
if the proposition does not actually have the required property, then we can
say that the proposition has betrayed human being. The above–mentioned
three requirements are fulfilled in this case, as well. First, human being is
vulnerable to the truthfulness or justifiedness of the proposition because a
false proposition can cause actions, which might be harmful to human be-
ing. Second, human being usually thinks well of the proposition, which has
either instrumental or intrinsic value. And third, human being is optimistic
that the proposition can be the object of justified belief and knowledge.
We see that the third case ISAbdi trusts another ISAbdi is similar to
the first one. First, ISAbdi is vulnerable to another ISAbdi. Second, it is
quite feasible to consider that ISAbdi thinks well of another ISAbdis, which
services she/he uses at least in a specific domain. And third, ISAbdi has a
positive belief that ISAbdi is competent in certain respects.
The fourth case ISAbdi trusts human being is similar to the case of hu-
man being trusts human being. The above–mentioned three requirements
are fulfilled, as well. First, ISAbdi is vulnerable to human being. For ex-
ample, if human being provides ISAbdi with an unjustified or false pro-
position, then ISAbdi might not provide a reliable
p (dependable) service.
Second, it is quite feasible to consider that ISAbdi thinks well of human
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being at least in a specific domain. And third, ISAbdi has a positive belief
that human being is competent in certain respects. The cases from five to
eight similar to cases from one to four.
Trust can be warranted in the sense of being plausible. The term ’war-
ranted’ comprises concepts ’justified’, ’well–grounded’, and ’plausible’. A
piece of information is trustworthy meaning that trust is warranted, when
it is for example [93]:
1. ”Plausible, only if the conditions required for trust exist. Knowing
what these conditions are requires understanding the nature of trust.”
2. ”Plausible, only when it is possible for one to develop trust, given
one’s circumstances and the sort of mental attitude trust is. For
example, trust may not be the sort of attitude that one will oneself to
have without any evidence of a person’s trustworthiness.”
3. ”Well–grounded, only if the trustee is trustworthy, which makes the
nature of trustworthiness important in determining when trust is war-
ranted.”
4. ”Justified, sometimes when the trustee is not in fact trustworthy,
which suggests that the epistemology of trust is relevant.”
5. ”Justified, often because some value will emerge from the trust or
because it is valuable in and of itself. Thus, the value of trust is
important.”
We summarize our thoughts about trust and trustworthiness by stating
that in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS they are important because they
are fundamental factors in the co–operation between ISAbdis and between
ISAbdi and human being. Without trust and trustworthiness there hardly
would exist any co–operation. In the context of ISAbdi the concepts trust
and trustworthiness must cover also cases that are more sociological than
technological by nature. We also extended trust to cover the attitude to-
wards entities such as propositions by stating A trusts B to have a property
X, where B is a proposition. Proposition B is trustworthy if it actually
has the property X, otherwise it betrays A, if A has established a strong
confidence based on proper factors that B has the property X. Trust and
trustworthiness are essential background components in the evaluation of
the dependability of ISAbdi and IDS.
3.8 Possible Objections 121
3.8 Possible Objections
In this section we discuss some potential objections to our approach. We
consider that the following four ones are the most important objections:
anthropomorphism, joint epistemic theories, pragmatic process reliabilism
as joint epistemic theory, and implementability.
Objection 1: Anthropomorphism
Even though the discussion created by John R. Searle on the capability of an
artificial entity (a digital computer) having intentionality, understanding,
and qualia has faded during 2010s, there still are doubts about AI–based
entities to be capable of having semantic content of the sort that is essential
to human cognition. In the context of this thesis the question is whether
ISAbdis (also robots) can have belief, justified belief, and knowledge. The
fundamental claim is as follows [129]: ”The purely formal or abstract or
syntactical processes of the implemented computer program could not by
themselves be sufficient to guarantee the presence of mental content or
semantic content of the sort that is essential to human cognition. Of course
a system might have semantic content for some other reason, but it does not
apply to Strong Artificial Intelligence, any more. The basic structure of the
Chinese Room Argument is rather obvious: the distinction between syntax
and semantics and the distinction between simulation and duplication.”
We can answer the objection using the following thought experiment:
We have two exactly similar rooms, which have equipment to carry out the
following training session. On the floors there are several tools, such as a
screwdriver, a hammer, a saw, etc. In one room there is a child to whom a
man teaches how to use the tools, and in another room there is a robot61
to whom another man teaches how to use the tools. The teaching session
goes in the following way: The teacher says to the child/robot ”Bring me
the hammer.” As, the first time, the child/robot does not know which tool
is the hammer, she/it picks up an arbitrary object which happens to be the
screwdriver, and brings it to the teacher. The teacher says in both cases:
”No, this is not the hammer ; this is the screwdriver.” The child/robot takes
the screwdriver back to its place. Next the child/robot takes the hammer
and brings it to the teacher. The teacher says in both cases: ”Yes, this is
the hammer, thank you”. Next the teacher says to the child/robot ”Bring
me the screwdriver.” Now, the child/robot does know, which tool is the
61The robot has required visual tools to recognize various objects, and limbs to move
and catch objects.
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screwdriver, she/it brings the screwdriver. The teacher says in both cases:
”Thank you”.62
Now, according to Searle, the child (mind) has a semantic mental con-
tent; therefore, the child understands and is able to reason. But the robot
does not have a semantic mental content; hence, the robot does not under-
stand (however, the robot is able to reason). The robot only simulates63
understanding of the meanings of the symbols, and there is not the right
kind of causal relationship64 [130]. Our intuition says that in both cases
there is semantics, thus understanding, involved. Our defence can be sum-
marized in the following claims: 1) Externalist attitude: states of a physical
entity get their content through causal connections to the external reality
they represent. This is not limited only to human beings. 2) ISAbdi can
have propositional attitudes if it has the right causal connections to the
world. 3) The syntactically specifiable objects over which computations
are defined can possess semantics; it is just that the semantics may not be
involved in the specifications. For example, in the context of ISAbdi we can
have semantics involved using metadata about information. 4) Program-
ming is precisely what could give something a mind. Therefore, we argue
that ISAbdi do have belief, justified belief, and knowledge.
Objection 2: Joint Epistemic Theories
The following question can be raised: Is there real need for joint epistem-
ological theories? This question is valid because the worlds (operating
environments) of human beings and ISAbdis can be considered to be quite
different from each other. And so far human beings have generally seen
computer–based entities not to be independent, but operate as useful tools
managed by human beings. Therefore, there is no need for epistemic the-
ories for computer–based entities.
The environment of computer–based systems (intelligent distributed
systems and intelligent software agents) is changing rapidly due to the
current strong development of AI and robotics. There will be independent
ISAbdis, robots, and other kinds of ISAs (e.g. based on deep learning). They
will offer services to human beings, so that human beings do not know that
the services are provided by independent computer–based entities, which
62This thought scenario can be extended by adding a teaching session discussing what
can be done with hammer and screwdriver.
63We cannot prove it to be duplication because we don’t know yet how a human brain
actually produces understanding and what the limits of understanding (mind) are.
64According to Searle the causal relationship should be a bottom–up relationship and
not an input–output relationship.
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are capable to learn, change their behaviour, deny or decline to offer ser-
vices, etc. Therefore, service users cannot make any difference between
whether the services are provided by human beings or ISAbdis. And in the
context of DIDS a service can be provided by co–operation between human
beings and independent ISAbdis. Therefore, we argue that joint epistemic
theories provide a better ground for the dependability of ISAbdis and DIDS.
If there were a contradiction between human beings and ISAbdis about the
epistemic theories, thus the epistemic quality of information, would it lead
to undependable IDS. The epistemic quality of information affect the de-
pendability of IDS, as discussed in Section 2.2.2.
Objection 3: Pragmatic Process Reliabilism as Joint Epistemic
Theory
Reliabilism has been discussed including objections in several articles, such
as [60, 57, 58, 148, 149]. For example, Jonathan Vogel in his article Reli-
abilism Leveled [148] points out that reliabilism has problems dealing with
higher–level or reflective knowledge. Therefore, he argues that the inabil-
ity of reliabilism to account for reflective knowledge has its roots in a more
basic deficiency, and he considers that in general knowledge is not either a
reliably true belief or a belief that results from a reliablep process. He sees
that knowledge is a kind of human success.
We argue that the above objection is not strong enough in the environ-
ment, where human beings and ISAbdis (or other intelligent artificial entity
based on AI) work in co–operation to produce dependable services. First,
there is no consensus among epistemologists on a general, overall valid epi-
stemic theory of justification and knowledge, and therefore, most proper
one for the joint environment shall be selected. Second, we have already
argued (see Sections 3.5 and 3.6) that PPR is the most proper one to be the
joint epistemic theories. Third, we argue that the problems of higher–level
or reflective knowledge are not so decisive factors that it would overcome
the benefits of PPR over other possible epistemic theories in the environ-
ment of human beings, DIDS, and ISAbdis. The actual, pragmatic role
of a higher–level or reflective knowledge in producing, storing, and utiliz-
ing beliefs is not so significant that it would be more meaningful than the
capability to evaluate efficiently the epistemic quality of information. The
higher–level knowledge (to know that one knows p) is either very seldom
needed or practical in the context of ISAbdi.
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Objection 4: Implementability
Epistemological discussions have been going on at least for two thousand
years including a hidden idea that only a human mind can really operate
according to a developed epistemic theory. Now, the scheme is being and
will be changed by AI. When adopting a theory of justification and know-
ledge (we can call it as applied epistemology), we must take into account
the implementability of the theory. We have already argued in Section
3.5, that process reliabilism faces less implementation problems than other
theories in justifying ISAbdi’s beliefs. PPR still faces implementation prob-
lems, especially in the case of knowledge, that have not yet been solved by
AI. The problems deal with the evaluation of possible consequences of an
action (various counterfactual worlds), which in turn affect the evaluation
of the epistemic quality of belief. However, we are of the opinion, that those
problems will be solved by the future development of AI.
3.9 Summary of Six Concepts
In the environment where human beings and ISAbdis work in co–operation
to produce dependable services we need the same epistemological base for
both parties.
Truth
We regard truth as an important concept in the co–operation between
ISAbdis and human beings, but it plays its role in the background. It is
intuitive to say that it cannot be known what is not true. We argued that
truth is the substantive property (inflationist approach), and there exists
the property F (correspondence) such that any proposition, if true, is so by
virtue of being F and this is a fact that is not transparent in the concept
of truth. So correspondence is necessary and sufficient for explaining the
truth of any true proposition p. The reliabilist theories of knowledge scope
truth well—correspondence of the world–to–world connection—in terms of
the truth–conduciveness of a belief–forming process.
Trust and Trustworthiness
In the co–operation between ISAbdis and human beings trust and trust-
worthiness are important, as they are fundamental factors in the successful
service provisions. Trust and trustworthiness cover situations that are more
sociological than technological by nature. We enhanced trust to cover the
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attitude towards entities such as propositions by stating A trusts B to have
a property X, where B is a proposition. Proposition B is trustworthy if it
actually has the property X, otherwise it betrays A, if A has established a
strong confidence based on proper factors that B has the property X.
Summary of Definitions
Our basic understanding of the required epistemic base can be stated as
follows:
Belief An epistemic agent has beliefs that have similar features to com-
pared with traditional human being’s beliefs. Belief is defined as
follows:
Belief is a propositional attitude,
1. which is the state of having an opinion about something to be
the case;
2. which is created by its actual and potential causal relations to
sensory stimulations, behaviour, and/or other propositional at-
titudes; and
3. the representation of which—structured if necessary—is stored
in a linguistic form.
Justified Belief Pragmatic process reliabilism explicates the justification
in the joint context of ISAbdi and human being. The definition of
justification is as follows:
An epistemic agent has justification for her/his/its belief that p if,
1. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
2. The belief was produced by sufficiently reliablep processes Pi;
and
3. The required degree of reliabilityp of the processes Pi is determ-
ined by the context where the epistemic agent uses his/hers/its
belief in reasoning and actions.
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Knowledge Pragmatic process reliabilism explicates well the way we un-
derstand the concept of propositional knowledge. Knowledge is defined
as follows:
An epistemic agent knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
2. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
3. If the epistemic agent were to believe that p, p would not be
false;
4. The epistemic agent’s belief that p was produced through reliablep
processes Pi; and
5. The reliabilityp of the processes Pi either exceeds or is equal to
the reliabilityp requirements of the actions,
(a) where the epistemic agent utilizes the belief that p and
(b) which are set by the expected consequences of the actions.
In the context of ISAbdi there exists only an instrumental value of know-
ledge.
Conclusions of Six Concepts
We have reasoned that PPR as the justification theory and knowledge the-
ory, and testimony as the transfer method of justified belief and knowledge
are the most proper ones in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS.
We have also come to the conclusion that truth is a very complex
concept, and it is not quite clear what its actual role in the context of
ISAbdi is. We argued that truth is the substantive property (inflationist
approach), and there exists the property F (correspondence) such that any
proposition, if true, is so in virtue of being F and this a fact that is not
transparent in the concept of truth. So correspondence is necessary and
sufficient for explaining the truth of a true proposition p in the context
of ISAbdi. In the case of ISAbdi we assumed that the reliability
p—if it is
high enough—of the belief–forming process, which is used to establish the
correspondence, is adequate to indicate truthfulness. And in the context
of ISAbdi truth plays its role in the background; though, in the context of
various logics truth is the important factor.
In Section 3.5 we argued that justification is context–sensitive, and
pragmatic process reliabilism is the proper theory of justification. We also
argued in Section 3.6 that the pragmatic process reliabilism theory of know-
ledge is the most appropriate one in the context of ISAbdi. We are of
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the opinion that PPR explains truth adequately enough—correspondence
as the world–to–world connection—in terms of the truth–conduciveness of
ISAbdi’s belief–forming process.
The epistemic contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS can be very complicated
consisting of many sources of information and many kinds of information.
We discuss this issue in more detail in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Belief as Dependability Factor
In this chapter the main scope of our discussion is to explore various roles
and meanings of knowledge, justified belief, and belief when taking into
account dependability of information services provided by ISAbdi and DIDS.
When a human being has a knowledge—or just justification for a belief—
and she/he needs to act based on this belief then she/he usually trusts that
acting based on this belief will lead to a successful result. Thus, belief is
a dependability factor in human being’s actions. We claim that this is the
case also in the actions of ISAbdi.
4.1 Justifiably be Trusted
The term trustworthiness in the context of computing systems usually
means that systems are secure, available, and reliablec. Thus, a trust-
worthy system does what people (its developers and users) expect it to
do and not something else despite environmental disruption, errors made
by human users and operators, hardware failures, and attacks by hostile
parties. Design and implementation errors must be avoided, eliminated, or
somehow tolerated. It is not sufficient to address only some of these dimen-
sions, nor is it sufficient simply to assemble components that are themselves
trustworthy. Trustworthiness is holistic and multidimensional [125]. But
we are of the opinion that this approach does not adequately address the
epistemological concept required by ISAbdi and DIDS.
As discussed in Section 2.1.2 a dependable system shall either deliver a
service that can justifiably be trusted or be capable to avoid service failures
that are more frequent or more severe than is acceptable to the users. We
also noted that there is a causal relationship between these two options.
Justified belief and knowledge are qualitative factors, but the evaluation
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Figure 4.1: Justifiably be trusted.
whether a belief is justified or knowledge is commonly based on quantitative
factors (in our case based on the PPR theory).
The concept of ”justifiably be trusted” begs a question: What kind
of justification for trust is plausible? We have already discussed this is-
sue above in Sections 3.5 and 3.7, and now we will establish a connection
between justifiably be trusted and the epistemic quality of belief.
In Section 3.7 we defined trust as follows: A trusts B to have a property
X, and B is trustworthy if it actually has property X, otherwise it betrays
A, if A has established a strong confidence based on proper factors that B
has property X. We explicate the above as follows (Figure 4.1):
• The property X of a dependable system B is that the service of the
system B either provides users with beliefs that fulfil the epistemic
quality (knowledge, justified belief, or belief) expected by users or
executes an action that is based on beliefs that fulfil the epistemic
quality expected by users and fulfil users’ demands.
• A proper factor is the reliabilityp of either the process that produces
belief or the process that certificates belief.
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Figure 4.2: High level scheme of context of epistemic evaluation.
• The reliabilityp of the process (as the probability of success) can be
derived and/or determined from various constituents:
1. Hardware specifications
2. Software specifications
3. Specifications of specific methods and algorithms
4. Reliabilityp measurements
5. The history of the process (if it is available) producing a service
6. Certification services
7. etc.
A high level scheme of the context of the epistemic evaluation is illustrated
in Figure 4.2. We claim that a system is justifiably trustworthy only if it
carries out actions based on only knowledge and/or justified beliefs1 and in
the case of information services the system shall distribute information with
1Of course, there are malicious systems, which are designed to distribute false inform-
ation and avoid technical service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is
acceptable; thus, they are dependable in this sense.
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associated metadata expressing the epistemic quality of beliefs (knowledge,
justified beliefs or beliefs without any justification). Operating on uncertain
(likely false) beliefs seldom produces trustworthy service.2 We also claim
that there is a causal relationship between the epistemic quality of beliefs
provided by the system and the service of the system to be justifiably
trusted. We assume that in general, the higher the epistemic quality of
the beliefs of the system is, the more justifiably trusted the service of the
system is.
4.2 Evaluation of Epistemic Quality of Belief
As already discussed in Chapter 3, the epistemic quality of belief depends
on the reliabilityp of the belief–forming processes of the sources (or of the
certification services) and expected consequences of the utilization of belief.
There are two factors that shall be evaluated in order to define the epistemic
quality of belief:
1. The reliabilityp of the belief–forming processes and
2. Expected consequences of the utilization of belief.
Next we discuss briefly these two factors, and a more detailed discussion is
in Appendix Discussions about Reliability of Sources of Beliefs.
4.2.1 Sources of Beliefs
There are several different kinds of information sources, and we discuss some
of their specific features concerning the epistemic quality of belief. We can
split ISAbdi’s belief–forming processes into two distinct type of processes.
First, processes that are external to ISAbdi, and second, ISAbdi’s internal
processes. In this section we assume that ISAbdi’s own belief–forming pro-
cesses are reliablep enough, and we concentrate on the external processes.
We use the scenario of TIS (see page 14) and the belief ”Road 101 is slip-
pery.”. Figure 4.3 illustrates the possible main sources of information, from
where ISAbdi–A may perceive information either through data communic-
ation services or directly using different input mechanism, such as internal
application interface, keyboard, mouse, video camera, thermometer, etc.
The different cases are summarized in Table 4.1.
2The history of Internet has proven this several times.
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Figure 4.3: Sources of information of ISA.




1 Sensor R Reliabilityp available — it can be obtained
from a manufacturer, a certification insti-
tute, or user tests.
2 Inference
service
R Reliabilityp available — it can be evaluated
from the reliabilityp of inferring algorithms
and their implementations.
3 Memory R Reliabilityp available — it can be evalu-
ated from the reliabilityp of memory spe-
cifications and the reliabilityp of the belief–





R Reliabilityp available — it can be evaluated
from the reliabilityp of the specifications of
distributed information base. Issues are, for
example, public cloud services, changeable






Reliabilityp available — certification ser-
vice evaluate and certifies belief (provides
justification); in addition this requires
reliabilityp of the certification process. Is-
sues are such as the combination of two
different reliabilitiesp, the certificate of the
certification service, and the possibility of






Reliabilityp is not in general available —
it requires using of a certification service
or a priori warrant of the human being.
Issues are such as difficulties to evaluate
reliabilityp of a human being and does a
warrant of a professional status guarantee
the reliabilityp of the process.
3Adopted epistemic theory: R = reliabilism and T = testimony
4We assume that information stored in the distributed information base has been
evaluated to be reliablep.
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7 Social
media
T Reliabilityp is not available — it requires
using of a warrant/certification service or
new social media applications, which can
manage the demanded metadata and their
creation. Issues are such as incompetent
human beings, fake persons, crackers, mali-






Reliabilityp is either available (by a priori
warrant: warranted service provider) or not
available depending on the status of the ser-
vice. Issues are such as difficulties to evalu-
ate reliabilityp of common information ser-





Reliabilityp either available or not available
depending on the ISAbdi-X. May require
use of a certification service or a warran-
ted ISAbdi. Issues are such as difficulties to
evaluate reliabilityp of a ISAbdi and does a
warrant of a ’professional ’ status guarantee
the reliabilityp of the process.
Table 4.1: Summary of sources of belief.
4.2.2 Evaluation of Consequences
The evaluation of the possible consequences of an action carried out by
ISAbdi is a difficult task, which comprises problems—such as the present-
ation of the actual world, specifying relevant counterfactual worlds, the
frame problem, and specifying the reliabilityp requirements of each counter
factual world not to happen—that may not fully be solvable with current
computing power and the state of the art in logics and AI. But, we are of
the opinion that a lot can be done even today. The evaluation of the con-
sequences is a fully application dependent issue, and as such, it is outside
the scope of this thesis. But we give a more detailed example in Appendix
Discussions about Reliability of Sources of Beliefs how it could be carried
out in the case of the belief ”Road 101 is slippery.” (illustrated in Figure 4.4
and in Table 4.2).5 The key idea is as follows: first, look up relevant con-
5The reliabilityp numbers in the table are made–up and they are only examples of
possible values.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.2: Relevant possible worlds of Traffic Information Service and eval-
uated reliabilityp requirements for declarations.
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Figure 4.4: Evaluation of consequences.
sequences; second, specify their severity (acceptance of happening); third,
specify their reliabilityp requirements, and fourth, specify the reliabilityp
limits for belief, justified belief, and knowledge. A belief may have sev-
eral epistemic qualities depending on the environments and circumstances,
where it is utilized.
In this example there are 12 relevant possible consequences (1 real world
and 11 counterfactual worlds) as listed in Table 4.2. For each relevant
world a reliabilityp requirement is specified based on estimations of users’
acceptance of the occurring of consequences. For example, not declaring a
traffic alert when the road is slippery (]11) is not the accepted consequence
because it may cause traffic accidents. In this example it is accepted to
happen only once (ADC) or five times (HDC) in 100 cases, when the road
is slippery. In this example this specifies directly its reliabilityp requirement
for knowledge.
4.3 Summary of Belief as Dependability Factor
We claimed that a system can be justifiably trustworthy and therefore de-
pendable only if it carries out actions based on only knowledge or justified
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beliefs, and in the case of information services the system distributes only
knowledge and justified beliefs with associated metadata expressing the epi-
stemic quality of beliefs. We established the connection between justifiably
be trusted and the epistemic quality of belief so that epistemological theories
can be used to establish one ground for the evaluation of the dependability
of ISAbdi and IDS.
There are several different kinds of information sources, and each one
of them has specific features concerning the epistemic quality of belief. A
preliminary analysis showed that in many cases the reliabilityp of belief–
forming processes can be obtained, but there are sources of which reliabilityp
of belief–forming process is not available. Therefore, there is a requirement
for third party warrant/certification services.
The evaluation of the possible consequences of an action—determining
relevant possible worlds—is a difficult task. It comprises problems that may
not be solvable with current state of art in logics and AI [6], but we claimed
that a lot can be done even today. We showed using an example how the
evaluation of possible consequences and requirements for the reliabilityp of
belief–forming processes could be carried out. For a more detailed discus-




The role of computing systems in the society is rapidly changing towards
autonomous intelligent software agents, which are operating more and more
in the environment of uncertain information. Therefore, as already men-
tioned in Section 2.1.2, we argue that some assumptions presented in Sec-
tion 2.1.2 will not hold in the future. The concepts of system dependability
need enhancements in order to be applicable in the environment of the
future distributed computing systems based on AI, ISAbdis and robots.
5.1 Issues of Dependability Taxonomy
Next we point out issues that we need to evaluate more thoroughly. When
we deal with intelligent—i.e. autonomous, capable of learning—software
agents, which are co–operating with human beings and other ISAs, the






The role of the functional specifications of a system is to describe as ac-
curately as possible what the system to be developed should do, so that
the designers and programmers of the system are able to implement the
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system correctly. The functional specifications are also used in the produc-
tion phase to reveal service failures. When we deal with a system, which
is capable of learning new services (and also to forget old services), it is
not possible to define the functional specifications of the system accurately
in the way that is required by Laprie’s dependability model. It is difficult
to predict what kind of new functionalities the system might learn during
its production phase. Let us have an example of an avatar, whose ori-
ginal functional specifications state that the avatar’s function is to provide
legal advices in the domain of e–commerce. However, the avatar happens
to learn, when analysing legal issues, also the trustworthiness of various
e–commerce companies, and therefore, the avatar begins to provide its cus-
tomers with the ratings of the trustworthiness of e–commerce companies.
Is this a correct service or not? The answer depends on the aims of the
avatar. If the aim of the avatar is to offer only legal advices, then the ser-
vice is not a correct one. But if the aim of the avatar is to learn and serve
also new services, then the service is the correct one.
The problems with correct service, service failure, and service outage
can be elaborated with the following example: In a nursing institute NI the
system function of a nursing robot NR is to transport paralysed patients to
a fitness hall for daily physical exercise. However, after having transported
a patient P during several months, NR learns that P does not actually
want to have physical exercise on Sundays, but wants to be transported to
a nearby seaside terrace to watch sailing yachts. Therefore, this Sunday NR
does not transport P to the fitness hall, but to the terrace. Now, did NR
deliver the correct service or was there a service failure and outage? This
depends on the viewpoint: from the viewpoint of NI it was a service failure
and outage as it deviated from the patient’s rehabilitation plan. But from
P’s point of view it was the correct service, as it followed P’s understanding
about what was good for her/him. Therefore, the roles of the users1 need
to be taken into account in other terms than interaction faults resulting
from human errors.
The degraded mode of a system is an interesting concept in the contexts
of ISAbdi and DIDS, particularly when ISAbdi deals with different qualities
of information, such as belief, justified belief, and knowledge. For example,
if ISAbdi has only beliefs—not justified belief or knowledge—to infer a next
action to carry out a service to its users, is it the case of the degraded mode
of the system? Again, this depends on the aim of ISAbdi. For example, if
the aim of ISAbdi is to provide services in all possible circumstances, then
1There are two classes of users of the nursing robot: the nursing institute and the
patients, and these have different viewpoints on the service.
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we can say that ISAbdi operates in the degraded mode. But if the aim of
ISAbdi is operate only on knowledge, then we can say that ISAbdi is not in
the degraded mode but in an error state.
Laprie’s model of dependability assumes that critical computer systems
are developed and used by organizations rather than individuals, and there
is an expected way of working. Therefore, it is possible to recognize devi-
ations from a correct service and associated system failures [32]. As several
examples2 in the literature of AI and robotics indicate this is no longer
the case. The dependability of systems extends beyond the hardware and
software into the social and lived experience of the group of various users.
Intelligent systems become a part of the self–concept for users, and there-
fore, it is essential that dependability does not just mean that a system
behaves according to the expectations of its designers, but users may have
requirements of dependability that are beyond the expectations of the de-
signers of the system [32].3
5.2 Attributes
As already mentioned in Section 2.1.2 (see Figure 2.4 on page 19) Laprie’s
model comprises the following attributes of dependability [12]:
1. Availability, which is defined as the readiness for the correct service.
2. Reliabilityc, which is defined as the continuity of the correct service.
3. Safetyc, which is defined as the absence of catastrophic consequences
on the users and the environment.
4. Confidentiality, which is defined as the absence of unauthorized dis-
closure of information.
5. Integrity, which is defined as absence of improper system alterations.
6. Maintainability, which is defined as the ability to undergo modifica-
tions and repairs.
But, these attributes are not sufficient enough for the evaluation of
some dependability issues in the environment of future intelligent systems.
For instance, in the nursing robot example above, how do we evaluate the
system that has learned the new service (transporting the paralysed patient
to the seaside terrace to watch sail yachts)?
2Autonomous cars, social robots, etc.
3For example, this can be the case when users begin to use an intelligent system either
in a way or in an environment which designers have not foreseen or expected at all.
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• Availability: The system is ready for usage, which was originally as-
signed to it to be the correct one. But it has inferred based on learning
new justified beliefs that the new usage would also be a correct and
better one. Therefore, availability is not affected by implementing
and executing the new service.
• Reliabilityc: The correct service is not interrupted in any way (of
course, this depends on the viewpoints, which might result in con-
flicting opinions.4)
• Safetyc: The risk of catastrophic consequences has not increased in
any significant way.
• Confidentiality: The risk of unauthorized disclosure of information
has not increased.
• Integrity: The risk of improper system alterations has not increased
in any significant way.
• Maintainability: Maintainability is not reduced in any significant way.
As we can see these attributes do not provide any proper ones to eval-
uate the dependability of systems that can learn—adapt their behaviour
and services—in a changing environment. Hence, we propose three new
attributes:
• Skilfulness, which we define as the ability to be cognitively skilful
to improve an existing service or to develop and to implement a new
correct service.
• Truthfulness, which we define as the ability to operate on and pro-
duce belief that satisfies the epistemic requirements of a correct ser-
vice.5
• Serveability, which we define as the ability to provide a correct
service in the environment of uncertain, conflicting, (or even con-
tradictory) information. This expresses a kind of sensitivity to the
epistemic quality of beliefs.
4There are at least two factors: Customers and the length of service episodes. There
are two customers of this service: the institute and the patient, and there are two dis-
tinguished episode lengths: the length of overall treatment consisting of several physical
exercises and the length of the single physical exercise.
5We discuss epistemic requirements in Chapter 3.
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These three attributes enable us to take into account the social and
lived experience of the group of users. Serveability enables us to consider
the effects of the epistemic quality of beliefs on the dependability of ISAbdi
and DIDS. For example, we can evaluate NR’s skilfulness based on the
consequences of the service for the patient’s well–being. If the patient’s
well–being is increased when having the new service, then NR’s skilfulness
is good, otherwise NR needs to be improved in this domain. If NR has based
the development and implementation of the new service on knowledge and
not on mere belief, then the truthfulness of the nursing robot NR is high.
If the new service is considered to be a correct one, then NR’s serveability
is good, otherwise it is poor.
5.3 Faults
Laprie’s model specifies three different groups of faults (Figure 2.4 on page
19) [12]: development faults, interaction faults, and physical faults. A more
detailed taxonomy of faults comprises the following list [12]:
1. Phase of creation or occurrence: development faults and operational
faults
2. System boundaries: internal faults and external faults
3. Phenomenological cause: natural faults and human-made faults
4. Dimension: hardware faults and software faults
5. Objective: malicious faults and non–malicious faults
6. Intent: deliberative faults and non–deliberative faults
7. Capacity: accidental faults and incompetence faults
8. Persistence: permanent faults and transient faults.
We argue that this categorization needs to be enhanced in order to
better describe possible faults, and thus to better enable implementing the
means of dependability in systems that learn new functions and services.
For instance, in the example of the nursing robot NR above, let us assume
that the case is a failure.6 So NR has learned a new behaviour that is
considered to be a service failure. In other words, NR has learned a belief
that it should not have taken into account when planning and executing
actions. How do we categorize this fault?
6The viewpoint of the institute.
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Fault Class Valid Fault Class Valid
development fault no operational fault yes
internal fault yes external fault yes
natural fault no human–made fault yes–no
hardware fault no software fault yes–no
malicious fault yes-no non–malicious fault yes-no
deliberate fault no non–deliberate fault yes
accidental fault yes incompetence fault yes
permanent fault yes transient fault yes
Table 5.1: Fault classes.
One approach is presented in Table 5.1. The main issues about this
approach are as follows: We cannot claim that the failure is the result of
a development fault because if we claimed so, it comprised a requirement
that either in the development phase all the things that the system is not
allowed to learn should be specified, or the system should learn what not
to learn. We claim that this is not feasible. It is an operational fault (as
it occurred during service delivery of the use phase), but the question is in
which phase the fault occurred. Was it in the learning or execution phase?
There is no simple answer. This does not help much when designing and im-
plementing the means of dependability. The fault can be either an internal
fault (originate inside the system boundary) or an external fault (originate
outside the system boundary). Once again this is not very helpful. The
fault can also be either a malicious fault (introduced by a human with the
malicious objective of causing harm to the system) or a non–malicious fault
(introduced without a malicious objective) depending on patient P’s psy-
chological objectives. Again, this does not help much when designing and
implementing the means of dependability. The same applies to a deliberate
fault (result of a harmful thinking) and a non–deliberate fault (introduced
without awareness). The fault is not an accidental fault because it is the
result of a deliberate reasoning. We can say that it is an incompetence
fault. But we argue that this fault class is too undetailed to be properly
helpful. It does not specify the kind of incompetence, which would be re-
quired when designing and implementing the means of dependability. The
fault can be either permanent or transient depending on future learning.
As we can see there is a need for fault classes that can help to man-
age faults in the context of training, learning and epistemic concepts. In
order to properly support the design and implementation of the means of
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dependability we need the following fault classes:
• Training fault: A trainer or a user has taught a system an erroneous
behaviour or a false belief.
• Learning fault: A system has learned an incorrect behaviour or a
false belief despite proper training or other proper perception.
5.4 Failures
A dependability failure occurs when a system suffers service failures more
frequently or more severely than acceptable [12]. We should consider the
extent to which a system possesses the attributes of dependability in a
relative, probabilistic sense, thus not in an absolute, deterministic sense
[11].
There are four viewpoints to characterize a service failure [12]:
1. Failure domain: content failures, timing failures, and erratic failures
2. Detectability of failures: signalled failures and unsignalled failures
3. Consistency of failures: consistent failures and inconsistent failures
4. Consequences of failures on the environment: minor failures, ... ,
catastrophic failures.
We need to extend the above categorization of the service failures to
handle better failures happening in social activities. The failure domain
does not offer a proper concept for the case such as the one in the above
example of the nursing institute. We propose the following enhancement:
• Action failure: An action, which a system performs, deviates from
the aim of the system.
The detectability of failures does not comprise the failures that users signal
to the system for the system to correct itself. We propose the following
enhancement:
• Observed failure: A failure, which a user of the system observes and
informs to the system for the system itself to carry out a corrective
action.
The key difference between a signalled (unsignalled) failure and an observed
failure is that in the former the system itself is responsible for declaring the
failure to a third party for a corrective action and in the latter the user is
responsible for declaring the failure to the system for a corrective action.
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5.5 Means
When a service has failed because of a training fault a correct fault removal
method would be the retraining of the system. In the case of the learning
fault there are two options: either to improve the learning algorithm or to
change the training of the system. We see that the means of dependability
in Laprie’s categorization are quite adequate. If we wanted to enhance
the means, then we can add the following concepts into the fault–removal
(diagnosis, isolation, reconfiguration, and reinitialization):
• Relearning in which a system itself replaces a faulty belief or action
with a new, correct belief or action.
• Retraining in which an external entity trains a system to replace a
faulty belief or action with a new, correct belief or action.
5.6 Discussion about New Attributes
These new attributes raise the following question: what is required to
achieve them? Skilfulness (being cognitively skilful) requires from the sys-
tem at least two the following abilities: first, to develop a new kind of meth-
ods or to enhance existing methods (action, algorithm, etc.) and second,
to be aware of the epistemic quality of information and its meaning to a
service to be produced. Our interest is in the second one. In order to
have ability of awareness of the epistemic quality of information the system
needs the following factors:
• Implementation of the supported epistemic theories
• Application requirements of dependability, that is what are possible
consequences and their severity to service users
• Understanding combined probability of failures of various information
sources.
Both truthfulness and serveability require from the system the ability to
be aware of three factors:
• Epistemic quality of information
• Meaning of different qualities of information to the production of the
service
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• Possible consequences of the service both to its users and to the en-
vironment of the service.
Truthfulness and serveability are directly related to the epistemic quality
of the beliefs of the system (perceived, stored, and communicated).
5.7 Problems of Implementing Dependability Con-
cerning Epistemic Quality of Information
Problems to implement dependable distributed systems have already been
discussed quite a lot in numerous articles and text books. However, in order
to take into account the epistemic quality of information raises, at least,
the following new problems:
1. Should there be a directory service that provides data about the
sources and their reliabilityp of information creation processes (for
example, similar to DNS (Domain Name Service) and UDDI (Uni-
versal Description Discovery and Integration) but offering reliabilityp
information)?
2. If so, then how do we implement the domain of the certificated reliabil-
ityp of the information creation processes of sources?
3. How do we actually evaluate and warrant/certificate the reliabilityp
of human beings’ information creation processes? Are official licenses
(submitted by universities, public administrators, etc.) for executing
professions a satisfactory solution, or should there be a real–time
evaluation of the results?
4. Are manufacturers and software companies willing to test and in-
form about the reliabilityp of information creation processes of their
product and services?
5.8 Summary of Dependability Taxonomy
Jean-Claude Laprie et. al. [82, 83] developed the basic concepts and ter-
minology of dependability in the decades of the eighties and nineties, and
they have developed them further in the first decade of the 21st century.
However, the expected, future development in the domains of AI, intel-
ligent software agents, and robotics will establish an environment where
the established basic concepts and terminology need to be enhanced. We
proposed the following ones:
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• Two new fault classes:
1. Training fault
2. Learning fault.
• Two new service failure concepts:
1. Action failure
2. Observed failure.
• Two new means:
1. Relearning
2. Retraining.
We argue that we are able to better formalize and develop methods to
manage and improve dependability of future intelligent distributed systems
with these new concepts despite the fact that there are still several problems
to be solved. Benefits of the enhanced taxonomy are listed in Table 5.2.




does not take well into ac-
count the effects of differ-
ent epistemic quality of in-
formation.
allows better to take into
account and understand
in design and execution
phase the effects of dif-
ferent epistemic quality of
information, especially in




does not cover well all as-
pects of functional spe-
cifications, such as in the
case of the autonomous
learning of new function-
alities or services.
enables better under-
standing the role of
functional specification
and its limitations, for
example, in the context of
learning systems.
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Topic Old Taxonomy Enhanced Taxonomy
Correct
service
does not support a correct
service to be beyond func-
tional specifications.
enables better under-
standing the role of
functional specifications
and takes into account a
correct service to be what
a system aims at.
Service
failure
causes a new, autonom-
ously learned service that
is not specified in func-
tional specifications to be
a service failure.
allows a new, autonom-
ously learned service not
to be classified as a service
failure, if the service is ac-




does not take well into ac-
count different epistemic
quality of information that
possibility affects the un-
availability of an offered
service.
allows to take into account
the epistemic quality of
information in the evalu-





does not take well into ac-
count different epistemic
quality of information
that possibility affects the
quality level of an offered
service.
allows to take into account
the epistemic quality of
information in the evalu-
ation of the quality of an
offered service. This en-
ables better understand-
ing reasons of the de-
graded mode of operation
in the environment of un-
certain information.
Skilfulness does not specify a needed
attribute to manage a
situation, where a system
learns a new service.
takes into account the
evaluation of the capab-
ility of a system to im-
prove an existing service
or to develop and to im-
plement a new correct ser-
vice. This enables better
understanding the capab-
ilities of a system.
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Topic Old Taxonomy Enhanced Taxonomy
Truthfulness does not specify a needed
attribute that defines the
ability of a system to oper-
ate on and to produce be-
liefs that satisfy epistemic
requirements.
specifies the attribute that
defines the ability of a sys-
tem to operate on and
to produce beliefs that
satisfy epistemic require-
ments of a correct service.
This enables, in turn, to
evaluate the dependability
of a system in the environ-
ment of uncertain inform-
ation.
Serveability does not specify a needed
attribute that defines the
ability of a system to
provide a correct service in
the environment of uncer-
tain, conflicting informa-
tion.
specifies the attribute that
defines the ability of a sys-
tem to provide a correct
service in the environment
of uncertain, possibly con-
flicting information. This
enables, in turn, to evalu-
ate better various levels of
the dependability of a sys-
tem
Training fault does not specify explicitly
a fault class, that would
address directly to a fault
that is caused by an error
in the training of a learn-
ing system.
specifies a fault class that
enables a better classi-
fication of faults in the
training phase; this, in
turn, improves to carry
out right corrective ac-
tions.
Learning fault does not specify explicitly
a fault class, that would
address directly to a fault
that is caused by an error
in the learning process.
specifies a fault class that
enables a better classifica-
tion of faults; this, in turn,
improves to carry out cor-
rective actions.
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Topic Old Taxonomy Enhanced Taxonomy
Action failure does not specify a fail-
ure type that describes a
failure, which happens in
the operation phase when,
for example, a system has
learned a new service that
is the aim of the system
and the service faces a fail-
ure.
specifies explicitly a fail-
ure type that enables a
proper analysis in the case
when a system faces a fail-
ure (does not provide a
service that it is aimed




does not specify a failure
type which a user informs
to a learning system in or-
der to the system to cor-
rect the service when the
system deviates what is its
aim.
specifies a failure type that
enables a proper analysis
in the case when a learn-
ing system faces a fail-
ure which is informed to
the learning system by its
user.
Relearning does not specify explicitly
means which is required to
carry out in the case where
a system needs to relearn
information or operation.
specifies explicitly means
which is required to carry
out in the case where a
system faces a learning
fault. This helps, in turn,
to carry out right correct-
ive actions.
Retraining does not specify explicitly
a mean which is required
to carry out in the case
where a system needs to
be retrained to obtain a
new information or oper-
ation.
specifies explicitly the
mean which is required
to carry out in the case
where a system faces a
training fault. This helps,
in turn, to carry out right
corrective actions.
Table 5.2: Summary of improvements on dependability taxonomy.
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Chapter 6
Belief Description Framework
In this chapter we introduce Belief Description Framework (BDF) that sup-
ports processing of information, beliefs, justified beliefs, and knowledge in
order to achieve better dependability of ISAbdi and DIDS. The main object-
ive of this chapter is to demonstrate how epistemic theories of pragmatic
process reliabilism can be applied to ISAbdi and DIDS. As John Pollock
expressed [106]: ”Implementation achieves two things. First, it requires
the theorist to be precise and to think the details through. Philosophers
are much too prone to ignore the details, just waving their hands when the
going gets rough. That might be all right if the details were mere details
and we could be confident that filling them in was a matter of grunt work.
But in fact, when philosophical theories fail it is usually because the details
cannot be made to work. .... So the first thing implementation achieves
is that it requires the theory to be sufficiently precise that it can actually
be implemented. It is remarkably common when implementing a theory to
discover to your chagrin that there are significant parts of the theory that
you simply overlooked and forgot to construct. .... The second thing that
implementation achieves is that it provides a test of correctness for theor-
ies.”
We use Unified Modeling Language [20, 101] to describe our ideas. A
more detailed example of BDF is illustrated in Appendix UML Diagrams
of Belief Description Framework. In order to demonstrate issues that are
application dependent we employ the scenario of TIS.1
1See page 14. TIS is illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, and the relevant possible worlds
of TIS and the reliabilityp requirements for declarations are illustrated in Table 4.2. A
more detailed discussion is in Appendix Discussions on Evaluating Epistemic Quality of
Beliefs.
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Figure 6.1: Classes of the epistemic quality of information.
6.1 Associations between Epistemic Quality and
Software Entities
In general, semantic information states something meaningful about some-
thing in the context of its usage. Semantic information can be categorized
into two classes: non–propositional (such as photographs, paintings, and
music) and propositional. Hereinafter, we use the term information to
refer to propositional information. As discussed in Chapter 3 there are
four concepts to describe the epistemic quality of an information stated by
a proposition: information, belief, justified belief, and knowledge (Figure
6.1).
Next we introduce the associations between epistemic theories of these
concepts and software entities. Information has relationships with several
other concepts (Figure 6.2), which affect the determination of the meaning
of information and the epistemic quality of information. The concepts are
the following ones:
1. Proposition: Any statement that expresses linguistically a meaningful
claim about something and is expressed in a way that an agent can
process it properly in a required context.
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Figure 6.2: Associations of information.
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2. Presentation: Any linguistic method to express information in the
way that information users are able to process information and the
semantic of information.
3. Epistemic quality: The property of information that expresses the
epistemic rating of information; that is how well information is as-
sumed to correspond to the state of an actual world.
4. Epistemic theory: Philosophical theories of belief, justified belief and
knowledge, which are used to specify the epistemic quality of inform-
ation.
5. Warrant: The property of information that expresses the assurance
of the epistemic quality of information.
6. Warrantor: Any epistemic agent that evaluates the epistemic quality
of information using a reliablep process and has been itself evaluated
by commonly/publicly acceptable methods.
7. Security: The measures that protect information against various
threats.
8. Context – possible worlds [94]: The environment of information that
consists of different worlds, where a world is the ”limit” of a series
of increasingly more inclusive situations. Situations are structured
collections of (physical) objects.
(a) Context – actual world: The environment of information that is
believed to be a real world.
(b) Context – counterfactual world: The environments that are be-
lieved to be possible situations of information, if some nonfactual
thing would be valid.
9. Actor on information: Any epistemic agent that either produces pro-
positional information or uses propositional information to deduce
actions to be executed.
(a) Actor on information – information source: Any epistemic agent
that produces propositional information that is presented in
forms in which information users are able to process in a mean-
ingful way.
(b) Actor on information – information user: Any epistemic agent
that utilizes propositional information in order to achieve its
aims.
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The lower part of Figure 6.3 represents the main information–related com-
ponents of Virtual Machine Functionality.2 Now, we can give an expression
to information (Figure 6.4), and we can instantiate the information class
as an object (Figures 6.5 and 6.8). We define these concepts to be at-
tributes of information. We model the concepts using UML stereotypes
(Figure 6.3).
As discussed in Section 3.4, belief is a propositional attitude,
1. which is the state of having an opinion about something to be the
case;
2. which is created by its actual and potential causal relations to sensory
stimulations, behaviour, and/or other propositional attitudes; and
3. the representation of which—structured if necessary—is stored in a
linguistic form.
Based on the above definition an epistemic agent has a belief when the
following presumptions are satisfied:
1. The epistemic agent holds a proposition stating the object of the
belief.
2. The information object, with which the proposition is associated,
is instantiated based on a causal relation to the epistemic agent’s
perception (perceptions), and/or reasoning from other propositional
attitudes.
3. The epistemic agent is cognizant of the identity of an information
source and/or an information warrantor.
4. The epistemic agent is cognizant of the reliabilityp of information
based on either an information creation process or an information
warranting process.
5. The reliabilityp of the information creation/warranting processes as-
sures information likely to be the case.
A belief is the state of an epistemic agent in which there is information
object (Figure 6.5) stored in the epistemic agent’s database of beliefs; thus,
the epistemic agent is in the state of having an opinion about something
(stated by object proposition) likely to be the case.
2See Section 3.1. To implement a fully operational Virtual Machine Functionality
requires several other components, and it is outside the scope of this thesis.
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Figure 6.3: Information concepts instantiated as stereotype classes of vir-
tual machine functionality.
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Figure 6.4: Information class.
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Figure 6.5: An example of a belief object.
6.1 Associations between Epistemic Quality and Software Entities 161
The first requirement is satisfied by the object that is an instance of
the Proposition class and states a proposition. The second requirement
is satisfied when the object that is an instance of the information class
is instantiated based on a causal relation to an epistemic agent’s activity
related perceptions or reasoning from other propositional attitudes. The
third requirement is satisfied by the object that is an instance of either
the InformationSource class or the Warrant class and the object states
the source of information and/or warrant. The fourth requirement is sat-
isfied by the above object having an attribute reliabilityOfActor (and/or
reliabilityOfWarrantor) that states the reliabilityp. The fifth requirement
is satisfied by the object that is an instance of the Belief class (stereotype
EpistemicQuality), and the object states the threshold of information (at-
tribute thresholdOfBelief) to be a belief. In general, the threshold shall be
greater than 0.50.
We defined justified belief in Section 3.5 as follows: An epistemic agent
has justification for hers/his/its belief that p if,
1. The agent believes p to be true;
2. The agent’s belief that p was produced through a reliablep belief–
forming process or warranted by a reliablep information warrantor;
and
3. The reliabilityp of the belief–forming process and/or the information
warranting process is adequately high for the requirements set by the
contextual factors in the environment where the agent utilizes the
belief that p.
Based on the above definition an epistemic agent has a justification for
its belief when the following conditions are satisfied:
1. The agent holds the proposition p;
2. The agent is cognizant of the identity of
• an information source and/or
• an information warrantor;
3. The agent is cognizant of the reliabilityp of
• a belief–forming process and/or
• an information warranting process;
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4. The agent cognizant of the requirements of the epistemic quality set
by a usage of belief; and
5. The reliabilityp exceeds the requirements.
A justified belief is the state of an epistemic agent in which there is in-
formation object (Figure 6.6), which satisfies the above listed requirements,
stored in the epistemic agent’s database of beliefs; thus, the epistemic agent
is in the state of having an opinion, which has justification, about something
likely to be the case.
The first requirement is satisfied by the object that is an instance of the
Proposition class and states p. Likewise in the case of belief, the second
requirement is satisfied by the object that is an instance of either the In-
formationSource class or the Warrant class, and the object states a source
of information and/or warrant. The third requirement is satisfied by the
above object having an attribute reliabilityOfActor (or reliabilityOfWar-
rantor) that states the reliabilityp. The fourth requirement is satisfied by
the object that is an instance of the EpistemicQuality class and states a
threshold of justifiedBelief for a belief to be justified. The threshold can
be reasoned from the objects possibleWorlds—actualWorld and counter-
FactualWorlds. The fifth item in the list is satisfied when the parameter
iReliability is higher than the parameter thresholdForJustifiedBelief.
We defined in Section 3.6 that an epistemic agent knows that p if and
only if
1. p is true;
2. The agent believes p to be true;
3. If the agent were to believe that p, p would not be false;
4. The agent’s belief that p was either produced by a reliablep belief–
forming process or warranted by a reliablep information warranting
process;
5. The reliabilityp of the process either exceeds or is equal to the reliabil-
ityp requirements of the actions,
(a) where the agent utilizes the belief p and
(b) which are set by the expected consequences of the actions.
The implementation of the anti–Gettier safety condition (the 3rd one
in the list above) is problematic because the concept of nearby worlds is
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Figure 6.6: An example of a justified belief object.
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not sufficiently exact.3 It could be implemented using the approach of
possible worlds and relevance. However, we are of the opinion that the im-
plementation of the safety condition is not necessary for the dependability
of ISAbdi. This is because of the following reasons: First, if the reliability
p
of a belief–forming process fulfils the requirements of knowledge, then it
does not affect the dependability whether the belief is achieved by luck or
not. In this sense, luck has no role, here. Second, if p is true, implementing
the anti–Gettier condition does not actually increase the dependability.
Based on the above we can argue that an agent knows that p when the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. p is true;
2. The agent is cognizant of the truth of p;
3. The agent has justification for p;
4. The agent is cognizant of the identity of
• an information source and/or
• an information warrantor;
5. The agent is cognizant of the reliabilityp of
• a belief–forming process and/or
• an information warranting process;
6. The agent is cognizant of the epistemic requirements set by the pos-
sible consequences of the usage of information;
7. The reliabilityp of the belief–forming and/or warranting processes ex-
ceeds the requirements.
Knowledge is the state of an epistemic agent in which there is inform-
ation object (Figure 6.7), which satisfies the above listed requirements,
stored in the epistemic agent’s database of beliefs; thus, the epistemic agent
is in the state of having an opinion, which has required justification for the
agent to know, about something to be the case.
The first requirement is problematic because as discussed in Section
3.3 truth itself is a difficult concept. However, we argue that the require-
ment of ”p is true” is satisfied by a correspondence relation and either the
3In addition, the concept of nearby worlds—what are actually relevant nearby
worlds—is very much dependent on an application and may vary quite a lot.
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Figure 6.7: An example of a knowledge object.
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very high reliabilityp of the belief–forming process or a warrant by the very
high reliabilityp of warranting process (stated by the value of the threshol-
dOfKnowledge attribute)4, and the agent is cognizant of them. And the
reliabilityp (parameter iReliability) equals or exceeds the value expressed
by the parameter thresholdOfKnowledge. The third requirement is already
discussed above in the context of justified belief. The fourth requirement is
satisfied by the object that is an instance of either the InformationSource
class or the Warrant class, and the object states the source of information
and/or warrant. The fifth requirement is satisfied by the above object hav-
ing an attribute reliabilityOfActor (or reliabilityOfWarrantor) that states
the reliabilityp. The sixth requirement is satisfied by the object knowledge
that is an instance of the EpistemicQuality class, and it states a threshold
for a piece of information to be knowledge. And the threshold is determined
from the objects possibleWorlds—actualWorld and counterFactualWorlds.
In the case of knowledge the value of the threshold must be significantly
higher than in the case of justified belief, and high enough so that there
is very little doubt about the proposition to be true. The value of the
thresholdOfKnowledge attribute must be derived from the analysis of re-
quired trustworthiness based on the relevant possible worlds with which the
information object is associated. The last item in the list is satisfied when
the parameter iReliability is equal or higher than the parameter threshold-
ForKnowledge. As an example Figure 6.8 illustrates an epistemic agent’s
knowledge ”Road 101 is slippery”.
6.2 Requirements for BDF
In this section we introduce the main requirements for BDF at a general
level. The objective of the requirements is to increase understanding of
BDF and not to specify exact implementation requirements of BDF. We
use the scenario of TIS presented in Section 2.1.1 (Figure 6.9)5 to clarify
requirements. The requirements are not bound to any solution technologies.
There are five major components:
1. Information,
2. Information source,
3. Information processing including perceiving, evaluation, inferring, and
distributing (or acting based on information),
4We are of the opinion that fallibility is an option even in knowledge.
5See page 14 and Figure 2.3.
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Figure 6.8: Information object structure of knowledge.
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Figure 6.9: An example of use case.
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4. Information warrant, and
5. Relevant possible worlds.
Information
As discussed in Section 6.1 information states something meaningful
about something in its context. Information never exists in isolation, but
it has associations with several other classes. The main requirements of
information are the following ones:
InFoReq-1 Information must be semantically meaningful in the contexts
of epistemic agents, where information is processed.
InFoReq-2 Information must have a linguistic presentation.
InFoReq-3 The semantics of information shall be embedded using jointly
agreed representations of semantics.
InFoReq-4 The representation of semantics shall support the logics that
are required to reason about information.
InFoReq-5 Information must be associated with its contexts.
InFoReq-6 Information shall have an epistemic classification.
InFoReq-7 Information must be associated with its source and/or war-
rantor.
Information Source
As discussed in Section 4.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 6.9 there can be
several different kinds of information sources, whose reliabilityp of inform-
ation creation processes varies a lot. Therefore, the source of information
affects strongly the evaluation of the epistemic quality of information. The
main requirements of an information source are the following ones:
InSoReq-1 The source of information must have a unique identity in
her/his/its social context of information.
InSoReq-2 The source of information should have the reliabilityp of its
information producing process evaluated by an authorized warrantor.
InSoReq-3 The source of information should embed its identity, a reliabil-
ityp value, and the identity of warrantor with information messages.
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Figure 6.10: Use case: perceive information.
InSoReq-4 The source of information should associate the date and time
of the creation of information with information message, if informa-
tion is contingent.
InSoReq-5 The source of information should be benevolent.
Information Processing
Information processing comprises at least three important domains of
activities, which are perceiving (Figure 6.10), evaluating and inferring (Fig-
ure 6.11), and carrying out actions (distributing information, selecting the
next action to be executed, etc.) as illustrated at a high level in Figure 6.9.
The main requirements of information processing are the following ones:
InPrReq-1 Information processing shall aim at the highest possible epi-
stemic quality of information.
InPrReq-2 Perceiving of information must validate the presentations (syn-
taxes and expressions) of information.
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Figure 6.11: Use case: evaluation of information.
172 6 Belief Description Framework
InPrReq-3 Information processing must operate only on valid represent-
ations and semantics of information.
InPrReq-4 Information processing shall follow the rules of logics suppor-
ted by the semantic representation language of information.
InPrReq-5 Information processing must maintain the security of inform-
ation.
InPrReq-6 Information processing shall operate on information in its
proper contexts.
InPrReq-7 Information processing shall associate all relevant context fac-
tors with information.
InPrReq-8 Information processing shall express all relevant context factors
of information.
InPrReq-9 Information processing should be able to manage relevant pos-
sible worlds of the results of utilizing information (that means relevant
consequences of the actions possibly carried out based on informa-
tion).
Information Warrant
The main objective of using a warrant service is to obtain justification
for information. The warrant service either evaluates the reliabilityp of
an information creation process or defines the reliabilityp of information
using other possible factors (e.g. other supporting knowledge, no defeaters,
etc.). However, there are instances, where the evaluation cannot be done
reliablyp enough because the required information is not available. The
warrant service needs to know the reliabilityp of its own warrant process.
The main requirements of a warrant service are the following ones:
InWaReq-1 Warrant processing must operate only on valid representa-
tions and semantics of information.
InWaReq-2 Warrant processing shall follow the rules of logics supported
by the semantic representation language of information.
InWaReq-3 Warrant processing must maintain the security of informa-
tion.
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InWaReq-4 The warrant must express either the reliabilityp of an inform-
ation forming process if available or the reliabilityp obtained other
valid methods.
InWaReq-5 The warrant must express the base of the reliabilityp value;
whether it is the reliabilityp of the information creation process or
the reliabilityp computed based on other factors.
InWaReq-6 The warrant shall be expressed as a (probability) value be-
tween 0.0 - 1.0, where the value 0.0 indicates total unreliabilityp and
the value 1.0 full reliabilityp.
InWaReq-7 Warrant of information (reliabilityp and warrantor) should
be available to an epistemic agent that processes information.
InWaReq-8 The warrant must be obtained only from a trustworthy war-
rantor.
InWaReq-9 The warrantor should announce its services in a directory
service.
InWaReq-10 The warrantor should be capable of processing required se-
mantic representations.
InWaReq-11 The warrantor should evaluate or be knowledgeable of its
own reliabilityp.
InWaReq-12 The warrantor should be authorized by a high level govern-
mental authorizer.
Possible Worlds
The main objective of the possible worlds approach is to model different,
relevant and likely outcomes of actions that would possibly be results if the
actions were carried out based on an information usage. Possible worlds
are used to evaluate the severity of the results and based on the severity to
determine the reliabilityp requirements. The main requirements of relevant
possible worlds are the following ones:
PoWoReq-1 A set of possible worlds must comprise an actual world and
relevant counterfactual worlds.
PoWoReq-2 The actual world must be the world the epistemic agent
happens to inhabit.
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PoWoReq-3 The model of the actual world is the model that the epi-
stemic agent believes to be the surrounding world.
PoWoReq-4 Relevant counterfactual worlds should be considered to be
possible worlds that are likely and not–too–distant alternatives of the
actual world.
PoWoReq-5 The counterfactual worlds shall state dependencies of whether,
when, and how one event occurs on whether, when, and how another
event occurs [95].
6.3 Specifications of BDF
In this section we introduce ideas for the specifications of BDF in order to
highlight possible solutions to manage the epistemic quality of information.
There are several possible ways to implement BDF, and therefore, there can
also be several different specifications of BDF. Our specifications of BDF
are described using UML in more detail in Appendix Belief Description
Framework.
6.3.1 Classes and Objects
There are several (stereotype) classes that specify information and its con-
text (Figure 6.12). As already mentioned, we use stereotypes in order to
highlight that there are specific epistemic–related concepts which are the
basis of the classes. The Information class (Figure 6.4 on page 159) is
the central point of BDF. The Information class defines the environment—
a kind of information ecosystem—of a proposition that states something
meaningful about something. It has relationships (dependency, association,
generalization, or realization) with other classes: Proposition, Presentation,
EpistemicQuality, Warrant, Security, Context, and ActorOnInformation. It
also specifies operations of each class. The Proposition class specifies a
proposition to be a string. An instance of the Proposition class states a
proposition that the information is about. The Presentation class specifies
the used representations of Information including languages of specifying
syntaxes and semantics. An instance of the Presentation class expresses
languages that are used to represent information (for example, in inform-
ation exchange). The EpistemicQuality class specifies the epistemic quality
of Information. It specifies a proposition to be either info, belief, justified-
belief, or knowledge. It also specifies adopted epistemological theories.
An instance of the EpistemicQuality class (Figure 6.13), such as Info, Belief,
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Figure 6.12: BDF classes.
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Figure 6.13: BDF epistemic quality class.
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JustifiedBelief, and Knowledge, describes the epistemic quality of inform-
ation. The Warrant class specifies both the status of a warrant and the
reliabilityp of a warrant. It also specifies the identity and type of a war-
rantor. An instance of the Warrant class states the situation concerning a
possible warrant. The Security class specifies required security measures for
Information. An instance of the Security class describes the security factors,
such as non–reputation, tampering, integrity, deception, and falsification
concerning the information.6 The Context class comprises a subclass Pos-
sibleWords that specifies a possible environment of Information including
an actual world and counterfactual worlds that are possible outcomes of
actions based on Information. This class is instantiated when defining the
final epistemic quality of Information by evaluating the severity of each
possible world. The ActorOnInformation class specifies the type of agent
(TypeOfActor enumeration class) to be human, robot, ISA, informationSer-
vice, or IOT. It also specifies whether an agent is a source or a user. An
instance of the ActorOnInformation class states a source of information or a
user of information and some of their features.
As an example of knowledge, Figure 6.14 illustrates one possible object
of the Information class that states justified belief ”Road 101 is slippery”.
An instantiation of the JustifiedBelief class specifies that the object in ques-
tion is justified belief, and it also specifies the threshold of reliabilityp for
justified belief and an obeyed epistemic theory. If Information is knowledge,
then the object is associated with a Knowledge object, and if Information is
mere belief, then the object is associated with a Belief object.
6.3.2 Collaboration
In general, BDF is a component that is utilized in several phases of the
information processing. In our scenario of TIS there are at a high level
three phases that are the following ones: perceive, evaluate, and utilize
(distribute) information.
ActorOnInformation is the main thread that controls all the activities
in the information processing. It creates, activates, and destroys required
activity–specific threads, such as InformationReceiver, SyntaxValidator, Ex-
pressionValidator, EvaluateInformation, ExamineAprioriEpistemicStatus, Ob-
tainWarrant, ContextEvaluator, DistributeRequisite, and InformationDistrib-
utor.
The PerceiveInformation phase consists of the following agents and ac-
tions: InformationReceiver obtains a message from a source, extracts in-
6These are outside the scope of this thesis.
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Figure 6.14: BDF instance of information class: justified belief.
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formation from the message. SyntaxValidator validates the syntaxes and
ExpressionValidator validates the expressions in which information is rep-
resented.7
The EvaluateInformation phase consists of the following agents and ac-
tions (Figures 6.15, 6.16, and 6.17): ExamineAprioriEpistemicStatus, Ob-
tainWarrant that comprises SearchWarrantor, and Warrantor. ExamineApri-
oriEpistemicStatus evaluates the a priori epistemic quality and determines
whether a warrant is needed or not. The key idea of evaluating the a pri-
ori epistemic quality is to have a first level understanding of the epistemic
quality of information, which affects the further processing of information.
ExamineAprioriEpistemicStatus checks the following factors:
1. Source: If there is no data concerning the source, then the epistemic
quality is information. A warrant is needed, if information will be
utilized in later activities.
2. Reliabilityp of the information creation process: If there is no data
concerning the reliabilityp or the reliabilityp is below the threshold of
belief, then the epistemic quality is information. A warrant is needed,
if information will be utilized in later activities.
3. Warrantor: If there is no data concerning the warrantor, then the
epistemic quality is information. A warrant is needed, if information
will be utilized in later activities.
4. Security factors: If the security factors are not at required level, then
the epistemic quality is information and it should be deleted.
The ObtainWarrant phase consists of searching a warrantor and querying
the epistemic quality of information (a warrant). ObtainWarrant creates and
activates a SearchWarrantor thread that queries from a warrantor service
directory a warrantor that provides warrants in the domain of informa-
tion.8 If a Warrantor is found then ObtainWarrant sends information to the
Warrantor for the evaluation of the epistemic quality. After this phase there
is a certain understanding of the epistemic quality of information, that is
the reliabilityp of the information creation and/or warranting process.
The utilize – distribute information phase consists of the following
agents and actions (Figure 6.18): ContextEvaluator, DistributionRequisite,
and InformationDistributor. ContextEvaluator determines possible worlds
and selects relevant worlds. It estimates the severity of each relevant world
7For further data, see Appendix Belief Description Framework.
8SearchWarrantor can also have its own list of needed warrantors.
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Figure 6.15: BDF sequence diagram of evaluation of information.
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(if necessary) and determines the reliabilityp thresholds for each epistemic
quality of information.9 DistributionRequisite sets the epistemic quality of
information and evaluates whether to carry out activities on the basis of the
epistemic quality of information.10 If a declaration needs to be announced
then ActorOnInformation creates and activates InformationDistributor that
takes care of transmitting a notice, warning, or alert to a user.
6.4 BDF and DIDS
In the future DIDS will be a dynamic and adaptive service provider, with
which individual ISAbdis and groups of ISAbdis (as well as human beings) as-
sociate when ever needed and from which dissociate when needed no more.
In this kind of environment there are two viewpoints to BDF, which are the
viewpoint of an individual ISAbdi and the viewpoint of the infrastructure
of DIDS. In the case of the individual ISAbdi BDF provides tools for the
ISAbdi to have beliefs, perceive information to form beliefs, determine the
epistemic quality of beliefs, and distribute or act on beliefs. From the view-
point of the individual ISAbdi all other ISAbdis and human beings providing
services in DIDS form an infrastructure in which the ISAbdi operates. A
basic infrastructure of DIDS should comprise the following services:11 a
service directory of warrant services, an evaluation the reliabilityp of in-
formation (warrant service), a control of information transfer, security, and
behaviour.
6.5 Summary of BDF
We have introduced a framework to describe and manage different epi-
stemic qualities of information. We modelled information as a concept that
comprises the structure of various concepts. Each concept in the structure
affects the determination of the epistemic quality of information.
BDF constitutes information as a structure, where the central point is
a class Information that has relationships (dependency, association, general-
ization, or realization) with other classes that are Proposition; Presentation;
EpistemicQuality comprising EpistemicTheory; Warrant comprising Warrantor;
9This phase comprises several unsolved problems dealing with modal logics, frame
problem, and omniscience.
10This activity is application dependent and therefore, outside the scope of this thesis.
11This depends very much on the application domain and its requirements.
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Figure 6.16: BDF activity diagram of evaluation of information – apriori.
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Figure 6.17: BDF activity diagram of evaluation of information – warrant.
184 6 Belief Description Framework
Figure 6.18: BDF activity diagram of distributing information.
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Security; Context comprising PossibleWorlds, ActualWorld, and Counterfactu-
alWorld; and ActorOnInformation comprising InformationSource and Informa-
tionUser). We see BDF as a part of Virtual Machine Functionality.12
We showed how BDF fulfils the requirements of the epistemic theory of
Pragmatic Process Reliabilism. We also showed with the help of the TIS
scenario some examples of instantiated classes and processing information.
We claim that BDF provides users with several advantages. First, BDF
is more close to human beings’ concept of information and usage of in-
formation than current approaches, which mainly implicitly assumes that
perceived information is true if it passes a rather rough evaluation. BDF
enables explicit specifications of the environment of information and the
epistemic quality of information (human being manages quite often uncon-
sciously these issues). Therefore, ISAbdis and DIDS systems can express
in the same sense as human beings phrases such as ”I believe that ...”, ”I
don’t believe that ... because ...”, ”I know that ...”, and ”I know that ...
because ...”. In addition, they are able motivate their actions to users, for
example, by stating ”I cannot do the intended action because I don’t know
the required requisites well enough.” and ”I don’t believe the situation to be
beneficial to carry out the task because information is not reliable enough
...”. This is more close to future social contexts of DIDS where human
beings and ISAbdis co–operate to produce and use services. Second, BDF
provides better tools to address dependability issues that are related to the
uncertainties of information. It enables to specify the limits of the epi-
stemic quality of information demanded by the expected consequences of
actions, so that ISAbdi is better able to plan and execute (or not to execute)
actions based on intentions. BDF enables more detailed analyses of faults,
failures, and errors in the cases where the epistemic quality of information
plays a role. In addition, BDF enables a good base to manage the degraded
mode of operation in situations where the epistemic quality of information
varies. Third, BDF provides also mechanisms for the information exchange
in collaborations to better take care of the epistemic quality of information.
But it is a challenging task to prove that our above claims are valid. It
requires a lot of work and a multidisciplinary project that comprises of the
expertise in the domains of AI, modal logics, computer science, cognitive
science, and epistemology. As we discuss these problems in this thesis at a
high, theoretical level, we consider the actual proof to be outside the scope
of this thesis; hence, it is the topic of future research.
12See page 53.
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There are several unsolved problems to implement and utilize BDF fully.
The problems deal with the following issues:
• Modal logics do not cover the varying epistemic quality of informa-
tion;
• Defining and implementing of possible worlds;
• Frame problem; and
• Omniscience.
But we claim that a lot can be implemented using current technology, and
in the future many of the problems will be resolved.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis we have discussed the role of the epistemic quality of inform-
ation in the new environment of information services provided by future
dependable intelligent distributed systems. The new environment will be
created by the developments of AI, intelligent software agents, and robotics
and the services provided by them. We defined an intelligent distributed
system to be as follows:
An intelligent distributed system is a collection of independent agents
that appears to its users as a singe coherent system, where an independent
agent can be either an intelligent software agent, a robot, a process running
in a computer, or a human being, and some of the independent agents are
software–based entities, of which some are implemented utilizing artificial
intelligence.
The difference between the definitions of distributed system and intelli-
gent distributed system is that in IDS the independent agent is an intelligent
entity (intelligent software agent, robot, or human being) and not just a
computer. IDS will process (perceive, create, modify, act on, distribute)
information, the epistemic quality of which may vary significantly.
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justification concerning on
what basis human being is justified to believe or does know something. We
are of the opinion that in the joint environment of intelligent software agents
and human beings we should use, whenever it is possible, concepts that are
used by and familiar to human beings. Therefore, we adapted epistemolo-
gical theories to the dependability theory. We argued that epistemological
theories establish a solid ground also for evaluating the epistemic quality
of information in the environment of ISAbdi and DIDS. First, we addressed
the problem of anthropomorphism and discussed our motivation for in-
telligent software–based entities to have epistemological concepts, such as
belief, justified belief and knowledge. Second, we showed that there is an
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important role of justified belief and knowledge in DIDS. Third, we dis-
cussed logical issues related to belief and knowledge. We discussed that
epistemic logic can be used to solve some of the problems, but there are
still several unsolved problems for future research.
One of the main contributions of this thesis is the analysis of the epi-
stemological concepts—belief, justified belief, and knowledge—in the con-
texts of ISAbdi and DIDS. We introduced the theories of Pragmatic Pro-
cess Reliabilism that can be adopted by dependable ISAbdis and DIDS. We
defined the concepts as follows:
Belief An epistemic agent has beliefs that have similar features compared
to human being’s beliefs. Belief is defined as follows:
Belief is a propositional attitude,
1. which is the state of having an opinion about something to be the
case;
2. which is created by its actual and potential causal relations to
sensory stimulations, behaviour, and/or other propositional at-
titudes; and
3. the representation of which—structured if necessary—is stored
in a linguistic form.
Justified Belief Pragmatic process reliabilism explicates the justification
in the joint contexts of ISAbdi and human being. The definition of
justification is as follows:
An epistemic agent has justification for her/his/its belief that p if,
1. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
2. The epistemic agent’s belief that p was produced through reliablep
processes Pi; and
3. The reliabilityp of the processes Pi is adequately high for the
requirements set by the contextual factors in the environment
where the agent utilizes the belief that p.
189
Knowledge Pragmatic process reliabilism explicates well the way we un-
derstand the concept of propositional knowledge. Knowledge is defined
as follows:
An epistemic agent knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
2. The epistemic agent believes p to be true;
3. If the epistemic agent were to believe that p, p would not be false;
4. The epistemic agent’s belief that p was produced through reliablep
processes Pi; and
5. The reliabilityp of the processes Pi either exceeds or is equal to
the reliabilityp requirements of the actions,
(a) where the agent utilizes the belief that p and
(b) which are set by the expected consequences of the actions.
In order to cope better with the situations created by the variation of the
epistemic quality of information we enhanced the dependability taxonomy
with the following concepts:




• Two new fault classes:
1. Training fault
2. Learning fault.
• Two new service failure concepts:
1. Action failure
2. Observed failure.




We are strongly of the opinion that with these new concepts we are
able to better formalize and develop methods to manage and improve the
dependability of future intelligent distributed systems.
Another main contribution of this thesis is Belief Description Frame-
work. First, we defined relationships between epistemological concepts and
software entities (classes). Second, we showed that information, belief,
justified belief, and knowledge can be specified as classes and then instan-
tiated as objects. The Information class defines the environment—a kind
of information ecosystem—of information. It is the central point. It has
relationships with other classes: Proposition, Presentation, EpistemicQual-
ity, Warrant, Security, context, and ActorOnInformation. Third, we specified
some important requirements for BDF. Fourth, we showed by modelling
BDF using the UML modelling method that BDF can be specified and im-
plemented.
The summary of contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. We introduced an epistemological approach based on the epistemic
quality of information to the dependability of ISAbdi and DIDS. This
is the major contribution of this thesis.
2. We provided methods and tools for better understanding depend-
ability issues related to the epistemic quality of information in DIDS.
We discussed these issues in Section 2.1.1 Scenarios, in Chapters 4
Belief as Dependability Factor and 6 Belief Description Framework.
3. We carried out careful analyses of epistemic value, truth, trust,
and trustworthiness in the joint context of artificial (intelligent soft-
ware agents) entities and human beings. We discussed these topics
in Sections 3.2 Epistemic Value, 3.3 Truth, and 3.7 Trust.
4. We specified enhanced definitions of beliefp, justified beliefp, and
knowledgep to be adapted in the joint context of artificial (intelligent
software agents) entities and human beings. We introduced and dis-
cussed these definitions in Sections 3.4 Belief, 3.5 Justified Belief, and
3.6 Knowledge.
5. We enhanced the dependability taxonomy to include concepts that
can be utilized in the contexts of ISAbdi and DIDS. We introduced
these in Chapter 5 Enhancement to Dependability Taxonomy.
6. We introduced Belief Description Framework that specifies one
proposal to implement and manage the different epistemic qualities
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of information. We discussed BDF in Chapter 6 Belief Description
Framework.
7. We defined a simple UML model to show implementability of
Belief Description Framework. We described this in Appendix Belief
Description Framework.
Future Research Topics
As this thesis is one of the first steps to adapt epistemological theories to
future dependable intelligent distributed systems, there are several various
topics for future research.
In the domain of epistemology there are many open issues. First, the
explication of PPR comprises the anti–Gettier (anti–luck) condition that
is difficult both to specify exactly and to implement efficiently. A topic of
future research is how to specify nearby worlds and how to implement them
without affecting the performance of ISAbdi and DIDS too much. Second,
a similar research topic is the evaluation of the required reliabilityp of both
justified belief and knowledge. Especially, the analysis of possible worlds
(actual world and counterfactual worlds) in the context of ISAbdi demands
more research. Third, what are the roles and effects of defeaters in the
context of ISAbdi?
In the domain of modal logics a topic of future research is the logic
of justification. Most contemporary studies of epistemology–related logic
concentrate on the logic of belief and knowledge, but there are many open
problems of the logic of justification.
In the domain of dependability the main future topic is an empirical
research on the effects of the epistemic quality of information on the de-
pendability of ISAbdi and IDS. In the domain of BDF some of the important
research topics are an implementation of BDF and a trial to prove the ac-
tual benefits of the epistemological approach to the dependability.
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An entity (either human being or intelligent software agent) that has
an important effect on a situation.
anthropomorphism
Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human traits, emotions, or
intentions to non–human entities.
availabil ity (computer science)
Availability means the probability that a system is operational at a
given time, i.e. the amount of time a device is actually operating as
the percentage of total time it should be operating.
belief (computer science)
Beliefs represent the informational state of the agent, in other words
its beliefs about the world (including itself and other agents). Beliefs
can also include inference rules, allowing forward chaining to lead to
new beliefs. Using the term belief rather than knowledge recognizes
that what an agent believes may not necessarily be true.
belief (epistemology)
Belief is a propositional attitude,
1. which is the state of having an opinion about something to be
the case;
2. which is created by its actual and potential causal relations
to sensory stimulations, behaviour, and/or other propositional
attitudes; and
3. the representation of which—structured if necessary—is stored
in a linguistic form.
bdi architecture (computer science)
The BDI (Belief—Desire—Intention) architecture model implements
the principal aspects of Michael Bratman’s theory of human practical
reasoning, where a rational agent has certain mental attitudes of be-
lief, desire and intention, representing, respectively, the information,
motivational, and deliberative states of the agent.
cognition (philosophy)
Cognition is the mental process of acquiring knowledge and under-
standing through thought, experience, and the senses. It comprises
terms such as knowledge, attention, memory and working memory,
evaluation, reasoning and computation, problem solving and decision
making. Human cognition is conscious and unconscious, concrete or
abstract, as well as intuitive and conceptual. Cognitive processes use




Coherentism defines that every justified belief receives its justification
from other beliefs in its epistemic neighbourhood.
confidentiality (computer science)
Confidentiality is ensuring that information is not accessed by unau-
thorized persons.
connectionism (computer science)
Connectionism is a set of approaches in the fields of artificial intelli-
gence that models mental or behavioural phenomena as the emergent
processes of interconnected networks of simple units. There are many
forms of connectionism, but the most common forms use neural net-
work models.
correspondence theory (epistemology)
Correspondence theory of truth defines that p is true if and only if p
corresponds to some state of affairs that exists, and p is false if and
only if p corresponds to some state of affairs that does not obtain.
dependability (computer science)
Dependability is the extent to which a critical system is trusted by
its users.
desire (computer science)
Desires represent the motivational state of the agent. They represent
objectives or situations that the agent would like to accomplish or
bring about.
epistemic agent
An entity (either human being or intelligent software agent) that has
an important effect on a situation and perceives, holds, processes,
and distributes semantic information.
epistemic logic (philosophy)
Epistemic Logic is the logic of knowledge, belief, and justification.
epistemology (philosophy)
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief.
error (computer science)
Error is that part of the system state that may cause a subsequent
failure. Before an error is detected, it is latent. The detection of an
error is indicated at the service interface by an error message.
fact / factual (philosophy)
Facts are the objects of certain mental states and acts, they make
truth-bearers true and correspond to truths, and they are part of the
furniture of the world. Factual is based on or containing facts.
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failure (computer science)
Failure of a system is an event that corresponds to a transition from
correct service to incorrect service. It occurs when an error reaches
its service interface.
fall ibil ism (philosophy)
No beliefs are so well justified or supported by good evidence that
they could not be false. Thus, there is no conclusive justification or
non rational certainly for any of our beliefs.
fault (computer science)
Fault is the (adjudged or hypothetical) cause of error. When it pro-
duces an error, it is active, otherwise it is dormant.
fault tolerance (computer science)
Fault tolerance is an approach by which reliability of a computer
system can be increased beyond what can be achieved by traditional
methods. A system can provide its services even in the presence of
faults.
fault tolerant system (computer science)
A system is fault tolerant if it can mask the presence of faults in the
system by using redundancy. The goal of fault tolerance is to avoid
system failure, even if faults are present.
fault tolerant service (computer science)
A fault tolerant service always guarantees strictly correct behaviour
despite a certain number and type of faults.
foundationalism (epistemology)
Foundationalism is a view about the structure of justification or knowl-
edge. The thesis is that all knowledge and justified belief rest ul-
timately on a foundation of non–inferential knowledge or justified
belief.
information (general)
Information is that which informs.
information (computer science)
Information is taken as an ordered sequence of symbols from an al-
phabet. Shannon information: the entropy, H, of a discrete random
variable X is a measure of the amount of uncertainty associated with
the value of X.
information (philosophy)
In philosophy information is a complex concept, the definition of
which cannot be briefly expressed.
See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/information/
integrity (computer science)
Integrity is the absence of improper system alterations.
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intell igent software agent (computer science)
Intelligent Software Agent (ISA) is a computational entity that can
be viewed as perceiving and acting upon its environment and that
is autonomous in that its behaviour at least partially depends on its
own experience.
intell igent distributed system (computer science)
An intelligent distributed system is a collection of independent agents
that appears to its users as a singe coherent system, where an inde-
pendent agent can be either an intelligent software agent, a robot, a
process running in a computer, or a human being, and some of the
independent agents are software–based entities, some of which are
implemented utilizing artificial intelligence.
intention (computer science)
Intentions represent the deliberative state of the agent, that is, what
the agent has chosen to do. Intentions are desires to which the agent
has to some extent committed.
intention (philosophy)
There are several different kinds of intention defined in philosophy:
intention as doing, intention in action, intention as plan, intention
related to belief. For further information, see
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intention/
justified belief (epistemology)
Justified belief is belief for which an agent has a proper support
for its truthfulness. Pragmatic Process Reliabilism: an agent has
justification for its belief that p if,
1. The agent believes p to be true;
2. The agent’s belief that p was produced through reliablep pro-
cesses Pi; and
3. The reliabilityp of the processes Pi is adequately high for the
requirements set by the contextual factors in the environment
where the agent utilizes the belief that p.
knowledge (epistemology)
There are several different definitions of knowledge. In this thesis we
use the theory of pragmatic process reliabilism which defines knowing
as follows: an agent knows that p if and only if
1. p is true;
2. The agent believes p to be true;
3. If the epistemic agent were to believe that p, p would not be
false;
4. The agent’s belief that p was produced through reliablep pro-
cesses Pi ; and
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5. The reliabilityp of the processes Pi either exceeds or is equal to
the reliabilityp requirements of the actions,
a) where the agent utilizes the belief that p and
b) which are set by the expected consequences of the actions.
maintainabil ity (computer science)
Maintainability is the simplicity and speed with which a system can
be repaired or maintained. It is also defined as the ability to undergo
modifications and repairs.
modal logic (logic)
Modal logic studies reasoning that involves the use of the expressions
necessarily and possibly. The term modal logic is used also more
broadly to cover a family of logics with similar rules and a variety
of different symbols, such as deontic logic, temporal logic, epistemic
logic, and doxastic logic.
ontology (philosophy)
Ontology is the study of the nature of existence, which is concerned
with identifying the kinds of things that actually exist, and how to
describe them.
ontology (computer science)
Ontology is an explicit and formal specification of a conceptualiza-
tion.
proposition (computer science)
A proposition is a statement that is either true or false.
proposition (philosophy)
A proposition is the shareable object of an attitude and primary bearer
of truth and falsity.
reliabil ism (epistemology)
Reliabilism explains important epistemic concepts in terms of the
truth-conduciveness of an epistemic agent’s reasoning, belief–forming
processes, methods, faculties, etc. The epistemic agent’s truth–
conduciveness is its likelihood to produce true beliefs, thus to avoid
false beliefs. The fundamental idea is that belief that p is justified on
the basis of a reason, or ground, r just in case r is a reliable indication
that p is true .
reliabil ity (computer science)
Reliability is defined as the continuity of the correct service.
reliabil ity (philosophy)
Reliability is defined as the probability that a system will produce
correct outputs up to some given time t.
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safety (computer science)
Safety is defined as the absence of catastrophic consequences on the
users and the environment.
safety (philosophy)
Safety is explicated as follows: If an agent were to believe that p, p
would not be false. In other words, in all nearby worlds where the
agent believes that p, p is not false.
semantic information (computer science)
Information is taken as an ordered sequence of symbols from an al-
phabet that is meaningful in its context of use. Semantic information
is defined as well-formed, meaningful and truthful data.
semantic web (computer science)
Semantic Web is an extension of the Web through standards by the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
serveability (computer science)
Serveability is the ability to provide a correct service in the environ-
ment of uncertain, conflicting, (or even contradictory) information.
This expresses a kind of sensitivity to changing epistemic levels of
beliefs.
trust and trustworthiness (philosophy)
There are three kinds of trust. In the first kind, people trust other
people because they cannot check all the bases for establishing a
belief. The formed belief is not resistant to counter–evidence. The
second kind of trust involves more than people’s willingness to accept
other people or to assume things on trust. People may judge an
individual or a thing on the basis of a non–ordinary belief. The
formed belief is not resistant to counter–evidence. The third kind
of trust is the case in which people think it to be rational to hold a
belief even though there is a counter–evidence. Trusting requires that
a trustor can tolerate some level of risk or vulnerability, at least, to
the failure by a trustee to do or to be what the trustor depends on the
trustee. Thus, trusting requires that a trustor can 1) be vulnerable
to the trustee, 2) think well of the other, at least in certain domains,
and 3) be optimistic that the trustee is competent in certain respect.
For trust to be warranted (i.e. well–grounded), both parties must be
trustworthy.
trustworthiness (computer science)
Trustworthiness of distributed systems asserts that the system does
what is required despite environmental disruption, human user and
operator errors, and attacks by hostile parties and that it does not
do other things. Design and implementation errors must be avoided,
eliminated, or somehow tolerated. Addressing only some aspects of
the problem is not sufficient. Moreover, achieving trustworthiness
8
requires more than just assembling components that are themselves
trustworthy.
Trustworthiness is assurance that a system deserves to be trusted; it
will perform as expected despite environmental disruptions, human
and operator error, hostile attacks, and design and implementation
errors. A trustworthy system reinforces the belief that will continue to
produce expected behaviour and will not be susceptible to subversion.
virtual machine functionality (philosophy)
According to virtual machine functionalism the human mind is one
kind of virtual machine, which is operated by a human body. An
intelligent software agent is another kind of virtual machine, which
is operated by a computer. The basic idea of functionalism is that
the essence of a mental state is not to be found in the biology of
the brain but rather in the role that plays in one’s mind and in the
causal relations that it bears to stimuli. Thus, functionalism claims
that mental states are not only physical states, but also functions or
operation of those physical states.
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This is an example of a high level UML model describing our ideas
about Belief Description Framework (BDF). The diagrams consist of
the following diagrams:
1. Profile diagrams, which define concepts and stereotypes and their
relationships.
Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
2. Class diagrams, which define important base classes of BDF.
Figures 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15.
3. Object diagrams, which provide one example of possible imple-
mentation of BDF.
Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19.
4. Use case diagrams, which define some examples of possible use
cases of BDF.
Figures 20, 21, 22, and 23.
5. Interaction diagrams, which provide examples of possible flows
of messages and control.
Figures 24, 25, and 26.
6. Activity diagrams, which provide some examples of the flow of
control and algorithms.
Figures 27, 28, 29, and 30.
7. An use case diagram of possible worlds, which illustrate an evalu-
ation of the requirements of reliability.
Figure 31.
3
Figure 1: Classification of propositional information.
4
Figure 2: Concepts of information.
5
Figure 3: Concepts of information explained.
6
Figure 4: Stereotypes of concepts.
7
Figure 5: UML profile of Belief Description Framework.
Figure 6: Mapping concepts to virtual machine.
8
Figure 7: Virtual machine functionality.
9
Figure 8: Class diagram of information.
10
Figure 9: Class diagram of proposition.
11
Figure 10: Class diagram of presentation.
12
Figure 11: Class diagram of epistemic quality.
13
Figure 12: Class diagram of warrant and warrantor.
14
Figure 13: Class diagram of security.
15
Figure 14: Class diagram of context.
16
Figure 15: Class diagram of information source and user.
17
Figure 16: Object diagram of belief.
18
Figure 17: Object diagram of justified belief.
19
Figure 18: Object diagram of knowledge 1.
20
Figure 19: Object diagram of knowledge 2.
21
Figure 20: Overall use case diagram of Belief Description Framework.
22
Figure 21: Use case diagram of perceive information.
23
Figure 22: Use case diagram of evaluate information.
24
Figure 23: Use case diagram of distribute information.
25
Figure 24: Interaction diagram of perceive information.
26
Figure 25: Interaction diagram of evaluate information.
27
Figure 26: Interaction diagram of distribute information.
28
Figure 27: Activity diagram of perceive information.
29
Figure 28: Activity diagram of evaluate information.
30
Figure 29: Activity diagram of obtain warrant.
31
Figure 30: Activity diagram of distribute information.
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Figure 1: Different Classes of Beliefs.
1 introduction
The epistemic quality of information has a significant role in hu-
man beings’ actions and thoughts. We claim that in the case of
intelligent software agents the quality of perceived information
also has a very important role in the execution of actions whether
the actions be a distribution of beliefs or physical activity. In this
appendix we discuss specifying reliabilityp1 requirements for the
epistemic quality of information, various sources of information,
and the affect of the sources upon the epistemic quality of in-
formation perceived by intelligent software agents. We have de-
fined that the epistemic quality of information depends on the
reliabilityp of belief–forming processes (based on [1, 2]) (and/or
of warrant services) and the expected consequences of the uti-
lization of belief. Different classes of information are illustrated
in Figure 1. In order to illustrate different cases we use a sce-
1 There are several terms, which have different explication in philosophy and
computer science. We use superscript ’p’ when we use a term in philosophical
meaning and superscript ’c’ in the meaning of computer science.
introduction 2
Figure 2: Use Case of Traffic Information Service.
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nario of a traffic information service (hereinafter TIS2) as illus-
trated in Figure 2 in the form of UML use case diagram. TIS
is provided by several co-operating intelligent software agents
(hereinafter ISAbdis)3 and human beings. The role of ISAbdi-A
is to announce traffic notices, warnings or alerts both to human
drivers (hereinafter HDC) and autonomous cars driven by ISAs
(hereinafter ADC), when cars are approaching Road 101 planning
to enter into it, and the belief "Road 101 is slippery." fulfils specified
epistemic requirements.
The scenario is divided into three sub–scenarios, which describe
the determination of reliabilityp values for belief, justified be-
lief, and knowledge, the evaluating of information from different
sources, and the declaration of a traffic announcement.
2 defining reliabilityp requirements
ISAbdi-A should declare a traffic notice, when there is a belief
(there is no acceptable justification available) that the road might
be slippery. ISAbdi-A should declare a traffic warning, when
there is a justified belief that the road could be slippery, and
ISAbdi-A should declare a traffic alert, when there is knowledge
that the road is slippery.
What are the reliabilityp requirements of the belief creation pro-
cesses for information to be belief, justified belief or knowledge?
In order to answer this question we need, at first, to analyse the
possible consequences of various traffic declarations. In general,
in order to analyse possible consequences of an action requires
that all the relevant possible worlds, which could be results of
the action, need to be determined. As such, this is a very difficult
problem—the so–called frame problem—comprising two different
challenges: first, to determine the possible worlds may require re-
sources that are beyond the power of contemporary logic as well
as beyond current computing power; second, to determine the
relevant worlds requires the analysis of relevance in the context
of an application, and then the analysis of each possible world
2 This is purely a hypothetical example in order to clarify our thinking about the
role of beliefs in this kind of environment.
3 We use ISAbdi subscript when we refer to the belief–intention–desire type of
intelligent software agent.
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] Action Reality - road is
1 Declare traffic notice slippery
2 Declare traffic notice not slippery
3 Do not declare traffic notice slippery
4 Do not declare traffic notice not slippery
5 Declare traffic warning slippery
6 Declare traffic warning not slippery
7 Do not declare traffic warning slippery
8 Do not declare traffic warning not slippery
9 Declare traffic alert slippery
10 Declare traffic alert not slippery
11 Do not declare traffic alert slippery
12 Do not declare traffic alert not slippery
Table 1: Possible actual and counter–factual worlds of traffic informa-
tion service.
regarding the relevance. Therefore, in most application domains
these problems are still human resolvable ones. However, we be-
lieve that the research in artificial intelligence and in other related
domains will resolve these problems in the future.
In our scenario there are 12 relevant worlds as listed in Table
1. The consequences of the actions, the outcomes of which are
successful (# 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12) are the ones that are expected
from the system; therefore, we consider that in these cases the
system is dependable. The other six worlds (# 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, and
11) require a more thorough analysis. Declaring a non-valid traf-
fic notice, warning, or alert (worlds 2, 6, and 10) results in the
consequence that the dependability of the system decreases, and
trust in the system suffers. But not declaring a traffic notice or
warning when it should done may result in dangerous situations
in traffic. And not declaring a traffic alert when it should be done
(world # 11) can result in situations, where traffic accidents are
likely to happen. Therefore, the world # 11 sets the strictest re-
quirements for the epistemic quality of beliefs. We assume that
human beings as drivers are more capable to adapt themselves to
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Figure 3: Evaluation of Consequences (ADC).
road conditions than ISAs as drivers. Hence, the requirements for
the epistemic quality of beliefs are more rigorous in the case of
ADC. We also assume that ADCs are guided not to enter a road,
where a traffic alert has been declared. As TIS has to produce epis-
temically high quality beliefs (including the metadata expressing
the reliabilityp of the process producing the beliefs), it shall oper-
ate on such formed beliefs, with which it is able to produce the
required epistemic quality.
Let us assume that the requirements illustrated in Figure 3 and
detailed in Table 2 are set to TIS.
As mentioned above failing to declare a notice, warning, or alert
might result the most severe consequences, therefore, these set the
highest requirements for the epistemic quality, that is the high-
est requirements for the reliabilityp of the processes producing
beliefs. The worlds # 4, 8, and 12 set the highest requirement
for belief, justified belief and knowledge and therefore, for the
reliabilityp of the processes of TIS. We can consider that in order
for the piece of information stated by proposition "Road 101 is
sources of beliefsp 6
Figure 4: Specifying Reliability Requirements.
slippery." to be the object of a belief, justified belief, or knowledge
demands the reliabilityp of the processes of producing informa-
tion to be 0.70, 0.85, or 0.99 respectively.
We can summarize the above discussion in the form of UML
process description as illustrated in Figure 4.
3 sources of beliefsp
There are several different kinds of information sources, and next
we discuss some of their specific features related to the epistemic















































































































































































































































Table 2: Reliabilityp requirements for declarations.
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quality of the piece of information stated by proposition "Road
101 is slippery.". Figure 5 illustrates the possible main sources
of information, from which ISAbdi-A may perceive information
either through data communication services or directly using dif-
ferent input mechanisms, such as internal application interface,
keyboard interface, mouse interface, video camera interface, sen-
sor interface, etc.
Let us assume, first, that Road 101 is in fact slippery (world #9
in Table 1 is the actual world; thus, all other ones are counter–
factual worlds), and ISAbdi-A should declare a traffic alert,4 and
second, that ISAbdi-A either perceives the piece of information
stated by the proposition "Road 101 is slippery." or required infor-
mation to infer it from the sources illustrated in Figure 5.
3.1 Sensor
In this case (illustrated in Figure 6) we assume that on Road 101
there is an intelligent road sensor system that can detect the slip-
periness of the road. The manufacturer of the road sensor sys-
tem has obtained from a certification institute a warrant that the
reliabilityp of the sensor system is 0.99. ISAbdi-A perceives from
the road sensor "Road 101 is slippery." with associated metadata
"Reliability is 0.99." "Warranted by VTT". In our example this
does fulfil the reliabilityp requirement for the formed belief to
be knowledge in both cases (ADC and HDC). Thus, ISAbdi-A de-
clares the traffic alert both to ADCs and to HDCs.
Conclusion: In this case we consider ISAbdi-A to be dependable.
The key issues are as follows:
1. Theory: reliabilism
2. Reliability can be checked from a certification institute or in
some cases from a manufacturer (if it is considered to be
trustworthy, enough).
4 We consider this to be the actual circumstance; thus the proposition "Road 101
is slippery" is true.
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Figure 5: Sources of Information of ISA.
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Figure 6: Sensor as the Source.
3.2 Inference Service
In this case (illustrated in Figure 7) we assume that ISAbdi-A per-
ceives information from six different sensors and utilizes an infer-
ence service to infer whether or not to declare a traffic warning.
Let us further assume that the reliabilityp of the sensors have been
tested and warranted, and the results are available to ISAbdi-A.
There are several different kinds of inference engines starting
from simple "IF-THEN" rule engines ending at either more power-
ful theorem provers implementing various modal logics or neural
networks. Each of these may have different levels of reliabilityp
to produce beliefs. The reliabilityp of the inference service is used
to determine the epistemic quality of the result of an inference
process, where affecting factors are, for instance, the reliabilityp
of inference algorithms and propositions used.5 Other factors to
determine reliabilityp can be derived from the dependability the-
ory of computer science and the logics used by inference engines
(for example truth–preserving logics).
5 How this is actually done is an application dependent factor and thus it is out-
side of the scope of this thesis.
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Let us assume that ISAbdi-A perceives from the sensors the
following data and requests the inference service to analyse the
condition of Road 101:6.
1. "Road 101." "Reliability 1.0" "Warranted by Trafi"
2. "Air temperature is -3oC." "Reliability 0.99" "Warranted by VTT"
3. "Road temperature is -1oC." "Reliability 0.99" "Warranted by
VTT"
4. "It is snowing." "Reliability 0.99" "Warranted by VTT"
5. "The depth of snow is 2cm." "Reliability 0.95" "Warranted by
VTT"
6. "The dew point is -3oC." "Reliability 0.99" "Warranted by VTT"
7. "The road is salted." "Reliability 1.0" "Warranted by Trafi".
Let us also assume that the reliabilityp of the inferring process it-
self is 0.9999, which is warranted by the developer of the inference
service.
All other factors fulfil the reliabilityp requirement for knowl-
edge, except the fifth one, which plays a specific role, here. It can
be considered to be either knowledge or justified belief. If the
level of the reliabilityp requirement is transitive (the reliabilityp
0.99 is required also from all input beliefs) then the proposition
"The depth of snow is 2cm." is considered to be the object of justi-
fied belief but not knowledge. Thus, it is the decisive factor, and
the inference system infers that the reliabilityp of the result of the
reasoning process in this kind of environment is 0.98. It responds
to ISAbdi-A with the following belief provided with a metadata:
"Road 101 is slippery." "Reliability is 0.98."7
In the case of ADC this does not fulfil the reliabilityp require-
ment for the piece of information stated by the proposition "Road
101 is slippery." to be knowledge. Therefore, ISAbdi-A does not
6 We assume also that the reliabilityp (the accuracy of the equipment) values are
provided by sensor manufacturers.
7 Note that in this case the reliabilityp is not inferred directly from the probability
calculation.
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Figure 7: Sensors and Inference Service.
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declare a traffic alert but a traffic warning, even though the traf-
fic alert should be declared. However, in the case of HDC the
reliability of 0.98 fulfils the requirement for the piece of informa-
tion stated by the proposition "Road 101 is slippery." "Road 101 is
slippery." to be knowledge, and ISAbdi-A declares a traffic alert,
which is valid.
Conclusion: In this case our intuition says that ISAbdi-A is depend-
able in the case of HDC, but not in the case of ADC. But ISAbdi-A
operates according to its specifications. This contradiction clearly indi-
cates that the epistemic quality of information affects the dependability.
1. "Road 101." "Reliability 1.0" "Warranted by Trafi"
"Knowledge requirement limit 1.0"
2. "Temperature is -1oC." "Reliability 0.99" "Warranted by VTT"
"Knowledge requirement limit 0.99"
3. "It is snowing." "Reliability 0.99" "Warranted by VTT"
"Knowledge requirement limit 0.99"
4. "The depth of snow is 2cm." "Reliability 0.87" "Warranted by
VTT"
"Knowledge requirement limit 0.80"
5. "The dew point is -3oC." "Reliability 0.99" "Warranted by VTT"
"Knowledge requirement limit 0.99"
6. "The road is salted." "Reliability 1.0" "Warranted by Trafi"
"Knowledge requirement limit 1.0".
If the reliabilityp requirement is not transitive, and each fac-
tor has its own reliabilityp limit based on the type of the sensor,
then the outcome changes. Now, each belief has its own weight
value (the belief "The depth of snow is 2cm." has the lowest value)
in the inference process. Now, the inference system infers that the
reliabilityp of the result of the reasoning process in this kind of
environment is 0.99. This does fulfil the reliabilityp requirement
for the piece of information stated by the proposition "Road 101
is slippery." to be knowledge in both cases. Therefore, ISAbdi-A
declares the traffic alert both to HDC and to ADC.
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Conclusion: In this case we consider ISAbdi-A to be dependable.
The key issues are as follows:
1. Theory: reliabilism.
2. The same reliabilityp of process can produce in one instance
knowledge and in another one only justified belief.
3. It is possible that the epistemic quality of the perceived piece
of information can create a situation, where a system is de-
pendable in one instance and not dependable in another in-
stance.
4. The evaluation of the possible consequences can be a dif-
ficult task in reality—comprises the frame problem and re-
quires the management of counter–factual worlds.
5. How do we take into account the effect of the reliabilityp of
various processes, when evaluating the overall reliabilityp
of the process?
3.3 Memoryc
In this case (illustrated in Figure 8) we consider the memoryc
to be ISAbdi-A’s private one, which is accessible only to either
the developers/maintainers of ISAbdi-A or ISAbdi-A itself. There
are two ways to store beliefsp into the memoryc: either a devel-
oper/maintainer stores them or ISAbdi-A itself stores them. In
both cases the reliabilityp needs to be evaluated and stored in the
metadata of the belief. The case of ISAbdi-A itself storing the
belief is straightforward, because ISAbdi-A knows the origin and
the base of the justification (e.g. an inference service). The case of
the developer/maintainer is more complicated, and it demands
that the developer/maintainer of belief specifies and collects the
required justification of the belief.
Let us assume that ISAbdi-A has stored for later utilization the
following belief: "Road 101 is slippery." with associated metadata
"Reliability 0.99" "Time 02.03.2020 14:00" "Source ISAbdi-A". Let
us further assume that ISAbdi-A retrieves at 02.03.2020 14:01 the
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Figure 8: Memory.
belief stated by the proposition "Road 101 is slippery." with the
associated metadata, and ISAbdi-A declares the traffic alert.
But shall ISAbdi-A declare the traffic alert? In this case there
is a time factor that needs to be taken into account in the evalu-
ation of the epistemic quality of the belief.8 There are two kinds
of beliefs: volatile and constant.9. A constant belief maintains
its reliabilityp value independent of time. As an example of this
kind of a belief we have the following one: "2 + 2 = 4" "Reliabil-
ity is 1.0." The belief "Road 101 is slippery." is volatile, because its
epistemic quality may change depending on the time of utilizing
the belief. The belief may gain or lose its justification as time is
passing. In this case our intuition says that a one minute delay
does not change the justification.
8 There are other factors, such as the reliabilityp of the memory itself and the data
transfer bus of a computer, which could be taken into account, but we consider
that their reliabilityp in this context is so high that they do not affect the result
in any way.
9 The related logical terms are contingent and tautology.
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Conclusion: In this case we consider ISAbdi-A to be dependable.
Let us assume that a system manager has stored the following
belief: "Road 101 is slippery." with associated metadata "Reliability
0.99" "Time 02.03.2020 14:00" "Source Manager-A".
ISAbdi-A retrieves at 02.03.2020 14:01 from the memory the
belief "Road 101 is slippery." with the associated metadata, and
ISAbdi-A declares the traffic alert.
But should ISAbdi-A announce the traffic alert in this case?
This is an example of testimonially transferred—via a memory—
belief. In this case our intuition says that this is a special case
of testimony, because Manager-A has a special role in the context
of ISAbdi-A. Manager-A is a kind of warrant source of informa-
tion in its relation to ISAbdi-A. Therefore, our intuition says that
ISAbdi-A does not need any other justification for the belief to be
knowledge.
Conclusion: In this case we consider ISAbdi-A to be dependable.
The key issues are as follows:
1. Theory: reliabilism and in some cases reliabilism via testi-
mony.
2. The time factor needs to be taken into account: stable and
changeable epistemic values.
3. The role of developers and system managers as ’warranted’
sources of beliefs. Do they know the reliabilityp of their own
processes?
3.4 Distributed Information Base
In this case (illustrated in Figure 9) we assume that ISAbdi-A has
stored for later utilization the belief "Road 101 is slippery." with
required metadata (reliability factor, time stamp, etc.) into the dis-
tributed information base: "Road 101 is slippery." with associated
metadata "Reliability 0.99" "Time 02.03.2020 14:00" "Source ISAbdi-
A".
At least the following factors need to be considered when de-
termining the epistemic quality of the proposition:
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Figure 9: Distributed Information Base.
1. The reliabilityp of processes that were used to established
the belief.
2. The reliabilityp of processes that are used to store the belief
(the process to populate the information database).
3. The reliabilityp of information storing (integrity).
4. The coherence of the different information sets.
5. The up-to-date status of information.
6. The role of testimony.
How can these values be obtained? The first case is a straightfor-
ward one: as discussed in examples 1 and 2 above the reliabilityp
is 0.99. In cases 2 – 4 the reliabilityp could be obtained from the
specification of the distributed information base.10 The fifth case
deals with the time factor as discussed in case 3 above.
10 This demands that the developers, the supervisors, or a certification institute
specifies and collects the required data.
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Let us suppose that ISAbdi-A retrieves at 02.03.2020 20:00 the
belief "Road 101 is slippery." with associated metadata "Reliability
0.99" "Time 02.03.2020 14:00" "Source ISAbdi-A" ISAbdi-A does
not declare a traffic alert. But should ISAbdi-A declare the traffic
alert? Due to the changing nature of weather, the traffic alert sys-
tem must operate as a real time system; therefore, our intuition
says that there is no longer justification for the belief "Road 101 is
slippery.". ISAbdi-A shall not declare a traffic alert, warning, or
notice based on this belief.
Conclusion: In this case we consider ISAbdi-A to be dependable.
The key issues are as follows:
1. Theory: reliabilism and in some cases reliabilism via testi-
mony.
2. There are other factors related to belief in addition to the
reliabilityp of the process that affect the dependability of
the system, such as the time factor, which needs to be taken
into account.
3. The question about the role of testimony: Many various
sources may store beliefs into the distributed information
base; therefore, the source of the belief needs to be stored
into the distributed information base with associated meta-
data expressing the reliabilityp of the belief–forming pro-
cess.
4. Testimony is not the source of justification or knowledge,
but only a transmission method.
5. The evaluation of the reliabilityp of the processes of dis-
tributed information bases can be difficult; for example, com-
mercial cloud services do not provide such data.
3.5 Warrant Service
In this case (illustrated in Figure 10) we assume that ISAbdi-A
perceives from a source X the piece of information stated by the
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Figure 10: Warrant Service.
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proposition "Road 101 is slippery." with associated metadata "Time
02.04.2020 14:00" "Source X". Because there is no reliabilityp data
available, ISAbdi-A sends the belief to a warrant service to be
warranted.
Warrant service is an important business area dealing with trust;
if something is warranted, there is an indication that it can be
trustworthy. We consider a warrant to provide a justification for
belief. There are several different kinds of warrant services pro-
viding warrants in numerous domains, such as healthcare (e.g.
the Joint Commission), education (e.g. universities), IT profes-
sion (e.g. Microsoft), and legal profession (e.g. universities). In
the domain of distributed computing systems digital certificate
services (utilized in cryptography: the certification authority cer-
tifies the identity of the peer in a trusted relationship) are the most
common ones having an administration infrastructure including
public governing bodies.11
In this case we refer to the domain of information warrant ser-
vice (hereinafter IWS), that evaluates the epistemic quality of in-
formation based on various factors including the reliabilityp of
the process, which has produced information. In the Web there
are several similar kinds of services, which are called "fact check-
ing" services12 [3]:
• Full Fact (www.fullfact.org) which is an independent, non–
partisan, fact–checking charity operating in UK
• FactCheck.org (www.factcheck.org) which is a project of the
Annenberg Public Policy Center
• Fact Checker (www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker)
which the Washington Post offers to its readers
• PolitiFact (www.politifact.com) which is a project of the Tam-
pa Bay Times
• Snopes.com (www.snopes.com) which is founded by David
Mikkelson
• TruthOrFiction (www.truthorfiction.com) which is provided
by Branches Communications, Inc. USA.
11 EU commission has listed authorized digital certificate service providers.
12 This is the case especially in the United States.
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These "fact checking" services operate mainly in the domains of
politics and public press, and facts are usually checked manually
by human beings.13 However, we argue that in the future "fact
checking" services will be expanded into other domains, which
demand high epistemic quality of information. And the evalua-
tion will also be carried out by autonomous, intelligent warrant
agents. But, so far it is a real challenge to create a fully auto-
mated information quality evaluation system [4], and this topic is
outside of the topic of this thesis.
The main objective of using the warrant service is to obtain jus-
tification for the belief in the form of the epistemic quality of the
piece of information stated by a proposition. What is required
from the warrant service? Firstly, the warrant service must eval-
uate the reliabilityp of the process that has created information.
However, there are instances, in which the evaluation cannot be
done reliablyp enough, because required information is not avail-
able. Secondly, the warrant service needs to know the reliabilityp
of its own warranting process.
Let us assume that after the evaluation ISAbdi-A perceives from
the warrant service: "Road 101 is slippery." "Reliabilityp is 0.95."
"Reliabilityp of warrant is 0.86." Warranted by Public Warrant Ser-
vice.”. The third one expresses the reliabilityp of the process of es-
tablishing the warrant. Now, there are two separate factors to be
taken into account when inferring whether or not to announce a
traffic warning. In our scenario this does not fulfil the reliabilityp
requirement for the belief to be knowledge, as the reliabilityp of
the evaluation process is not high, enough. But it is high enough
for the belief "Road 101 is slippery." to be justified belief. ISAbdi-A
declares the traffic warning both to ADC and to HDC.
But is ISAbdi-A dependable? The question is raised, because in
the actual world the traffic alert should be declared. ISAbdi-A op-
erates on the belief, which the reliabilitiesp of the belief forming
and warrant processes are not adequate for it to be knowledge.
And as specified in the scenario ISAbdi-A shall declare the traf-
fic warning, when the belief fulfils the requirementp of justified
belief but does not fulfil the requirementp of knowledge. There-
fore, ISAp-A operates according to its specifications, but due to
the lack of epistemic quality of the perceived piece of information
13 This is the case at at time of writing this thesis.
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ISAbdi-A is not dependable from the viewpoint of users.
Conclusion: In this case we consider ISAbdi-A not to be depend-
able. But the main reason for not being dependable is the lack of
epistemically high enough quality information. In this sense ISAbdi-A
is equivalent to human operated system: without epistemically proper
beliefs it is difficult to act dependably.
The key issues are as follows:
1. Theory: reliabilism and reliabilism via testimony.
2. Who can provide warrant services?
3. There are two factors: the reliabilityp of the belief forming
process, and the reliabilityp of the process, which warrants
the belief.
4. The evaluation of the reliabilityp of the warrant process. An
institute?
5. Is the warrant adequate in the cases, where the reliabilityp
of the belief forming process is not available, at all?
6. We can consider that warrant is the solution in the cases,
where there are no direct data available about the reliabilityp
of the belief producing processes.
3.6 Human being
In this case (illustrated in Figure 11) we assume that ISAbdi-A
perceives the piece of information stated by the proposition "Road
101 is slippery." from a human being via a specific interface, such
as a keyboard, voice, or short message service. There is a require-
ment to know the reliabilityp of the person producing the piece of
information. There are several factors, which can be used in the
evaluation:
1. The accuracy of the person in past action
2. The appropriateness of the person to issue the piece of infor-
mation
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Figure 11: Human Being via warrant Service.
sources of beliefsp 24
3. The consistency of the person in past actions
4. The relevance of the person to issue the piece of information
5. The reputation of the person (history)
6. The timeliness of the piece of information.
How the evaluation itself should actually be carried out is out-
side the topic of this discussion. There are some similarities with
the evaluation of information quality, which has been discussed,
for example, in [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Another approach is the warrant
of persons (for example, the reliabilityp of the process of medical
professors to form beliefs in the domains of their expertise.)
Let us assume that ISAbdi-A perceives the piece of information
stated by the proposition "Road 101 is slippery." from a traffic po-
lice X, and sends the following data to a warrant service for eval-
uation: "Road 101 is slippery." , "Time 02.04.2020 14:00", "Source
traffic police X". Let us assume that the reliabilityp of the traffic
police to produce traffic information has been warranted to be
0.99. The traffic police X is a member of the traffic police, hence
we consider the traffic police X’s reliabilityp to be 0.99, as well.
After the evaluation ISAbdi-A perceives from the warrant service:
"Road 101 is slippery." "Reliabilityp is 0.99." "Reliabilityp of warrant
is 0.99." “Warranted by Public Warrant Service.”. Based on the result
of the warrant service, ISAbdi-A declares the traffic alert both to
ADC and HDC.
Conclusion: In this case we consider ISAbdi-A to be dependable.
The key issues are as follows:
1. Theory: reliabilism and reliabilism via testimony.
2. The reliabilityp of a human being to produce belief.
3. The evaluation or warrant of a human being.
4. The evaluation of the reliabilityp of the warrant process.
5. The warrant is the solution in the case of human beings (ei-
ther beforehand or in real time).
6. The warrant of individual human being is a difficult issue.
Professional individuals?
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7. Does an individual inherit the reliabilityp of the processes
of an organization?
3.7 Social Media (human beings)
In this case (illustrated in Figure 12) we assume that ISAbdi-A
perceives the piece of information stated by the proposition "Road
101 is slippery." from a social media.
We refer social media to be a group of Internet (Web–based)
applications that enable anyone to publish and access information,
collaborate, and build relationships. There are several different
kinds of social media, such as streams (Twitter), discussion boards
(blogs) and forums (Google Groups), social networks (Facebook),
reviews and ratings (Amazon.com), wiki (Wikipedia), wisdom of
the crowd (Reddit), and questions and answers (Answers.com).
Each of these has a different profile of the epistemic quality of
information. For example, the profile of Wikipedia designates to
justified beliefs and knowledge and the profile of Google Groups
designates to beliefs (opinions).
Social media has achieved enormous popularity having over
one billion users. This has resulted in a huge amount of user-
generated information, because everyone can be an information
producer. And the high majority of this information has been
contributed by sources that do not/cannot provide any valid jus-
tification for beliefs. The epistemic quality of user–generated in-
formation can vary significantly from malicious false beliefs to
highly credible justified beliefs (knowledge).
In the year 1997 Strong et.al. suggested that quality of infor-
mation should be established during the manufacturing of the
information [11], but this idea has not gained any popularity in
social media. Social media applications do not provide users with
any metadata about the reliabilityp of the process that has created
a published belief. Therefore to assess the epistemic quality of
beliefs in social media is a huge problem, which is worth sepa-
rate research projects. A similar problem is the trustworthiness
of information in social media, which has been widely studied in
various research projects and presented in a considerable number
of articles, for example, in [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13].
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Figure 12: Social Media via Warrant Service.
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We argue that testimony is not the source of either justification
or knowledge; therefore, a priori epistemic quality of information
received from social media is unknown. There is a possibility that
the source of information does not himself/herself/itself believe
the piece of information that he/she/it distributes. There is also
a possibility that the piece of information has been maliciously
altered. The user of the piece of information either needs to eval-
uate possible justifications, or requests a warrant service to carry
out the evaluation.
Let us assume that ISAbdi-A perceives the piece of information
stated by the proposition "Road 101 is slippery."
1. as a tweet from a person X
2. as a notice from a Facebook group "101 drivers"
3. as a notice from a local traffic police’s blog.
We argue that Twitter application does not provide enough fac-
tors to evaluate the reliabilityp of the information creation process,
that is the reliabilityp of the person X to produce the piece of in-
formation.14 Therefore, ISAbdi-A does not declare even a traffic
notice based on this information. The same applies to the second
case, as well.
Conclusion: In this case our intuition says that ISAbdi-A is depend-
able.
The third case is more interesting, because the reliabilityp of the
processes of the traffic police (the traffic police is a well–organized
public organization) can be evaluated, and the police blog appli-
cation may provide metadata about the reliabilityp. If there is
no such metadata, then ISAbdi-A could carry out a reliabilityp
assessment for the piece of information using, for example, the
following factors: social media application, source, author posi-
tion, and reputation. Reputation comprises the following factors:
past history related to the content creation, responses to the pre-
vious content, and generic interaction with others. As such this
14 For example, there is possibility of a fake profile or the Twitter account might
haven cracked.
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case resembles the case 6 above. Based on the result of the war-
rant, ISAbdi-A declares the traffic alert both to ADC and HDC.
Conclusion: In this case we consider ISAbdi-A to be dependable.
When ISAbdi-A operates on beliefs, which is perceived from social me-
dia, ISAbdi-A shall itself evaluate or request a warrant service to carry
out the evaluation of each piece of information.
The key issues are as follows:
1. Theory: reliabilism and testimony.
2. The epistemic quality of information in various social me-
dia.
3. The reliabilityp of unknown or uncertified human being to
distribute information in various social media.
4. The reliabilityp of the processes of the social media to dis-
tribute information (cracking problems).
5. In reality the piece of information may represent knowledge
but produced via a not–reliablep enough process, which
causes undependable system.
3.8 Common Information Service
In this case (illustrated in Figure 13) we assume that ISAbdi-A
perceives the piece of information stated by the proposition "Road
101 is slippery." from a common information service.
There are several different kinds of common information ser-
vices, such as healthcare information services (e.g. medical records
by Kela15 and Terveyskirjasto by Duodecim16), administrative in-
formation services (e.g. Suomi.fi by Finnish government17), traf-
fic security information services (e.g. Trafi18), domestic security
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Figure 13: Common Information Service.
There are two possibilities: first, the reliabilityp of the informa-
tion creation processes of the common information service has
not been evaluated, and second, the reliabilityp has been evalu-
ated (for example, by a governmental authority). Let us assume
that in the first case ISAbdi-A perceives from a common infor-
mation service "Road 101 is slippery." with associated metadata
"Time 02.03.2020 14:00" "Source Association of Taxi Drivers". There
is no data about the reliabilityp of the Association of Taxi Drivers–
produced information. Thus, the epistemic quality is unknown,
and ISAbdi-A does not declare the traffic notice, warning or alert.
Conclusion: In this case our intuition says that ISAbdi-A is depend-
able.
In the second case, ISAbdi-A perceives from the common infor-
mation service "Road 101 is slippery." with associated metadata
"Reliabilityp is 0.99" "Source Trafi" "Warranted by Trafi" (Figure 13).
Our intuition says that the process of Trafi (based on actions dur-
ing long history) is reliablep enough (without a warrant done by
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another government party) in the domain of traffic services to
produce belief, which creation processes fulfil the reliabilityp re-
quirements for knowledge. Therefore, we consider that the belief
"Road 101 is slippery." is knowledge, and ISAbdi-A declares the
traffic alert.
Conclusion: In this case we consider ISAbdi-A to be dependable.
The key issues are as follows:
1. Theory: reliabilism and reliabilism via testimony.
2. The reliabilityp of various common services to produce in-
formation.
3. The evaluation or warrant of common services.
4. Can a common service be trusted a priori to provide the
reliabilityp data?
5. A belief without any data about the reliabilityp of the belief
creation process shall be neglected.
6. Does an individual inherit the reliabilityp of processes of an
organization?
3.9 Another ISAbdi-X
In this case (illustrated in Figure 14) we assume that ISAbdi-A
perceives the piece of information stated by the proposition "Road
101 is slippery." from another ISAbdi-X.
There are four different cases as listed in Table 3: First, a cer-
tified ISAbdi-X operates on beliefs with embedded metadata pro-
viding the reliabilityp of the belief forming process (and the relia-
bilityp of the justification forming process). Second, the certi-
fied ISAbdi-X operates on beliefs without any data about the
reliabilityp of the belief forming process. Third, the non–certified
ISAbdi-X operates on beliefs with embedded metadata providing
the reliabilityp of the belief forming process (and the reliabilityp
of the justification forming process). Fourth, the non–certified
ISAbdi-X operates on beliefs without any data about the reliabil-
ityp of the belief forming process.
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Figure 14: Another ISA.
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1 2
ISAbdi-X certified ISAbdi-X certified
Reliability of belief known Reliability of belief not known
3 4
ISAbdi-X not certified ISAbdi-X not certified
Reliability of belief known Reliability of belief not known
Table 3: Cases of ISAbdi as source of information.
The first case is an example of testimonially transferred belief,
therefore the key question is the one whether the justification in
the metadata is well–grounded for the receiver of the belief to be
justified to believe or to know the belief. Is there a requirement
for additional justification? The second, third, and fourth cases de-
mand to evaluate the reliabilityp of the belief forming process, for
example, using a warrant service. In other words, the evaluation
of the reliabilityp of the ISAbdi or the reliability of the warrant
service to form or certify such a belief. There are several factors,
which can be used in the evaluation:
1. The manufacturer of the ISAbdi
2. The accuracy of the ISAbdi in past actions
3. The appropriateness of the ISAbdi to issue the belief
4. The consistency of the ISAbdi in past actions
5. The reputation of the ISAbdi (history)
6. The timeliness of the belief.
We argue that ISAbdi as a source of belief is comparable to a
human being. Therefore, the case of the human being (Section 2.6)
is applicable in this case.
The key issues are as follows:
1. Theory: reliabilism and testimony.
2. The reliabilityp of ISAbdi to produce belief.
3. The evaluation or warrant of ISAbdi.
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Figure 15: Activities of Traffic Announcement.
4. The warrant service is the solution in the case of ISAbdi
(either beforehand or in real time).
5. The warrant of an individual ISAbdi is a difficult issue. Can
it be based on the same principles as the warrant of a human
being.
6. Does an individual ISAbdi inherit the reliabilityp of the pro-
cesses of a whole multi-agent system?
We can summarize the above discussion in the form of a UML
activity diagram as illustrated in Figure 15.
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4 ontology of traffic information
system
A simplified ontology of this scenario is illustrated in Figures 16
and 17.
A more detailed ontology can be found in the appendix and in
more readable form on http://www.heimolaamanen.fi .
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Figure 16: Class hierarchy.
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Figure 17: Object property hierarchy.
5 summary
We claimed that in the future intelligent software agents will pro-
duce highly sophisticated services in co–operation (having equal
operational status) with human beings. This requires that ISAbdis
should have similar concepts about the epistemological quality of
information with human beings. In this paper we discussed sev-
eral issues related to the epistemological quality of information in
the contexts of various information sources. We showed that the
epistemological quality of information affect the dependability of
intelligent software agents (actually in a similar way as it affects
the dependability of human beings).
We summarize our discussion in Table 4.
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] Source Theory General Features
1 Sensor Reliabilism Reliability available—either man-




Realiabilism Reliability available—can be eval-
uated from the reliability of
different sources and inferring
methods.
3 Memory Reliabilism Reliability available—can be eval-





Reliabilism Reliability available—can be eval-







Reliability available by third
party—in addition requires re-
liability of justification. Au-




Testimony Reliability is not available — re-




Testimony Reliability is not available—
requires use of warrant service
or new social media application,
which can manage demanded








Reliability either available or not
available depending on the status







Reliability either available or
not available depending on the
ISAbdi-X. May require use of
warrant service or certificated
ISAbdi.

















































PossibleWorlds v ¬ SourceOfInformation
PossibleWorlds v ¬ Data



































∃ hasAffectOn Thing v ∃ hasAffectOn PossibleWorlds
> v ∀ hasAffectOn (∃ hasAffectOn TargetsOfInformation)
hasMetaData
∃ hasMetaData Thing v ∃ hasMetaData SourceSocialMedia
∃ hasMetaData Thing v ∃ hasMetaData SourceCertificationSer-
vice
∃ hasMetaData Thing v ∃ hasMetaData SourceCommonInfor-
mationService
∃ hasMetaData Thing v ∃ hasMetaData SourceHumanBeing
∃ hasMetaData Thing v ∃ hasMetaData SourceISA
∃ hasMetaData Thing v ∃ hasMetaData SourceInferenceService
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∃ hasMetaData Thing v ∃ hasMetaData SourceSensor




∃ hasReliabilityToBeBelief Thingv ∃ hasReliabilityToBeBelief Be-
lief




∃ hasReliabilityToBeJustifiedBelief Thing v ∃ hasReliabilityTo-
BeBelief JustifiedBelief




∃ hasReliabilityToBeKnowledge Thing v ∃ hasReliabilityToBe-
Knowledge Knowledge




∃ hasValueFrom Thing v ∃ hasValueFrom ReliabilityToBeJusti-
fiedBelief
∃ hasValueFrom Thingv ∃ hasValueFrom ReliabilityToBeKnowl-
edge
∃ hasValueFrom Thing v ∃ hasValueFrom ReliabilityToBeBelief
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the chinese room argument 1
1 the chinese room argument
John R. Searle seems to strongly believe that homo sapiens—having
the ability to make and use complex tools—is one of the kind, and
there will never be a digital computer (an artificial entity), which
capabilities (intentionality, understanding, qualia) are equal or ex-
ceeds the ones of human beings. He has tried to prove his ar-
gument and refute the Turing Test[1] with a thought experiment
called Chinese Room (hereinafter CRA). The CRA argument is the
following one [2]1 Suppose that a man is locked in a room and given a
large batch of Chinese writing. Suppose furthermore that the man knows
no Chinese, either written or spoken, and that the man is not even con-
fident that he could not recognize Chinese writing as Chinese writing
distinct from, say, Japanese writing or meaningless squiggles. Now sup-
pose further that after this first batch of Chinese writing the man is given
a second batch of Chinese script together with a set of rules for correlat-
ing the second batch with the first batch. The rules are in English, and
the man understands these rules as well as any other native speaker of
English. They enable the man to correlate one set of formal symbols with
another set of formal symbols, and all that "formal" means here is that
the man can identify the symbols entirely by their shapes. Now suppose
also that the man is given a third batch of Chinese symbols together
with some instruction, again in English, that enable the man to correlate
elements of this third batch with the first two batches, and these rules
instruct the man how to give back certain Chines symbols with certain
sorts of shapes given the man in the third batch. Unknown to the man,
the people who are giving the man all of these symbols call the first batch
"a script", they call the second batch "a story", and they call the third
batch "questions". Furthermore, they call the symbols the man gives
them back in response to third batch "answers to the questions", and the
set of rules in English that they gave the man, they call "the program".
Now just complicate the story a little, image that these also give sto-
ries in English, which the man understands, and they then ask the man
questions in English about these stories, and the man gives them back
answers in English. Suppose also that after a while the man gets so good
at following the instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and
the programmers get so good at writing the programs that from the ex-
ternal point of view—that is, from the point of view of somebody outside
1 The word "I" has been replaced with the word "man" in the text below.
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the room in which the man locked—the man’s answers to the questions
are absolutely indistinguishable from the native Chinese speakers. No-
body just looking at the man’s answers can tell that the man doesn’t
speak a word of Chinese. Let us also supposes that the man’s answers to
the English questions are, as they no doubt would be, indistinguishable
from those of a native English speaker. From the external point of view—
from the point of view of someone reading the man’s "answers"—the
answers to the Chinese questions and the English questions are equally
good. But in the Chinese case, unlike the English case, the man produces
the answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. As far as
the Chinese is concerned, the man simply behaves like a computer; the
man performs computational operations on formally specified elements.
For the purpose of the Chinese, the man is simply an instantiation of the
computer program.
Searle himself summarized his claims in the abstract of his arti-
cle Minds, brains, and programs as follows [2]:
1. "Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of
causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact
about the actual causal relations between mental processes and
brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient
for intentionality. "
2. "Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient
condition of intentionality. The main argument is directed at es-
tablishing this claim. The form of the argument is to show how a
human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the
relevant intentionality. "
These two propositions have the following consequences:
• "The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot
be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a
strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. "
• "Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have
causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a
trivial consequence of 1."
3. "Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong
AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have
to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain."
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The programs implemented by computers are just syntactical, and
they do not responds to the meaning of symbols as minds do. The
main target of the CRA was to argue that there is no artificial enti-
ties based on digital computers having any genuine psychological
properties solely in virtue of its running a program [3]. Searle’s
aim was also to refute the functionalist approach to understand
minds [4]. This is because of that the room not only behaves as if
it understood Chinese, it functions as if it does [3].
Searle’s argument, that because syntax is not sufficient for se-
mantics, programs cannot produce mind, is the following one [3]:
1. Programs are purely formal (syntactic).
2. Human minds have mental contents (semantics).
3. Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of, nor sufficient for,
semantic content.
4. Therefore, programs by themselves are not constitutive of
nor sufficient for minds.
Later in 2002 Searle expressed that his fundamental claim as
follows [5]: "The purely formal or abstract or syntactical processes of
the implemented computer program could not by themselves be sufficient
to guarantee the presence of mental content or semantic content of the
sort that is essential to human cognition. Of course a system might
have semantic content for some other reason, but it does not apply to
Strong Artificial Intelligence, any more. The basic structure of the Chi-
nese Room Argument is rather obvious: the distinction between syntax
and semantics and the distinction between simulation and duplication."
In this statement Searle admits that a system might have seman-
tic content for another reason than Strong Artificial Intelligence
(hereinafter SAI). Then what is the SAI? There is no unambigu-
ous definition. It seems to be a term, which is used to describe a
particular mindset of Artificial Intelligence (hereinafter AI) such
as the goal of the SAI is to develop AI to the level where the
machine’s intellectual capabilities is functionality equal to ones
of human beings. Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig have defined
the SAI as follows [6]: The assertion that machines do actually think-
ing as opposed to simulate thinking. Searle himself has defined the
SAI to be the following one: The appropriately programmed com-
puter really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right pro-
grams can literally said to understand and have other cognitive states
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[2]. Thus, there is a difference between simulating understanding
(thinking) (Weak Artificial Intelligence) and really understanding
(thinking).2 Searle’s definition beg questions: What does he mean
with "literally said to understand"? What is the difference between
real understanding and simulated understanding?
Searle [5] claims that the SAI is a weird mixture of behaviourism
and dualism. It is behaviourist in its acceptance of the Turing Test
and dualist by rejecting the idea that consciousness and intention-
ality are ordinary biological phenomena like digestion. If you
accept the combination of behaviourism and dualism, then it is
natural to think that the mind is a substantive physical process,
and it is something formal and abstract.
It is an open question what sorts of systems are necessary and
sufficient to produce consciousness and intentionality, and it is
likely to remain open until we figure out how brains do it. In or-
der to create consciousness you have to create mechanism which
can duplicate and not merely simulate the capacity of the brain to
create consciousness [5]. Thus, Searle argues that in this case there
is a substantial difference between simulation and duplication.
The CRA has raised a lot of writings and published articles
discussing of the possibility of digital computers to understand
language or think. In the late 70’s and earlier 80’s, at the time
when John R. Searle wrote his article, AI was experiencing its first
real hype; there was no limits what AI could do in the future. But
it turned out that the development and implementation of algo-
rithms required to fulfil the promises of AI were at that time too
difficult, because of the inadequate state of computer science and
low performance of computers. AI [3] was seen to be an attempt
to design and build computer systems, which display a range of
genuine psychological attributes such as problem-solving, think-
ing, understanding, and reasoning. In addition, an ultimate goal
AI was to produce consciousness, feeling, and emotion. Thus,
mental processes are seen to be computational processes over for-
mally defined elements. We need to regard the CRA in this back-
ground.
Is Searle correct when claiming that a digital computer is just
a device that manipulates symbols without a possibility to have
semantics, understanding, or consciousness? AI and the perfor-
2 As the CRA is about understanding, I mainly concentrate on understanding and
not on other properties of intentionality.
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mance of computers have progressed significantly during the last
30 years, and this sets the CRA into a more challenging frame-
work. At the moment we are experiencing the hype of AI, once
again. For example, a computer applications based on AI has won
best human players on television quiz show Jeopardy3 indicating
understanding of natural languages and stories, and robots are
shown to provide elderly people with healthcare and social care,
or develop their own language and teach it to other robots indi-
cating to have mental contents [7]. I will evaluate the CRA in
this new framework in this essay, but at first I present the major
replies to the Chinese Room Argument.
2 replies to the chinese room ar-
gument
There are several different approaches to reply to the CRA. The
main lines are the following ones [4]:
• The man in the room does not understand Chinese, but ex-
ecuting the program (as a whole) may establish something
that understands Chinese.
• A different kind of a computer system (e.g. robot) could
understand Chinese.
• The scenario is not feasible and our intuitions in such cases
are unreliable. For example, what does Searle mean by "un-
derstand" and "intentionality"?
2.1 The Systems Reply
Searle has said that the Systems Reply is the most common one.
According to the Systems Reply the man in the room does not
understand English, but the man is just a part in a larger sys-
tem, and the larger system as a whole understands Chinese. Sev-
eral philosophers (Ned Block, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, John
Haugeland, and Ray Kurzweil) have supported the System Reply.
3 www.jeopardy.com
replies to the chinese room argument 6
Searle has responded to the Systems Reply by stating that even
though the man can internalize the whole system and leave the
room and wander outdoors conversing Chinese, the man still
would have no way to attach "any meaning to the formal symbols".
The man would be the entire system, yet he still would not un-
derstand Chinese. The System has no more means to attach se-
mantics to the Chinese symbols than the person in the room has,
because a system can have no psychological properties not pos-
sessed by its subsystems [3].
2.2 The Virtual Mind Reply
The key idea of the Virtual Mind Reply is that even though the
man in the room does not himself understand Chinese, the im-
portant thing is that understanding is created. An active system
may create new, virtual, entities that are distinct from the sys-
tem as a whole or the subsystems (e.g. central processing unit
and memory). A virtual entity may create an agent that under-
stand Chinese (as an example, Apple’s Siri understands English
reasonably well) [4]. The CRA is wrong in claiming that the SAI
is about "the computer understand Chinese" or "the System under-
stands Chinese", but the appropriate issue for the SAI is whether
"the running computer creates understanding of Chinese". We should
distinguish between minds and their realizing systems. The CRA
cannot controvert the following the SAI claim: it is possible to cre-
ate understanding using a programmed digital computer [4]. This
kind of approach is supported by following philosophers: Marvin
Minsky, Aaron Sloman, Monica Croucher, David Chalmers, and
Ned Block. Searle has not actually responded properly to the Vir-
tual Mind Reply.
2.3 The Robot Reply
The Robot Reply [4] agrees with Searle that a computer in a com-
puter room cannot understand a language, or know what words
mean. Understanding and knowing require proper connections
to the external world. Therefore, the Robot Reply suggests that a
digital computer is put into a robot body provided with required
perception equipment, and effectors equipment to move around
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and to manipulate its environment. This kind of a robot could
learn by seeing and doing. It can attach meanings to symbols,
and thus actually understand a natural language. This approach
supports externalist semantics by stating that suitable causal con-
nections with the world can give a semantic meaning to internal
symbols. Therefore, a robot can have propositional attitudes. Tim
Crane [4] argues that "The proper response to Searle’s argument is:
Sure, Searle–in–the–room, or the room alone, cannot understand Chi-
nese. But if you let the outside world have some impact on the room,
meaning or ’semantics’ might begin to get a foothold. But of course,
this concedes that thinking cannot be simply symbol manipulation." .
Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, and Georges Rey have supported the
Robot Reply.
Searle considers that the Robot Reply to the CRA is not any
better than the Systems Reply, because sensors just provide addi-
tional (only syntactic) input to the computer. Searle argues that
this syntactic input will do nothing to allow the man to associate
meanings with Chinese characters [4]. Searle claims that there
is a wrong level of causation. The robot Reply leaves out the
normative dimension of intentional concepts, as intentionality is
irreducible [3]. Stevan Harnad argues that feelings—such as the
feeling of understanding—are missing [8].
2.4 The Brain Simulator Reply
The Brain Simulator Reply supposes that a computer simulates
the actual sequences of nerve operations that occur in the brain—
connectionism—of a native Chinese language speaker when that
person understands Chinese. Since the computer operates the
very same way as the brain, it will understand Chinese. Paul and
Patricia Churchland are proponents of this approach.
According to Searle, simulation does not make any difference,
because a simulation of brain activity is not the real thing [4].
Searle agrees that it would be reasonable to attribute understand-
ing to an android system (totally human–like artificial entity), but
only as long as you don’t know how it works. As soon as you
know the truth—it is a computer manipulating symbols on the
basis of syntax, not meaning–you would cease to attribute inten-
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tionality to it [2]. The computational power of neural networks is
no stronger than that Turing machines.
2.5 The Other Minds Reply
The key point of the Other Mind Reply is the following one: “How
do you know that other people understand Chinese or anything else?
Only by their behaviour. Now the computer can pass the behavioural
tests as well as they can (in principle), so if you are going to attribute
cognition to other people you must in principle also attribute it to com-
puters.” [4]. Now, Searle’s reply to this approach contains a very
interesting point [2]: The problem in this discussion is not about how I
know that other people have cognitive states, but rather what it is that I
am attributing to them when I attribute cognitive states to them.
The thrust of the argument is that it couldn’t be just computational pro-
cesses and their output because the computational processes and their
output can exist without the cognitive state. This statement raises the
question: Is Searle attributing same properties as other people
involved in this discussion do?
2.6 The Intuition Reply
According to the Intuition Reply the CRA seems to be based on
intuition on which a computer cannot think or have understand-
ing [4]. Ned Block states that Searle’s argument depends for its
force on intuitions that certain entities do not think. But this begs
a question: Is this kind of intuition a correct one, as the progress
of science changes our intuitions (the sun does not orbit anymore
around the earth). Therefore, it seems to be impossible to settle
these questions without employing a definition of the term ’under-
stand’ that can provide a test for judging the hypothesis is true or
not.
AI researchers Herlbert Simon and Stuart Eisenstadt argue that
various attributions of mentality—such as understanding—can be
associated with programs by using "intentions" that determine ex-
tensions. Daniel Dennett claims the CRA is "clearly a fallacious
and misleading argument..." For example, the technology of au-
tonomous robotic cars has proven the CRA to be invalid argu-
ment.
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3 issues on syntax and semantics
One of the key points of Searle’s claims against the SAI is that
syntax is not sufficient for semantics, therefore programs cannot
produce minds [4].
1. Programs are purely formal (syntactic).
2. Human minds have mental contents (semantics).
3. Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of, nor sufficient for,
semantic content.
4. Therefore, programs by themselves are not constitutive of
nor sufficient for minds.
This argument relies on the linguistic distinction between syntax
and semantics (syntactical properties and semantic properties).
Searle points out that "formal symbols by themselves can never be
enough for mental contents, because the symbols, by definition, have
no meaning (or interpretation, or semantics) except insofar as someone
outside the system gives it to them." This is an interesting aspect,
because it begs questions: What is the significant difference between
a human learning a symbol and a meaning of the symbol and an AI
application (for example a robot) learning a symbol and a meaning of
the symbol? What is the significant difference between a human act-
ing based on the meaning of the symbol correctly and an AI application
acting based on the meaning of the symbol correctly?
What does the first premise actually mean? It is not quite clear
what the term program means? In computer science, a program is
a specific set of operations for a computer to perform. As such,
the program is not an entity that has any active or causal role in its
environment; it is just a combination of bits in a computer mem-
ory or a print on a paper sheet. Thus, I agree that in this sense
of the term program the first premise is true. But, this changes,
if Searle means with the term program a running program, which
is called process in computer science4. A process in a robot can
have causal relationships with its environment, and there exist
counter-factual worlds; thus the robot may have semantics5. But
4 We can assume that this is the case, as Searle mentions "instantiating a computer
program" in the abstract of his article.
5 It is quite possible to build a robot that can be taught to order and bring me a
pizza instead of a hamburger from a restaurant.
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now, Searle argues that it is not the right kind of the causal rela-
tionship [9].
Let us have a following thought experiment: We have two ex-
actly similar rooms, which have equipment to carry out the fol-
lowing training session. On the floors there are several tools, such
as a screwdriver, a hammer, a saw, etc.. In one room there is
a child to whom a man teaches the tools, and in another room
there is a robot6 to which another man teaches the tools. The
teaching session goes in the following way: The teacher says to
the child/robot "Bring me hammer.". As, at the first time, the
child/robot does not know which tool is hammer, she/it picks
up an arbitrary object which happens to be the screwdriver, and
brings it to the teacher. The teacher says in both cases: "No, this
is not hammer; this is screwdriver. The child/robot takes the
screwdriver back to its place. Next the child/robot takes the
hammer and brings it to the teacher. The teacher says in both
cases: "Yes, this is hammer, thank you". Next the teacher says to
the child/robot "Bring me screwdriver.". Now, the child/robot
does know, which tool is the screwdriver, she/it brings the screw-
driver. The teacher says in both cases: "Thank you".7
Now, according to Searle, the child (mind) has a mental con-
tent (semantics), but the robot does not have a mental content
(semantics thus understanding). The robot only simulates8 under-
standing of the meanings of the symbols, and there is not the right
kind of the causal relationship9 [9]. My intuition says that in both
cases there is semantics involved. Searle’s statement in context of
the Brain Simulator Reply "It would be reasonable to attribute under-
standing to an android system, but only as long as you don’t know how
it works. As soon as you know the truth—it is a computer manipulating
symbols on the basis of syntax, not meaning–you would cease to attribute
intentionality to it." is interesting indicating that Searle is attribut-
ing to human some mystique properties (e.g. a hidden property
of understanding, which is Searle’s account of non-formal causal
6 The robot has required visual tools to recognize various objects, and limbs to
move and catch objects.
7 This though scenario can be extended by adding a teach session discussing,
what can be done with hammer and screwdriver.
8 It cannot be duplication, because we don’t know yet how brain actually pro-
duces understanding and what are the limits of understanding (mind).
9 According to Searle the causal relationship should be bottom-up relationship
and not input-output relationship.
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power of the brain created by a biological entity.) which cannot
be reproduced artificially using a digital computer.10
The third premise raises a question about what Searle actually
means with the term "syntax by itself". I argue that it is quite
feasible that we can have semantics expressed with a program
(e.g. using semantic web languages) in a similar way as a human
mind expresses semantics with a natural language, and semantics
expressed in this way gets its content in the execution of the pro-
gram. Today’s examples of a robot developing its own language
defining terms about its surroundings and teaching the language
to another robot [7], and of an application based on AI that wins
the best human players in quiz game called Jeopardy prove that
programs (a.k.a process) might be constitutive of and sufficient
for a kind of minds11.
Thus, I argue that the above argument is either valid (the first
interpretation of the term program), but it says nothing about mod-
ern applications based on AI, or it is not valid (the second inter-
pretation of the term program).
David Cole and Daniel Dennett, among others, support the idea
that a computer running a program is not the same as syntax
alone. A computer is an enormously complex electronic causal
system. Actually Dennett argues that programming is precisely
what could give something a mind — but only on organic, hu-
man brains. He also argues that Searle has apparently confused
a claim about the underivability of semantics from syntax with a
claim about the underivability of the consciousness of semantics
from syntax [10]. Georges Rey and David Chalmers argues that
a realization is not just a structural mapping, but involves causa-
tion, supporting counterfactuals. "This point is missed so often: the
syntactically specifiable objects over which computations are defined can
and standardly do possess a semantic: it is just that the semantics is not
involved in specification." [4].
10 Of course, one could consider counterfactually than when human being knows
in the future the truth about how a mind is created by a human brain, one could
cease to attribute intentionality to it ;-).
11 Please, see http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/ibmwatson/
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4 issues about intentionality and
consciousness
A lot of discussion about the capability of a computer to be a
mind deals with intentionality. Intentionality is the power of mind
to be about, to represent, or to stand for things, properties and
states of affairs. It is a pervasive feature of many different men-
tal states, such as beliefs, hopes, judgements, intentions, and love.
[11] But intentionality is not yet well-understood, and there are
many open issues; for example, how mind does create intention-
ality. Searle has not specified an account of intentionality that is
precise enough, and until Searle does it, it is an open question
whether the SAI could produce intentionality, or whether it is be-
yond its scope.
According to Searle consciousness is the necessary condition of
intentionality, and we can interpret the states of computer as hav-
ing content, but the states themselves do not have original inten-
tionality. It is consciousness that is lacking in digital computers.
[4] On the other hand, Ray Kurzweil argues that AI systems can
potentially have such mental properties as understanding, intelli-
gence, consciousness and intentionality, and will exceed human
abilities in these areas12. And Daniel Dennett is of the opinion
that all intentionality is derived, and attributions of intentionality
are instrumental and allow to predict behaviour. Fred Dretske
sees intentionality as information–based, and a state of the world
may carry information about other states in the world. This in-
formational aboutness is a mind–independent features of states.
Searle claims that the kind of intentionality that computers appar-
ently display is not the kind which humans display [3]. The level
of consciousness varies quite a lot from human to human, from
animal to animal and exhibits itself in different ways, thus there
is not an ubiquitous phenomena called consciousness. As long
as the philosophy of the mind and neuroscience cannot answer
properly the questions "how does mind create consciousness?", "how
is intentionality established?, and "what is real understanding?" the
claims of the CRA about consciousness remain unsolved.
12 Please see the book Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans
Transcend Biology
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5 some other thoughts
Searle argues that the Chinese Room thought experiment proves
it to be untrue that the machine can literally be the said to understand
the story and provide the answers to questions [2]. This claim is based
on two fundamental logical truth: First, syntax is not semantics,
and secondly, simulation is not duplication [5]. However, Searle
does not explicate well enough what he means with the phrase
"literally be said to understand". According to WordNet13 the word
"understand" is explicated in the context of language as follows:
"make sense of a language" [12]. I agree that the man in the Chinese
Room does not make sense of Chinese. But I argue that the robot
in the thought experiment in section 3 have learnt some English
and does make sense of what it has learnt. Now, what might
"literally" mean? Searle discusses the right kind of the causal rela-
tionship to be a form of ’bottom–up’ causality, where the specific
neurobiological processes in the brain establish intentionality, un-
derstanding, etc. Searle seems to claim that this kind of the causal
relationship is possible only for biological entities; all other kinds
of causal relationships (e.g. implemented using digital computers)
are either wrong kinds—input–output—or a simulation of the bi-
ological causal relationship. Does the robot duplicate or simulate
the capability of understanding exercised by the child when show-
ing to make sense of the English utterance "Bring me screwdriver."
by collecting the right item from the floor and taking it to the
teacher? This is a difficult issue. My intuition says that it is dupli-
cation, because the causal result of "understanding" is same in the
real world.14 But I am not quite confident of my intuition. Based
on this discussion I am of the opinion that Searle seems to have
built a sandbox in which he can argue and be right that the SAI
is false. But is the CRA meaningful in the domain of modern AI,
anymore?
I see that both the Turing test and the Chinese Room thought
experiment are outdated from the viewpoint of AI. But as the ar-
gument to refute the computationalist and functionalist theories
of mind the CRA has the role in the philosophy of mind. The term
Strong AI as it is specified by Searle is no longer relevant in the
13 A lexical database for English published by Princeton University.
14 An example: simulation of heart in a virtual world versus artificial heart actually
taking care of the blood circulation.
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context of AI, and AI people are more discussing about the term
superintelligence. Superintelligence refers to artificial entities that
greatly outperform the best current human minds in most general
cognitive domains. As Nick Bostrom in his book Superintelligence:
Paths, Dangers, Strategies states that an artificial intelligence need
not much resemble a human mind. Artificial intelligence will have
very different cognitive architectures than biological intelligences
[13]. Therefore, instead of the Turing test and the CRA we should
consider whether an artificial entity can act as a full member of
a society fulfilling adequately its responsibilities as the member
of the society (equally to a human member of the society)? For
example, can there be a robot that could autonomously operate
a cancer patient as well as a human surgeon, or can there be an
avatar that can provide students with a lecture series about phi-
losophy of mind at a university, or can there be an autonomous,
intelligent, honest software agent that acts a politician in a parlia-
ment?
My personal opinion can be summarized in the following claims:
1) Externalist attitude: states of a physical entity get their con-
tent through causal connections to the external reality they rep-
resent (Fred Dretske, Hilary Putnam, and Jerry Fodor). This is
not limited only to human beings. 2) A computer might have
propositional attitudes if it has the right causal connections to
the world. (Jerry Fodor). 3) The syntactically specifiable objects
over which computations are defined can and standardly do pos-
sess a semantic; it’s just that the semantics is not involved in the
specifications (Georges Rey) [14]. For example, in the context of
Intelligent Software Agents we can have semantics involved us-
ing metadata about information. 4) For example, intentional state,
just as belief, can be split into two distinct properties: conscious
awareness of the belief and intentional state; thus, to allow attri-
bution of intentionality to systems that can learn (Fred Dretske).
Intentional state is the key idea, here. 5) Programming is precisely
what could give something a mind (Daniel Dennett).
6 summary
John R. Searle has succeeded in raising a lot of discussion of the
capabilities of artificial intelligence to create human-like minds.
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He argues that his Chinese Room Argument proves that instanti-
ating a program is never either constitutive or sufficient for minds.
The many issues raised by the Chinese Room argument may not
be settled until there is a consensus about the nature of meaning,
its relation to syntax, and about the biological basis of conscious-
ness. There continue to be significant disagreement about which
processes create meaning, understanding, and consciousness.
I see that the main weaknesses of John R. Searle’s arguments
are as follows: 1) Terms, such as understand, intention, and con-
sciousness are not unambiguously explicated, well enough. Are
we arguing about same issues? 2) John R. Searle seems assume
that human beings have some kind of higher level metaphysical
entity that explains the ’superiority’ features over artificial entities.
Therefore, the terms understand, intention, and consciousness are
not possible for any kind of digital computers. 3) The Chinese
Room Argument is outdated, nowadays.
Today’s examples of the results of modern artificial intelligence
indicate that the actual issue is not whether a digital computer
with the right program can be a mind, but does superintelligence
greatly outperform the best current human minds in most general
cognitive domains?
Anyway, anthropomorphism still seems to be a difficult issue,
especially from humanistic point of view, as Sir Anthony Kenny
pointed out in his first Georg Henrik von Wright lecture at the
University of Helsinki [15].
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